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Abstract
In this thesis, we study the impact of competitive scenarios on individual and team behaviour.
In chapter one, we study experimentally the role of leadership in teams facing a game with
a complex strategy space. Teams of three members face an instance of a team dispatching
problem, in which the members jointly devise then separately implement a plan to visit a set
of locations on a map. Some teams have one member designated as a “leader”, although this
role does not confer any distinct responsibility or capability in the game. We compare the
performance of teams with elected leaders, appointed leaders, and no leaders. We find that
teams with leaders perform better than those without, while teams with elected leaders and
teams with appointed leaders perform similarly. Our results indicate that electing a leader serves
as a device to coordinate team activity, and is valuable primarily when a team needs to be able
to deliver well immediately. We find that teams with leaders are more confident than those
without, but this additional confidence is in line with those teams’ superior performance.
In chapter two, we study experimentally the effects of individual skill in a real-performance
task and the responsiveness of individual skill to various incentive schemes. Participants faced
instances of the Truck Dispatch Problem, in which they devised three journeys which visit a
set of locations on a map. Some participants were remunerated under a rank order tournament
incentive scheme, some participants were informed of their performance ranking and were given
a fixed rate whilst some participants were remunerated under a fixed rate incentive scheme.
We find evidence for individual skill differences in the task, but that the distribution of these
differences does not depend on the incentive treatment.
In chapter three, we study empirically the effects of domestic and international football
tournaments on domestic abuse in England and Wales and how these effects vary with people’s
expectations of the football match outcomes. Previous studies on domestic abuse and football in
England and Wales have focused primarily on international tournaments and have not taken into
account the effects of expected match outcomes. This is surprising given the visibility of the
English Premier League (EPL). We find in our analysis, that the existence of an EPL fixture is
associated with a 1% percent increase in domestic violence while the existence of a FIFA World
Cup fixture is associated with a 3% increase in domestic violence in England and Wales. Our
results, also suggest that expected match outcomes have strong effects on domestic violence in
England and Wales.
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Competition as a situation in which at least two individuals (or groups) vie for the same goal
which can only be attained one person (group) has vast applications in everyday life. These can
range from encouraging higher levels of performance in a firm, to encouraging better sports-
manship in the sports field and even encouraging better scholarship in the colleges. These
competitive settings, have been found to affect human behaviour in various ways. These effects
can be good: competition can lead to improvements in productivity (Nalbantian et al., 1997)
or lead to better team coordination (Bornstein et al., 2002; Riechmann and Weimann, 2008);
or bad: competition can lead to a waste of effort expenditure (Sheremeta, 2018), increased
likelihood of dishonest behaviour (Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010), negative effects on
well being (Brandts et al., 2006) particularly when rivalries run deep (Kilduff et al., 2012) and
poorer performance of females relative to males in competitive environments (Gneezy et al.,
2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004).
In this thesis we approach competition from two broad perspectives. First, we consider
competition as a motivator of performance and second, we consider competition as a source
of emotional stimulus. As motivator of performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), the relative
performance of individuals (groups) in a competition can serve as the standard against which
their remuneration depends. This type of remuneration system is known the rank order tour-
nament incentive scheme (system). In the first two chapters of this thesis, we use the rank
order tournament incentive scheme to encourage the performance of teams and individuals in a
real-performance task which we introduced to the experimental literature.
In chapter one, we focused primarily on how teams might perform in a competitive setting
when they either have to self organise of have a named leader. In chapter two we study the
responsiveness of individual performance, in a real-performance task, to various remuneration
schemes. The tournament incentive scheme comprises of the idea that your payment is contin-
gent on you ranking. It is possible that people might care about their ranking more than they
care about their payment, or might care about their ranking before it determines their payments.
In chapter two, we break the tournament incentive scheme into some of its components and
study how the performance of individuals respond when payments are dependent on ranking
and when rankings are known but payments are independent of ranking.
In chapter three, we consider competition experienced vicariously as an emotional stimulus.
The outcome of competition, when experienced directly can affect emotions such that happi-
ness can result from the satisfaction of winning and sadness can result from the pain of losing
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Interestingly, the outcome of competition, even when experienced indi-
rectly, can have strong effects on emotions i.e. the joy or sadness of a sports fan based on the
performance of their supported team (Spaaij, 2014).
We explore this indirect effect of competition in chapter three, where we investigate the
effects of the outcome of major sporting (football) tournaments on domestic abuse in England
and Wales.
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Chapter 1
Leadership in Complex Games: A
Laboratory Experiment
In this chapter, we study experimentally the role of leadership in teams facing a game with
a complex strategy space. Teams of three members face an instance of a team dispatching
problem, in which the members jointly devise then separately implement a plan to visit a
set of locations on a map. Some teams have one member designated as a “leader”, although
this role does not confer any distinct responsibility or capability in the game. We compare
the performance of teams with elected leaders, appointed leaders, and no leaders. We find
that teams with leaders perform better than those without, while teams with elected leaders
and teams with appointed leaders perform similarly. Our results indicate that electing a
leader serves as a device to coordinate team activity, and is valuable primarily when a team
needs to be able to deliver well immediately. We find that teams with leaders are more
confident than those without, but this additional confidence is in line with those teams’
superior performance.
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1.1 Introduction
Many activities require coordination among a small team. Clubs, musical bands, and sporting
teams are groups which act jointly to discover how best to organise an event, write a hit song, or
win a championship. Firms often screen job candidates in part on their perceived ability to act
effectively and take initiative within the context of teams. Managerial practice often encourages
employees to develop leadership skills, through a combination of training and personal devel-
opment, to support the effective operation of small teams. One motivation for this can be to
“flatten” organisational hierarchy, so no individual need be named as leader or manager.
Meanwhile, in professional team sports such as soccer and rugby football, the identity of
the player who is named “captain” is a topic of great interest among sports journalists and fans
alike. Although the captain (often) does not have a functional role specified by the rules of the
game, the naming or removal of a captain can create a greater furore than decisions about who
is in or out of the squad, and therefore eligible to play. Although flat, non-hierarchical teams
without formally identified leaders may hold some attraction for organisations, in the belief
(or hope) that leaders will emerge naturally, experience from sports suggests people believe a
named leader is important for team performance.
Experimental economics has extensively studied the effect of leadership on coordinating
the activities of a group. Many laboratory studies have used coordination games, specifically
those with multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria, as the theoretical framework for defining the
task facing a group of participants. Van Huyck et al. (1990) showed experimentally that play
in a coordination game may converge to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, and proposed strate-
gic uncertainty as a reason for this coordination failure.1 Cooper et al. (1990) proposed that
strategic uncertainty could result from the existence of multiple plausible rules for selecting
from a game’s set of equilibria, including for example payoff dominance (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988), risk dominance (Van Huyck et al., 1990) and focal points (Schelling, 1980). Devetag
and Ortmann (2007) have surveyed the types of games used to examine the reasons for these
coordination failures.
Calvert (1992) posits that a group’s recognition of the strategic uncertainty in a coordination
problem underpins demand for leadership within the group. This idea has been developed
further by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Dessein et al. (2016). Calvert (1992) further
argues that leadership helps to satisfy this demand and reduce strategic uncertainty by imparting
focal properties onto some equilibria which otherwise lack them. Leadership can bring this
about by use of selective incentives (Olson, 1971), explicit communication (Dewan and Myatt,
2008), or by sending a signal (Wilson and Rhodes, 1997) which may can be costly (Hermalin,
1998; Majumdar and Mukand, 2004).
The experimental evidence on leadership and coordination largely supports the above ar-
guments. Managers can use targeted changes in financial incentives to improve performance
1Although play may converge to an equilibrium, we will follow Van Huyck et al. in referring to a situation in
which a group is stuck at a Pareto-inferior equilibrium as an instance of “coordination failure”.
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(Brandts and Cooper, 2006). However, communication from leaders can be equally or even
more effective, even in the absence of the ability to target incentives (Brandts and Cooper,
2007).
The effectiveness of a leader depends on the group’s perception of him or her. Wilson and
Rhodes (1997) studied a setting in which a group’s leader could send a signal to the group. In
their experiment, there were two leader types: a good leader type who could send group-serving
signals, and a bad leader type who could send self-serving signals at the group’s expense. They
found that if the leader type and by extension the leader’s credibility was questionable, coordi-
nation suffered significantly. The legitimacy of a leader, that is, the process through which a
person attains a named leadership role, also has been argued to affect the ability of a leader to
influence group performance. Brandts et al. (2014) compared the efficacy of appointed leaders
and elected leaders to bring about coordinated change in the turnaround game, and found that
groups with elected leaders performed better.
The importance of credibility and legitimacy is also identified in the social psychology lit-
erature. Legitimacy is seen as set of complex attitudes held by followers towards the person
of the leader as well as the process that named the leader (Hollander and Julian, 1969; Read,
1974; Bass and Stogdill, 1990). Within this body of literature there is evidence that the process
of assigning leaders matters for the efficacy of leadership (Goldman and Fraas, 1965). Election
often leads to stronger legitimacy and thus better leader-follower relations as investments in and
expectations of the leader are higher, especially when compared to leadership named by random
appointment (Ben-Yoav et al., 1983).
Timing also plays a role in the usefulness and effectiveness of leadership. Bolton and Farrell
(1990) argue that leadership, defined as a central authority or planner, is more efficient when
the group must take a decision under time pressure, and/or when members of the group do not
hold private information relevant to determining the best decision. Calvert (1992) notes that
leadership is more efficient for coordination when the group lacks a long social history, for
example, if it is newly-formed or if membership in the group is transient.
By using coordination games with relatively small strategy spaces (typically under 10 choices),
the experimental economics literature has focused on leadership as a way to address strategic
uncertainty arising from competing equilibrium selection rules. However, many groups oper-
ate in complex environments, in which identifying candidate solutions in the first place is an
important part of the decision-making process. When the strategy space is sufficiently large,
cognitive constraints imply group members will be able to consider only a small subset of al-
ternatives, and likewise may not conceive fully of the outcomes associated with the alternatives
they do consider.
In this chapter, we address the hypothesis that leadership can have additional value in com-
plex environments by shaping the process the group uses to identify the options to give fuller
consideration to. Teams with three members are assigned to one of three leadership treatments:
some teams have no named leader, some have a named leader who is appointed, and some a
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named leader who is elected by the team members. The teams are presented with combinatoric
routing problems, and given financial incentives to propose the most efficient routing they can
find. In our experiment, leadership is only a label which does not confer any additional infor-
mation or capability to the leader. We find that having a named leader significantly improves
the quality of the routes teams propose. However, the process of naming the leader does not
have an effect: teams with elected leaders and those with appointed leaders propose routes of
similar quality.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce the team dispatching problem,
a combinatoric optimisation problem well-suited to address our research questions. Section 1.3
describes our implementation of the team dispatching problem as a laboratory experiment. Sec-
tion 1.4 lists our main research hypotheses. Section 1.5 presents our analysis of our results.
Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion.
1.2 The Team Dispatching Problem
We introduce to the literature in experimental economics a new group decision-making task, the
team dispatching problem (TDP), as a setting to study group dynamics and the role of leadership
when the set of feasible strategies is large. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study
to explore how human subjects perform in the TDP. The TDP is a variation on the well-known
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) in combinatorial optimisation. In the TSP, a decision-maker
is presented with a number of locations on a map. A feasible solution (i.e. a strategy) for the
decision-maker is a route which starts at a home location, visits each other location once, and
then returns to the home location. The decision-maker’s objective is to find the feasible route
which involves traveling the shortest distance.
The TSP is an example of a combinatorial optimisation problem. It it classified as an NP-
hard problem. There is no known algorithm which can solve an NP-hard problem in time
proportional to a polynomial function of the problem size. In principle only exhaustive enu-
meration of all possible feasible routes ensures that the optimal one will be found. If there
are N locations to be visited, the number of feasible routes is proportional to N !. There do
exist heuristic algorithms for identifying “good” but not necessarily optimal solutions. These
do not result in a guarantee of finding the optimal route because making local improvements
to a route, such as swapping the order in which two locations are visited, is not guaranteed to
converge monotonically to the optimum.
There is a limited literature in psychology studying human performance in the TSP. Mac-
Gregor and Ormerod (1996) studied the performance of subjects in the laboratory on TSPs with
10 locations and with 20 locations. They found that with maps of this size, human performance
was comparable to that of heuristic algorithms. Therefore, although the task is sufficiently chal-
lenging that people do not frequently find the optimal solution, nevertheless it is possible for
them to make useful progress on finding a reasonably good one. MacGregor and Ormerod did
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not find significant variation in performance across subjects, in that a subject who submitted a
close-to-optimal solution for one map was not more likely to submit a close-to-optimal solution
on another map.
The TDP modifies the TSP by having a group of several agents who jointly must visit all
of the locations on the map. The TDP was first formulated by Dantzig and Ramser (1959) as
the Truck Dispatching Problem. Each member of the group can make one journey, which starts
at the home location, visits no more than n < N other locations, and then returns to the home
location. A feasible route is therefore a collection of journeys, one for each member of the
group, in which each locations is visited exactly once by exactly one member of the group, and
no member of the group visits more than n locations. Like the TSP, the objective is to find the
feasible route which minimises the total distance traveled, and the TDP is likewise an NP-hard
problem.
Dantzig and Ramser (1959) pose the TDP as an optimisation problem with a central planner
who defines and coordinates the routes. We use it as the basis for a coordination game with
pre-play communication. Instead of having a central planner, in our TDP the members of a
group choose their respective journeys. Put in game-theoretic terms, a journey is a strategy for
a group member. If group members choose their journeys simultaneously, they face a Pareto-
coordination problem. First, members want to coordinate by choosing journeys which, put
together, form a feasible route. In addition, among those feasible routes, members would prefer
to coordinate on one with a shorter total distance than a route with a longer total distance.
As the number of valid journeys a member can select from is very large, successful coor-
dination requires the members to have some form of guidance regarding how best to divide up
the N locations among the group members before making their choices. In our experiment, the
members of a group engage in pre-play communication in the form of a free-text chat. Cooper
et al. (1992) reported an experiment in which communication between the two players in a
coordination game led to the play of the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Similarly, Blume and Ort-
mann (2007) reported an experiment in which costless pre-play communication led to increased
coordination in games with two or more players. In their experiment, participants played a coor-
dination game for 8 rounds, where strategies were numbered 1 through 7. Prior to each round,
participants were allowed to send a message taken from the set 1 through 7; the distribution
of these messages was made known to the players before they made their strategy decision in
the round. Brandts and Cooper (2007) reported an experiment in which two-way communi-
cation between subjects, labeled as managers and employees, led to better coordination in the
turnaround game.
Within this framework of a group playing a Pareto-coordination game with pre-play commu-
nication, in some treatments a group has one member designated as a “leader”. Viewed entirely
from a standard game-theoretic perspective, a group’s leader plays the same role functionally
as any other member of the group. The leader is able to participate in the pre-play discussion,
and then chooses his or her own, and only his or her own, journey as part of the play of the
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game. The leader role is therefore just a label, which is observed by the group members within
the pre-play communication.
Leaders therefore do not have a central command power as assumed in Dantzig and Ramser
(1959). Instead, our groups have a flat (non-hierarchical) structure, in which some decision-
making ability is vested in each group member. In social psychology, Salas et al. (2005) argue
that within flat teams, communication is one of the major coordinating mechanisms, and lead-
ership emerges organically as a result of this working of the group. Pearce et al. (2008) propose
a theory of shared leadership, in which leadership roles within teams are shared, or shift among
team members depending on the task and the capability of each member.
In contrast, most designs in experimental economics impose a functionally distinct role for
the leader. Leaders may have some private information not available to the group as a whole
(Komai et al., 2011). Communication may be restricted, such that communication between the
leader and group members is possible, but direct communication among the group is prohibited.
(Brandts et al., 2014) Leaders may make the decisions at a different time than other group
members, for example, moving first as a potential exemplar for the rest of the group (Sahin et al.,
2015). The role and efficacy of leadership may be quite different in these more hierarchical
structures than within a flat team (Burke et al., 2006).
1.3 Experimental Design
In each session, we invited 18 participants selected randomly from the standing participant pool
at the Laboratory for Economic and Decision Research (LEDR) at University of East Anglia.
All interaction was mediated via computer, with a program written using zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). Our design consisted of two blocks. In the first block, participants completed seven
instances of the TDP individually, designing all three journeys as in the original optimisation
problem of Dantzig and Ramser (1959). Prior to the second block, our software formed six
teams of three participants each. These teams completed an additional seven instances of the
TDP in the second block.2 In these instances, team members had an opportunity to communicate
first, and then each member simultaneously completed one of the team’s three journeys.
1.3.1 Block One: Individual Solutions
Block One consisted of seven rounds. In each round, participants proposed routes for an in-
stance of a TDP with 13 locations, which were called checkpoints. Each round began with a
decision screen, which displayed the 13 checkpoints as orange triangles on a map 100 units
high by 100 units wide, as in Figure 1.1(a). The starting and ending point for all journeys was
the home base, located in the centre of the map and indicated by an icon of a house. To start
2We selected the 14 TDP instances via a series of pilot exercises. We started with 200 randomly-generated
maps, and selected the 14 which generated the most heterogeneity in proposed solutions. That is, we tried to pick
maps on which reasonable people would disagree as to what the best solution would be.
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a journey, a participant clicked on one of the orange triangles to indicate the first checkpoint
to be visited. A line was drawn from the home base to this checkpoint, and the checkpoint’s
colour changed from orange to grey, indicating that it had been visited. Each checkpoint was
associated with a different letter of the alphabet.3 At the right of the screen was an alphabet flag
box listing all of these letters. Initially all of these letters were grey; a letter changed colour to
orange when the participant visited the corresponding checkpoint.
Figure 1.1: Interacting with the decision screen
(a) At the start of a period (b) Drawing a route (c) After all journeys completed
To continue a journey, the participant then clicked on another orange triangle to visit another
checkpoint. As each checkpoint was visited, the clicked triangle turned grey, the line indicating
the path of the journey was extended, and the corresponding letter turned orange.4 At the left of
the screen, a box displayed, for each journey, the number of checkpoints visited on that journey
and the corresponding distance traveled. Distances were computed as the straight-line distance
between successive checkpoints. Figure 1.1(b) shows what the decision screen looked like in
the middle of the process of inputting a route.
The participant could visit at most five locations on a single journey. The participant could
end a journey at any time by clicking on the home icon. Once the participant had visited five
checkpoints on the current journey, a reminder message appeared at the bottom of the screen,
and the decision screen would only accept a click on the home icon as the next location to visit,
and complete the journey. Figure 1.1(c) shows a typical decision screen after the completion of
all three journeys.
After completing all three journeys in a round, participants saw a score card screen as shown
in Figure 1.2. This screen provided two score cards. At the left was the score card for the
route the participant selected for the current instance of the TDP. This listed, for each journey,
the number of locations visited on that journey, and the distance traveled on the journey. We
rounded the distance for each journey to the nearest integer, and computed the total distance
for the route as the sum of these three rounded distances. The decision screen did not enforce
3The role of assigning letters to each of the locations was to facilitate communication in the team discussions
in Block Two, as will be seen presently.
4We frame this task as being as if the participant is making the journey from checkpoint to checkpoint. There-
fore there was no mechanism to undo a checkpoint visit once the triangle was clicked. We designed all maps so
that checkpoints were sufficiently far apart that accidental clicks on an unintended triangle should not occur.
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Figure 1.2: The score card as shown at the end of a round in Block One. The left card details the
route selected by the participant. The right card is blank, because information on
the performance of the other participant was revealed only at the end of the block.
that the participant provide a feasible route visiting all 13 locations. The score card reported the
number of locations not included in the route, if any, and the total penalty distance of 100 units
per omitted location. The total score was computed as the sum of the distances traveled on the
three journeys, plus any penalty distance for omitted locations.
At the right of the screen was a score card labeled Other’s Score Card for Round j. This
score card had the same structure as the participant’s score card, except all entries contained
question marks. This was to remind participants they were matched with one other participant,
and the comparison of their score against this other participant’s score would determine their
earnings for Block One. However, they would only learn about the routes chosen by the other
participant after all seven rounds of Block One were completed.
After all seven rounds in Block One were completed, one of the rounds was chosen at
random to be the round which would determine earnings for the Block. This was done by
placing seven balls, numbered one through seven, in an opaque bag; the experimenter asked a
participant to reach into the bag and pull out one of the balls. The number on the selected ball
determined the round which was paid.
After the payment round was drawn, the participant saw a summary table as in Figure 1.3.
This table listed, for each round, the participant’s score, and the score of the other participant
with whom they were matched. The round selected for payment was highlighted with an or-
ange background. If the participant’s score was lower than the other’s score in that round, the
participant earned £10 for Block One; if their score was higher, the participant earned £5 for
Block One. In the event of a tie, the participant earned £7.50 for the block. This calculation
was summarised at the bottom of the results screen.
Block One concluded with a screen re-visiting the score cards for the round selected for
1.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 31
Figure 1.3: Summary screen at the end of Block One. The round selected for payment is high-
lighted in orange. The earnings calculation for the Block is summarised at the bot-
tom.
Figure 1.4: The score card as shown at the end of Block One, including the details of the route
selected by the other participant.
payment, as in Figure 2.4. This recapped the same information on the participant’s route in the
given round as they saw it at the end of that round, and adds the details for the other participant’s
route as well.
1.3.2 Block Two: Team solutions
Block Two followed the same general structure as Block One, in that there were seven instances
of the TDP, which participants completed in sequence without information on the performance
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of others. In Block Two, however, participants were formed into teams of three, who jointly
completed one instance of the TDP in each round.
We used the performance of participants in Block One to assign the participants into teams.
The 18 participants in a session were grouped into two cohorts of nine based on the desk at
which they were seated. Within each cohort, we ranked the nine participants in order of their
average score across the seven rounds of Block One. Participants were then assigned to teams
using the schema outlined in Table 1.1. For example, participants of rank 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and
6 were allocated to team 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. This “serpentine” system attempts
roughly to equalise the average skill of participants across teams, as measured by their relative
performances in Block One, such that no team is comprised of only high ranked or low ranked
participants.
Table 1.1: Schema for assigning participants to teams based on their Block One performances.
Member ID Team 1 Team 2 Team 3
Purple Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
Yellow Rank 6 Rank 5 Rank 4
Indigo Rank 7 Rank 8 Rank 9
At this point, teams were assigned to one of the three treatments: elected leader (EL),
appointed leader (AL), or no leader (NL). We rotated which team number, as given by Table 1.1,
was assigned to which treatment, according to Table 1.2. There were equal numbers of cohort
types EAN, ANE, and NEA.
Table 1.2: Schema for allocation of teams to treatment, by cohort type.
EAN cohort ANE cohort NEA cohort
Team 1 EL AL NL
Team 2 AL NL EL
Team 3 NL EL AL
Before the start of Block Two, the experimenter read aloud instructions introducing the rules
of the team version of the TDP. Block Two began with a series of three screens. The content of
the three screens varied based upon the treatment the participant’s team was assigned to. The
verbal instructions made no mention of a team captain; therefore participants were unaware of
the existence of other treatments within the same session.
After the instructions, the first screen of Block Two introduced the organisation of the team,
including that each member of the team would receive a colour name as their identity for the
duration of Block Two. Teams assigned to the elected leader (EL) treatment additionally saw
a message that on the subsequent screen, they would have an opportunity to select a “team
captain”. Teams assigned to the appointed leader (AL) treatment saw a message that a captain
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would be appointed for their team. It was explained that the team captain’s role would be to
click a button to start each round.
On the second screen of Block Two, players learned their colour names, assigned per the
schema in Table 1.1, and also observed the average scores of all three members of their team
in Block One. The best-performing member of each team, as measured by Block One perfor-
mance, was Player Purple; the second-best performing member Player Yellow, and the worst-
performing member Player Indigo. Teams assigned to the elected leader (EL) treatment addi-
tionally had a pair of radio buttons at the bottom of the screen, captioned “Please vote for your
team captain.” There were two candidate, Player Purple and Player Yellow, which the candidate
receiving the majority of votes to be named as captain.5
On the third screen of Block Two, teams in EL learned which candidate had been selected
as the captain. Each cohort included exactly one EL and one AL team. The third screen of
Block Two also revealed the captain to the AL team. The AL captain was always selected to be
the same colour as the successful candidate for the EL team in the same cohort. In this way, the
distribution of the relative performance of the team captain in Block One is comparable between
EL and AL.
Figure 1.5: A chat in progress, for Player Yellow. This team has a captain, Player Purple, indi-
cated by the (C) label in the chat window.
Following the three preliminary screens, each team completed seven instances of the TDP.
Each round began with a chat stage, as in Figure 1.5. At the left of the screen was the map.
Checkpoints on the map were displayed as rectangles labeled with letters of the alphabet.6 At
5By restricting to two candidates, we ensure that ties were not possible. Brandts et al. (2014) used a voting
mechanism in which all members of 6-member groups could vote for any member, including themselves; ties were
broken at random. In Levy et al. (2011) group members (in a 4-member group) could vote for other participants
only; they reported that ties did not occur.
6We used letters to label the checkpoints to offer a convenient shorthand for participants to exchange possible
allocations quickly, e.g. “I’ll take RCHW.” Indeed we found participants often did communicate in this way; see
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the right was a chat window. Messages entered into the chat box were sent immediately to
the other two members of the team. For teams in the EL and AL treatments, the member
designated as the team captain was indicated with a (C) notation, e.g. “Player Purple(C)” or
“Player Yellow(C)”. The chat phase lasted 90 seconds; a countdown on the screen indicated
how much time was remaining in this phase.
The Decision Screen followed the chat phase. The Decision Screen followed the same
structure as the Decision Screen from Block One, except each participant could input only one
journey. The three team members entered their journeys simultaneously, without knowing what
journeys the other members of their team were making. The alphabet labels were removed
from the checkpoints in the Decision Screen. So, if teams did use the labels to discuss possible
journey allocations, participants had to commit to memory which labels corresponded to which
checkpoints before passing from the chat phase to the Decision Screen. A typical Decision
Screen with a route input is shown in Figure 1.6(a).
After all three team members completed their journeys, the next screen displayed the com-
posite route consisting of the three journeys of the team members, as in Figure 1.6(b). As in the
individual TDP Decision Screen, the number of checkpoints visited on each journey and each
journey’s distance were tabulated at left. In addition, the number of omitted checkpoints was
presented.
After the composite route was shown, the team’s Score Card for the round was displayed.
This Score Card was identical in structure to the individual TDP Score Card from Block One
(Figure 1.2). It likewise included question marks for the results of the other team, as the perfor-
mance of the other team was only revealed at the end of the Block.
After completing the seventh and final round, but before seeing the results of the Block,
participants completed some questions which captures (over)confidence.
1.4 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Teams with a named leader (elected or appointed) will perform better, as mea-
sured by task scores, than teams without a named leader.
Recall from our discussion in Section 1.1 that leadership has the capacity of aiding effective
navigation through strategic uncertainty, as well as the capacity of imparting focal qualities on
equilibria or solutions which would otherwise lack them. We anticipate that teams with named
leaders (elected or appointed) will navigate the strategy space of the TDP more effectively and
thus, perform better than teams without leaders.
Hypothesis 2. Teams with an elected leader will perform better, as measured by task scores,
than teams with an appointed leader.
the Results for more details.
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Figure 1.6: The Decision Screen for the team TDP.
(a) A typical Decision Screen for Player Yellow.
(b) A team’s completed route, with the journeys of all three players.
Since the effectiveness of a leader depends on their legitimacy and how they are perceived
by their group. We anticipate, because the process of election is associated with stronger legiti-
macy, that teams with elected leaders will perform better than teams with appointed leaders.
Hypothesis 3. Teams with named leaders will be (more) overconfident about the performance
of their team.
As a group’s recognition of strategic uncertainty in a coordination problem underpins de-
mands for leadership, it is possible that in the presence of a leader a group might feel (over)
optimistic about the group’s ability to navigate strategic uncertainty and perform well on a task.
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Hypothesis 4. The solutions proposed by teams will be better than those proposed by individ-
uals on their own.
Drawing from the experimental literature which argues that teams perform better than indi-
viduals in experimental tasks (Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Maciejovsky et al., 2010), we anticipate
that solutions proposed by teams will be better than solutions proposed by individuals in the
TDP.
Hypothesis 5. In the chat phase, teams with leaders will have fewer journey (or route) propos-
als than teams without leaders.
Drawing from Hypothesis 1, we anticipate that teams with leaders will be more effective
than teams without leaders and therefore more organised. More organised teams will require
fewer journey (or route) proposals than less organised teams when deciding on a team solution
to each instance of the TDP.
1.5 Results
We conducted a total of 15 experimental sessions with 18 participants each, for a total of 270
participants. These participants were grouped in total into 90 teams in Block Two, 30 teams
assigned to each of the treatments NL, AL, and EL.
Let i = 1, . . . , 90 index teams, and T : {1, . . . , 90} → {NL,AL,EL} be the function
mapping each team into its leadership treatment. Let m = 1, . . . , 7 index the seven maps, in
the order in which they were presented to the teams. Let Sim be the score of team i on map
m, which is the total distance traveled by team i on its three journeys, plus any penalties for
omitted flags.
Let i denote a team, t and t′ denote treatments with t 6= t′, and m a map. The winning
percentage of team i on map m, against opponents of type t′ is
Wm(i, t
′) =
1
|t′|
∑
j∈t′,j 6=i
1(Sim < Sjm) +
1
2
· 1(Sim = Sjm), (1.1)
where 1(b) is the indicator function equal to 1 when the boolean condition b is true and 0 other-
wise. The overall winning percentage of team i against treatment t′ isW (i, t′) = 1
7
∑7
m=1Wm(i),
and team i’s winning percentage overall is W (i) = 1
3
∑
t∈{EL,AL,NL}W (i).
Given these, we can compute the winning percentage Vm(t, t′) of teams in treatment t
against those in treatment t′ in map m as Vm(t, t′) = 1|t|
∑
i∈tWm(i), and the overall winning
percentage of teams in treatment t against those in t′ as V (t, t′) = 1|t|
∑
i∈tW (i).
Result 1. Teams with leaders perform better overall than teams without leaders.
Support. Overall, teams with elected leaders outperform those with appointed leaders, who
in turn outperform those with no leaders. Specifically, V (EL,NL) = .581, V (EL,AL) =
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of team winning percentages W (i) by treatment. The boxes indicate
the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the distributions for each treatment.
NL
AL
EL
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
0 .25 .50 .75 1
Team winning percentage W(i)
.536, and V (AL,NL) = .551. To test this more formally, Figure 1.7 plots the distribution of
team winning percentages V (i) by treatment. The median of team winning percentages in NL
is .456, as compared to .524 for AL and .526 for EL. We use the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
(MWW)7 test over the ordinal ranking of teams generated by W (i)8 to compare the distribution
of teams without leaders versus those with leaders. We reject the null hypothesis that winning
percentages without and with leaders come from the same distribution (p-value .026). The effect
size, the chance or probability that a randomly-selected team without a leader outperforms a
randomly-selected team with a leader is r = .356.9
Result 2. Teams with elected leaders perform only slightly better overall than teams with ap-
pointed leaders.
Support. Figure 1.7 suggests that, among teams with leaders, there is little difference between
those whose leaders were elected versus those who were appointed. The upper and lower quar-
tiles are lower for AL than for EL, but medians are very close. The MWW test comparing teams
with appointed leaders to teams with elected leaders is not significant (p = .438, r = .442).
Result 3. Overall teams exhibit overconfidence. Teams with leaders do report more optimistic
assessments of their performance; however, this additional optimism is roughly in line with
those teams’ superior actual performance.
Support. At the end of the experimental session, we asked each participant, “How many rounds
do you think your team won?” Each participant answered this independently of other team
members, prior to knowing the outcomes of Block Two. For each team, we construct a measure
7The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test also known as the Mann-Whitney two sample statistic or the
Wilcoxon Ranksum test is a nonparametric test statistic which tests the hypothesis that two independent samples,
say A and B are from populations within the same distribution. The null hypothesis H0 is that A and B have the
same distribution and the alternative hypothesis H1 is that A and B have different distributions. In conducting the
MWW the observations in both samples are ranked in order of increasing size and ties are averaged. The sum of
ranks for each sample are obtained and compared (Moffatt, 2015; Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
8Note that the calculation of W (i) does not use information about which treatment team i is assigned to.
Therefore, it is suitable to use this ranking as the data for an MWW test.
9We report this effect size (probability) for all MWW tests. We express all MWW tests as population A versus
population B, and the effect size is in the sense of a random member of population A being higher than a random
member of population B.
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Figure 1.8: Team predicted performance versus actual performance. Each point represents one
team. The line plots the linear fit on actual performance as a function of predicted.
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of predicted wins by treatment. The boxes indicate the lower quartile,
median, and upper quartile of the distributions for each treatment.
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of overconfidence (predicted minus actual wins) by treatment. The
boxes indicate the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the distributions
for each treatment.
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of a team’s assessment of their own performance by averaging the three responses of each
team’s members. We can compare this to the team’s actual performance W (i). Figure 1.8 plots
each team’s predicted versus actual performance. Overall, teams expected to win 4.06 out of
the 7 rounds, giving a mean overconfidence of 0.56 wins.10 Overconfidence aside, there is a
positive correlation between a team’s predicted performance and their actual performance. A
10This is consistent with standard results on overconfidence, e.g. Oskamp (1965); Lichtenstein et al. (1977);
Camerer and Lovallo (1999).
1.5. RESULTS 39
Table 1.3: Predicted and actual team performance, by treatment. All cells are averages over all
teams, measured in wins per 7 rounds.
Wins
Treatment N Predicted Actual Overconfidence
NL 30 3.76 3.19 0.57
AL 30 4.26 3.54 0.72
EL 30 4.17 3.78 0.39
Total 90 4.06 3.50 0.56
simple linear regression of actual performance on predicted performance gives
actual performance = 1.592 + 0.470× predicted performance, (1.2)
with an adjusted R2 = .24. Although teams do not get feedback on their performance relative
to that of any other teams, nevertheless teams which actually do well tend to believe they did
well, and vice versa.
Teams without a leader predicted on average 3.76 wins out of the 7 rounds. Teams with
a leader predicted 4.21 wins on average. Figure 1.9 plots the distribution of predicted wins
by treatment. Teams without a leader predict fewer wins than those with a leader (MWW
p = .0095, r = .333). There is no difference in predicted wins between teams with appointed or
elected leaders (MWW p = .81, r = .482). However, the more optimistic assessments offered
by the teams with leaders, are in line with actual performance differences. The last column of
Table 1.8 reports the mean overconfidence by treatment, computed as the difference between
the predicted performance and the actual performance. Figure 1.10 plots the distribution of this
overconfidence measure by treatment. The overconfidence of teams without leaders and with
leaders is not different (MWW p = .77, r = .519). Likewise, teams with appointed leaders do
not differ from those with elected leaders (MWW p = .38, r = .434).11
Figure 1.11: Distribution of team performance against individual solutions.
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Result 4. Over the seven maps, the scores of solutions proposed by teams are not systematically
different than those proposed by individuals.
11Alternatively, a Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that all three treatments have the same
distribution of overconfidence (p = .60).
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Support. We selected the maps used in the sessions based on a series of pilot experiments. In
the pilot experiments, participants completed two blocks of seven maps each, as in Block One
of these experiments, and were incentivised using the same system as in Block One. In the pilot
experiments, we used a wider range of maps. We used the pilot data to select the 14 maps in
our experiment, by choosing maps which generated the largest dispersion of submitted routes
in the individual experiments, with the goal of posing instances of the TDP to teams in which
individual judgments as to what constituted a good solution differed, and therefore it would be
more likely that teams would need to choose among different proposals offered by different
members.
For each map in Block Two, in addition to the 90 observations of team solutions, we have
20 observations of individuals proposing routes on those same maps. We can therefore bench-
mark the performance of a team i by comparing, for each map m, its performance against the
20 solutions proposed by individuals. A team’s overall performance is given by its average
performance over the seven maps. We plot these team-versus-individual winning percentages
in Figure 1.11. The median team-versus-individual winning percentage is exactly .5; the lower
quartile is .375 and upper quartile .629, meaning the distribution is close to being symmet-
ric around .5. Therefore there is no evidence overall that teams perform better or worse than
individuals.
We now turn to the chat transcripts to look for ways in which having a leader might affect
the decision-making process of the team. There are (at least) two coordinated approaches a
team might take in organising the process of identifying and agreeing a plan. In a centralised
approach, one team member can act as a central planner and allocate or propose a journey
to each member of the team. Alternatively, a team may adopt a more decentralised, bottom-
up approach, in which each member of the team makes proposals sequentially for their own
(intended) journey. Either model would result in a total of three journey proposals, while at-
tempting to use a mix of the models or members making proposals simultaneously would lead to
overlapping journeys or missed flags, requiring the proposal of revised journeys. This suggests
using the number of proposals per chat period as a measure of team organisation.
Figure 1.12: Distribution of proposals by treatment. The boxes indicate the lower quartile, me-
dian, and upper quartile of the distributions for each treatment.
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Result 5. In the chat phase, teams with leaders have fewer journey or route proposals than
teams without leaders.
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Table 1.4: Number of proposals per team, across all rounds.
Proposals
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev.
NL 30 25.23 3.05
AL 30 23.37 4.11
EL 30 24.30 2.81
Overall 90 24.30 3.42
Support. Table 1.4 shows the average number of proposals by treatment, and Figure 1.12 plots
the distribution of proposals by treatment. Teams in EL have the lowest number of proposals and
teams in NL the highest number. Teams with no leaders (NL) have significantly higher numbers
of proposals than teams with named leaders (EL and AL) (MWW, p = 0.0752, r = 0.615).
Teams in EL and AL have similar numbers of proposals (MWW, p = 0.7258, r = 0.473).
1.6 Discussion
We investigate the role of leadership in flat teams facing a complex decision task with a large
number of possible options. Our decision task, drawn from a problem in combinatoric opti-
misation, has several features found in the problems faced by real-world teams such as clubs,
musical bands and sporting teams. Teams do not have the time to consider and rank every fea-
sible option, and face a coordination problem both in agreeing on which option to implement,
and then in actually carrying it out. Similar to results in experimental economics on coordina-
tion games, we find that having a named leader (elected or appointed) improves the quality of
teams’ decisions. We strengthen this finding because our experiment does not introduce any
functional or asymmetric role for the named leader. In contrast to theories from social psychol-
ogy, although our design allows teams to self-organise, teams with named leaders outperform
those without; self-organisation is not a complete solution for teams in our environment.
The captaincy of a sports team might be a frequent topic of discussion because people may
misperceive that having a named leader improves the performance of a team. A feature of
our experimental design is that we are able to look for evidence that having a named leader
affects the (over)confidence of a team, because we have a measure of team performance in a
controlled environment. As is usual, we do find that participants are on average overconfident
in their team’s performance, and that participants on teams with leaders are more confident
than those on teams without. However we do not find additional overconfidence among those
teams with leaders. Higher reported confidence correlates positively with actual performance;
the optimism of our teams with named leaders is not a misperception but is grounded in the
team’s performance. Sports journalists and bloggers opining on captain controversies therefore
may not be merely filling column inches and dead airtime.
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1.A Instructions
1.A.1 Block One: Individual Solutions
Introduction
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment.
This is an experiment of decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make appro-
priate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your earnings
for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need any assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, e.t.c., you will be asked to leave and you
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Today’s session consists of two blocks. Your earnings in each block depend only on the
decisions made in that block.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions
as they are read aloud.
Block 1
In Block 1, you will be matched randomly and anonymously with one other participant in
today’s session. You will not know the identity of the participant with whom you are matched,
nor will that participant know your identity, either during or after the session.
Your earnings for Block 1 will be determined by your choices and the choices made by the
other participant with whom you are matched.
In Block 1, there will be seven (7) decision rounds. In each round you will propose a route
which visits checkpoints laid out on a map. Each checkpoint is associated with a letter of the
alphabet. We will now show you what your screen will look like during a decision round.
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Figure 1.13: Example of the Decision Screen
Alphabet Flags
In each round there will be 13 checkpoints for you to visit. When you visit a checkpoint, you
will automatically collect a flag with that checkpoint’s letter.
The box of ’Alphabet Flags’ at the right of the screen keeps track of the lettered flags you
have collected so far. When you collect a flag, the corresponding letter box will change from
grey to orange.
Figure 1.14: Box of Alphabet Flags
1.A. INSTRUCTIONS 49
The Map
The checkpoints in each round are laid out on a map like the one below, which will be shown in
the middle of your screen. In each round, all participants will see the same map.
The map is 100 units top to bottom and 100 units left to right. In the centre of the map is
your home base, indicated by the picture of a house. On the map are the 13 checkpoints, each
indicated by a triangle. Each checkpoint has a corresponding alphabet flag.
Figure 1.15: Example of a Map
Choosing Your Route
You can make three journeys to collect flags. You begin each journey at your home base. From
there, you can visit a checkpoint by clicking on the corresponding triangle. When you visit a
checkpoint, you will automatically collect a flag with that checkpoint’s letter. That checkpoint’s
triangle will change colour from orange to grey, and in the Alphabet Flags box the checkpoint’s
letter will change colour from grey to orange.
You can visit checkpoints in any order while on a journey. However, you can carry no
more than five flags at a time. Once you have visited five checkpoints and therefore collected
five flags, you must complete the journey by returning to your home base. You may choose to
complete a journey at anytime, even if you have not yet collected five flags. But, remember that
you have only three journeys in which to visit the 13 checkpoints and collect the corresponding
13 flags.
As you make your journeys, the computer will draw the route you have taken. Your route
will be represented by straight lines between checkpoints. Checkpoints which you have already
visited will be shown as grey triangles; the checkpoints you have yet to visit will be shown as
orange triangles.
Once you collect a flag from a checkpoint you cannot return it. So plan ahead for your
journey before setting out.
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Figure 1.16: Routes are represented as straight lines between checkpoints
Your Score
Your score for a round is given by the total straight-line distance you travel along the routes you
choose for your three journeys. Lower scores are better; therefore in choosing your journeys
your aim is to minimise the total distance travelled.
In the event you do not collect all of the flags on your three journeys, an additional penalty
distance of 100 will be added to your score for each flag you did not collect. Because the grid is
100 units high and 100 units wide, you can always get a lower score by visiting all checkpoints
rather than missing some out.
You will complete seven rounds, with a new map in each round. At the end of each round,
you will see a Score Card showing a detailed breakdown of how your score was determined for
that round. You will also see a Score Card for the person with whom you are match in Block 1.
Their score card will contain question marks, as you will only find out their score for that round
at the end of the block. The next screen shows a sample Score Card.
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Figure 1.17: Example of a Score Card
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Summary Screen
At the end of Block 1, one of the seven rounds in the block will be selected at random. Each
round has an equal chance of being select. In each pair the participant who had the lower score
in the selected round will earn £10, and the participants who had the higher score in the selected
round will earn £5. In the event both participants in a pair have the exact same score (i.e., a tie),
both participants will earn £7.50. Because you will not know in advance which round will be
selected, you should complete each round as if it will be the one chosen to determine payment
for the block.
After the round for payment is determined for Block 1, you will see a summary like the
one below. This table will show your score and the score of the other person with whom you
are matched for each of the seven rounds. The round which is selected for payment will be
highlighted.
Figure 1.18: Example of the Summary Screen
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1.A.2 Block Two: Team Solutions
Introduction
As you were told earlier, today’s session consists of two blocks. Your earnings in each block
depend only on the decisions made in that block. You have just completed Block 1. We will
now begin Block 2. We will describe the block in more detail. Please follow along with these
instructions as they are read aloud.
Block 2
Block 2 has exactly the same structure as Block 1. You will see a new series of seven maps,
100 units wide by 100 units high, with a home base in the middle and 13 checkpoints. You have
three journeys to collect the flags, and on each journey you can collect at most five flags.
In Block 2 your will be matched anonymously with two other participants in today’s session
to form teams of three. You will never find out the identities of those with whom you are
matched, nor will they find out yours. for identification purposes, one member of the team will
be known as Indigo, one member as Yellow, and one member as Purple. At the start of the
block, when your team is organised, you will learn your colour identities. The composition of
the team and the identifying colours, will remain the same throughout Block 2.
Each team will then be matched randomly and anonymously with one other team. Your
team will not know the identity of the members of the team with which your team is matched,
nor will be members of the other team know your identity, either during or after the experiment.
Your earnings for Block 2 will be determined by your team’s choices and the choices made
by the other team with which your team is matched.
Choosing your route
Your team will make a total of three journeys to collect flags. Each member of the team will
make exactly one journey. Each journey begins at your home base. From there, you can visit
a checkpoint by clicking on the corresponding triangle. When you visit a checkpoint, you will
automatically collect a flag with that checkpoint’s letter. That checkpoint’s triangle will change
colour from orange to grey, and in the Alphabet Flags box the checkpoint’s letter will change
colour from grey to orange.
You can visit checkpoints in any order while on a journey. However, you can carry no more
than five flags at a time. Once you have visited five checkpoints on a journey and therefore
have collected five flags, you must complete the journey by returning to your home base. You
may choose to complete a journey at any time, even if you have not yet collected five flags.
Remember that your team has only three journeys in order to collect all 13 flags.
You and the other two members of your team will make your journeys individually. You will
not see which checkpoints the other members of your team are visiting while you are making
your journey.
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Prior to making your journey, your team will have the opportunity to discuss a plan of action
in text-based chat which we will now discuss.
The chat screen
Figure 1.19: Example of the Chat Screen
To the left of the chat screen will be the map for that round. The label on each checkpoint
corresponds to the alphabet labels on the alphabet flags panel of your decision screen. To the
right is the chat window. Any message you type in this chat window will be seen by the other
two members of your team and vice versa. These messages will not be seen by the members of
other teams. Your team will have 90 seconds to discuss your plan of action. During this time
your team is free to discuss the plan any way you wish, with the following restrictions:
1. You may not identify yourself or pass along any information that could be used to identify
you (for example, age, race, background, seat number and so forth).
2. You may not use obscene or offensive language.
After the 90 seconds are over, you will be taken to the decision screen where each member of
the team will make their own journey.
Choosing your route
Your will make your journeys individually. You will only see the journeys of your team mates,
after your own journey has been completed. As you make your journeys, the computer will draw
1.A. INSTRUCTIONS 55
the route you have taken. Your route will be represented by straight lines between checkpoints.
Checkpoints which you have already visited will be shown as grey triangles; the checkpoints
you have yet to visit will be shown as orange triangles.
Once you collect a flag from a checkpoint you cannot return it. So plan ahead for your
journey before setting out. When all journeys have been completed, you will see a screen which
shows the map with the journeys made by all three members of your team.
Team Journey Screen
Figure 1.20: Example of the Team Journey Screen
Your Score
Your team’s score for a round is given by the total distance the members of the team travel along
the routes you choose for your three journeys. Lower scores are better; therefore in choosing
your journeys your team’s aim is to minimise the total distance travelled. In the event your tea
does not collect all of the flags on your three journeys, an additional penalty distance of 100
will be added to your score for each flag your team did not collect. Because the grid is 100 units
high and 100 units wide, your team can always get a lower score by visiting all locations rather
than missing some out.
You will complete seven rounds, with a new map in each round. At the end of each round,
you will see score card showing a detailed breakdown of how your team’s score was determined
for that round. You will also see a score card for the team with which your team is matched in
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the block. Their score card will contain question marks, as you will only find out their score for
the round at the end of the block. The next screen shows a sample score card.
Figure 1.21: Example of the Team Score Card
Summary Screen
Recall that your team will be matched with one other team for Bock 2, at the end of Block 2,
one of the seven rounds in the block will be selected at random. Each round has an equal chance
of being selected. If your team had the lower score in the selected round, all participants in your
team will earn £10 each, and if your team had the higher score, all the participants in your team
will earn £5 each. In the event both teams have the exact same score (i.e., a tie), all members
in your team will earn £7.50 each. Because you will not know in advance which round will
be selected, you and your team should complete each round as if it will be the one chosen to
determine payment for the block.
After the round for payment is determined for Block 2, you will see a summary like the one
below. The table will show your team’s score and the score of the other team with which your
team is matched for each of the seven rounds. The round which is selected for payment will be
highlighted.
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Figure 1.22: Example of the Team Summary Screen
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Chapter 2
Individual Skill and Incentives in a
Laboratory Experiment
In this chapter, we study experimentally the effects of individual skill in a real-performance
task and the responsiveness of individual skill to various incentive schemes. Participants
faced instances of the Truck Dispatch Problem, in which they devised three journeys which
visit a set of locations on a map. Some participants were remunerated under a rank order
tournament incentive scheme, some participants were informed of their performance rank-
ing and were given a fixed rate whilst some participants were remunerated under a fixed
rate incentive scheme. We find evidence for individual skill differences in the task, but that
the distribution of these differences does not depend on the incentive treatment.
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2.1 Introduction
Economics experiments ask participants to make a variety of decisions, usually guided by finan-
cial or other incentives. Within this framework, the types of decisions that participants make can
vary substantially depending upon the objectives of the experiment. Many studies in the exper-
imental literature make use of tasks which we will refer to as stated effort tasks. For example,
in the turn-around game (Brandts et al., 2014), each participant chooses a number, for example,
from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Each number is interpreted as a level of effort. Higher numbers
correspond to higher levels of effort, and come at a higher cost to the participant, which is
represented by a financial cost in the experiment. Stated effort tasks have the advantage of con-
trolling for individual characteristics such as ability and experience, when those characteristics
are not of primary interest to the research question.
However, stated effort tasks have been criticized on the grounds that they are unrealistic
and lack external validity (Levitt and List, 2007). Real effort tasks, which involve participants
performing a tangible action, such as accurately positioning slider bars on a computer screen or
stuffing envelopes, have become increasingly popular in the experimental literature (Brüggen
and Strobel, 2007; Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Corgnet et al., 2015; Gächter et al., 2016). These
tasks trade off the benefit of realism against a loss of some degree of control over the idiosyn-
cratic effects of ability and experience. For example, if effort is believed to come at a cost to
participants, as is often assumed in economic models (Falk and Fehr, 2003), in a real effort task
this cost of effort is unknown to the experimenter.
In the experiment in Chapter One, teams of three participants produced solutions to in-
stances of the Truck Dispatching Problem (TDP).1 Similar to a real-effort task, the TDP involves
executing a tangible action, namely, drawing a route around a map. Unlike most real effort tasks,
which are simple and repetitive, the TDP is a complex problem, and it is the problem-solving
aspect of the TDP that makes it an interesting task to use in Chapter One to investigate the role
of leadership.
Therefore, the TDP has some features of stated effort tasks and some features of real effort
tasks. Carrying out the task is important for the experiment, but it is not per se the effort in
carrying out the task that is of direct experimental interest. We propose to refer to this type of
task as a real performance task. We coin the term real performance task to refer to tasks which
have the quality of being a tangible task with a cost of effort function that can be controlled and
known by the experimenter.
As a tangible task, performance in the TDP might be affected by individual characteristics
such as ability, experience, or the subjective utility derived from performing such tasks (Brüggen
and Strobel, 2007). We designed the experiment in Chapter One to construct teams based on
their performance in an initial set of TDP instances, in such a way that teams within a session
would be of comparable overall skill. Nevertheless, because we constructed the teams from
1In Chapter One, we referred to this as the Team Dispatching Problem as teams had to jointly participate on the
task.
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cohorts of nine participants, if participants do vary significantly in their performance on the
task, the teams we constructed might likewise vary significantly in their capacity to produce
good solutions to the TDP.
The TDP is a generalisation of the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP). The TSP and TDP
are demonstrably difficult optimisation problems for which efficient solution algorithms are not
known. The psychology literature has studied he ability of people to produce approximations
to the optimal solution in the TSP, and has found mixed evidence of individual differences in
skill. Experimental designs in that literature focus more on the processes or heuristics people
use to produce approximate solutions, as opposed to the quality of the solutions themselves.
Our experiment focuses on the quality of the approximation solutions produced, and how the
quality is affected by the use (or absence) of performance-contingent incentives, and the type
of feedback participants receive.
2.2 Related Literature
The Truck Dispatching Problem (TDP) (Dantzig and Ramser, 1959) is a generalisation of the
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). In an instance of a TSP, the objective is to find the route
passing once through each ofN locations on a map, which has the shortest distance (MacGregor
and Ormerod, 1996; Laporte, 2010). In our formulation of the Truck Dispatching Problem, the
route must begin from a given “home” location. A route is comprised of several journeys. On
each journey, no more than m of the other N − 1 locations may be visited. If m = N − 1 this
is equivalent to the TSP; if m < N − 1, as in our experiment, multiple journeys are required to
visit all locations. The objective is to find the route, which satisfies this constraint, which has
the shortest distance.
The TSP and the TDP is easy to state and understand. Nevertheless, it is remarkably com-
putationally difficult to find the shortest distance in many instances. Computationally, these
problems are classified as NP-hard. There are no known algorithms which can provide solu-
tions to NP-hard problems, in which the running time increases as a polynomial function of the
size N of the problem.2 There do exist heuristic algorithms which are not guaranteed to find the
optimal route, but usually find “good” routes, the length of which is not much longer than the
length of the optimal route. It is the combination of the ease of description and the challenge of
solution which made the TDP suitable for the experiment in Chapter One.
There exists a body of experimental literature in psychology which studies human perfor-
mance on instances of the TSP (MacGregor and Ormerod, 1996; Vickers et al., 2001; Chronicle
et al., 2008). From the evidence, it is not clear whether people are systematically different in
their ability to produce good routes. One set of studies consistently finds evidence in favour
of individual differences (Vickers et al., 2001, 2003, 2004; Burns et al., 2006). People who
2Such an algorithm, or a proof that no such algorithm exists, would fetch a $1,000,000 prize from the Clay
Mathematical Institute (Applegate et al., 2006).
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produce better routes for the TSP also tend to perform better on other tasks, as well as scoring
more highly on intelligence measures such as Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Vickers
et al., 2001). Within instances of the TSP itself, Vickers et al. (2001) compared performance on
TSP problems with 10, 25, and 40 nodes, and found within-subject rank-order correlations of
0.81 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.87.
On the other hand, another set of studies consistently finds no evidence that individual skill
is important in TSP performance. This strand of the literature argues that when presented as a set
of points on a two-dimensional map, people produce routes using the human perceptual system,
instead of using explicit cognitive reasoning (MacGregor and Ormerod, 1996; MacGregor et al.,
1999, 2006). MacGregor and Ormerod (1996) compared performance on TSP problems with
10 and 20 nodes, and found within-subject rank-order correlations of 0.02 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.06.
In an attempt to reconcile this stark difference, Chronicle et al. (2008) argued that the cause
of the discrepancies might be differences in experimental practices. For example, Vickers and
coauthors use TSP instances with larger numbers of nodes, which participants completed on
a computer. MacGregor and colleagues, on the other hand, use TSP instances with relatively
few nodes, which participants completed using paper and pencil. Chronicle et al. reported an
experiment in which TSP instances used by Vickers and colleagues were presented to partic-
ipants using the paper and pencil method from MacGregor and colleagues. They compared
performance on TSP problems with 30 and 40 nodes, and found within-subject rank-order cor-
relations of 0.20 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.30. These correlation are higher that those obtained by MacGregor
and Ormerod (1996) but smaller than those obtained by Vickers et al. (2001). They interpreted
their results as evidence that individual differences in performance on the TSP become more
apparent as TSP problems become more complex, arguing that more complex problems require
a shift from basic perceptual mechanisms to higher-order cognitive or analytic mechanisms.
In the studies discussed above, participants were paid a flat fee for their participation, which
did not depend on the routes they chose. This is the usual practice in psychology experiments,
which psychologists defend by arguing that participants are intrinsically motivated to do well,
and therefore payment contingent on performance is not beneficial (Deci, 1971; Deci et al.,
1999). In experimental economics, on the other hand, it is standard practice to pay participants
contingent on the choices they make or their performance on a task. Experimental economists
argue that such incentives give the experimenter greater control over the preferences of the
participants in the context of the decision-making environment of the experiment. Monetary
incentives are argued to be more uniformly valued across experimental participants, compared
to e.g. course credits or the satisfaction of doing well, and therefore support the replicability of
experiments (Smith, 1976; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Croson, 2005).
Economists maintain that financial incentives improve performance and reduce variance in
experimental data (Smith and Walker, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ort-
mann, 2001; Read, 2005). Smith and Walker (1993) argue that financial incentives improve the
performance of experimental participants by compensating for the cost of mental effort. They
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presented a theoretical model in which mental effort, much like physical effort, imposes a cost
upon the economic agents. In order to encourage higher effort levels, agents need to be offered
a monetary compensation which offsets the mental cost of decision making. From their meta-
analysis of 31 experimental studies, which include bilateral bargaining, Cournot oligopoly, bi-
nary choice prediction, and double auction market experiments, they found that when exper-
iments are incentivised the central tendencies of performance are closer to the predictions of
normative models, and that the variance of errors around optimal decisions is reduced. The
effects of incentives are more pronounced when participants are offered larger monetary incen-
tives.
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) study the effects of incentives on performance in experiments
by conducting a meta-analysis of 74 studies published in the American Economic Review,
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy and Quarterly Journal of Economics between 1990
and 1998. They find evidence for a more nuanced picture of the relationship among tasks, in-
centives and performance. Over all tasks, they find that financial incentives lead to a reduction
in variance of performance, which is consistent with the results of Smith and Walker (1993).
The results for levels of performance are mixed. Using task complexity as proxy for the skill
demanded by a task, they find financial incentives have a stronger effect on performance levels
when the task is simple. For example, financial incentives tend to result in higher performance
in judgement tasks, such as memory or recall tasks, or clerical tasks which are mundane and
require close attention to perform well. Tasks such as these do not require much skill; they
are within the capacity of most (if not all) experimental participants, so performance depends
primarily on a willingness to exert some kind of effort. In contrast, more complex tasks typi-
cally require skill. For some participants, skill (for example, cognitive capital or lack thereof)
becomes a binding constraint on performance; for these participants more effort does not lead to
more performance, so incentives for effort are not relevant for them. Camerer and Hogarth argue
that variation in performance on complex tasks therefore depends more on individual charac-
teristics than on the amount of effort participants are willing to give. This is consistent with
the model in Smith (1976), in which financial incentives will not lead to increased performance
when the agent’s ability is bounded.
Bonner et al. (2000) conduct a meta-analysis of 131 studies in which they take into account
both the complexity of the task, and characteristics of the incentive scheme. They likewise
find that the more complex the task, the less participants’ performance depends on monetary
incentives. They provide a ranking of types of tasks ordered by increasing complexity: vigi-
lance and detection tasks; memory tasks; production and simple clerical tasks; judgement and
choice tasks and problem solving; reasoning and game playing tasks. They divide the incentive
schemes used in their sample into four categories, given some quantified measure of partic-
ipants’ performance. In fixed-rate schemes, participants are paid a fixed amount irrespective
of performance. In quota schemes, participants are paid a fixed amount irrespective of perfor-
mance until a given level of performance is attained; beyond this level participants receive a
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bonus. A tournament scheme compares the participants’ performance measures, and pays par-
ticipants using a schedule depending only on the relative ranking of their performance. When,
in addition, the measure of the participants’ performance is on a cardinal scale, so the perfor-
mance scale has meaningful units, a piece-rate scheme pays participants a fixed amount per
each unit achieved on that scale. Bonner et al. find that quota schemes are the most effective in
producing higher performance – and therefore presumably more effort – followed by piece-rate
schemes, tournament schemes and fixed-rate schemes.
The foregoing has focused on outcomes as the measure of performance; for example, in the
TSP, performance is measured by the length of the route the participant constructs. Other mea-
sures of behaviour, such as the time participants spend completing the task, could be useful in
understanding the processes participants use. Vickers et al. (2001) report on a TSP experiment
with two treatments. In one treatment, the Optimisation Group, participants were instructed
to draw a route which was “ as short as possible”; in the other, the Gestalt Group, partici-
pants were instructed to draw the route which looked “most natural, attractive and aesthetically
pleasing”. They found that participants in the Gesalt Group completed the task more quickly
on average than participants in the Optimization Group; however, the average route length did
not differ significantly between the groups. They interpret the difference in response times as
arising from different psychological processes: the wording of the Optimisation Group prompt
triggered the use of higher-order cognitive mechanisms, while the working of the Gestalt Group
led to reliance on the basic human perceptual system.
Within economics, the argument that cognitive processes should lead to longer response
times also in decisions and games was advanced by Rubinstein (2007). He analyses “sev-
eral thousand” observations of response times of over 5000 students on classic experimental
economics games, including matrix games, the traveller’s dilemma (Basu, 1994), the p-beauty
contest (Nagel, 1995), the centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981; Binmore, 1987), the ultimatum
game (Güth et al., 1982), and the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) version of the Allais Paradox,
collected via the gametheory.tau.ac.il website. He argues that participants who make decisions
consistent with models of strategic sophistication, generally take longer to make their response.
Arad and Rubinstein (2012) study decisions and response times in a Colonel Blotto game, and
find that participants who take longer to submit their decision are more likely to win the game.
2.3 Experimental Design
In our experiment, participants completed 14 instances of the TDP, designing all three journeys
as in the original optimisation problem of Dantzig and Ramser (1959). Each session consisted
of two blocks. Seven instances of the TDP were completed in Block One and another seven
instance were completed in Block Two.3 We used the same maps in the same sequence in all
3We selected the 14 TDP instances via a series of pilot exercises. We started with 200 randomly-generated
maps. We gave these to some of our colleagues, and eliminated maps for which most people gave the same
2.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 65
sessions. Each map was referred to as a “round” in the experimental instructions.
Within each block, participants completed the seven instances successively without any
feedback about the performance of others. We conducted three treatments, across participants
and across sessions, in which we varied the information at the end of each block, and its con-
sequences for the participants’ earnings. One of the seven rounds (call it m) in the block was
drawn at random.
• In Treatment Contingent Tournament (CT), each participant saw their own score in round
m and the score of another participant in the session in the same round.4 If their score
was better than the score of the other participant, they earned £10 for that block. If their
score was worse than other participant’s score, they earned £5 for that block. In the event
of a tie, both participants earned £7.50.
• In Treatment Non-contingent Tournament (NT), each participant saw their own score in
round m and the score of another participant in the session in the same round. However,
their earnings did not depend on the comparison of the scores; both participants earned
£7.50 for completing the block.
• In Treatment Non-contingent Non-tournament (NN), each participant saw their own score
in round m, and also the score from the optimal route. No participant received any infor-
mation about the scores of other participants. All participants earned £7.50 for completing
the block.
Each participant’s earnings were determined by adding their earnings from the two blocks. In
the next section, we describe the TDP task.
2.3.1 The TDP task
In each round, participants proposed routes for an instance of a TDP with 13 locations, which
were called checkpoints. Each round began with a decision screen, which displayed the 13
checkpoints as orange triangles on a map 100 units high by 100 units wide, as in Figure 2.1(a).
The starting and ending point for all journeys was the home base, located in the centre of the
map and indicated by an icon of a house. To start a journey, a participant clicked on one of the
orange triangles to indicate the first checkpoint to be visited. A line was drawn from the home
base to this checkpoint, and the checkpoint’s colour changed from orange to grey, indicating
that it had been visited. Each checkpoint was associated with a different letter of the alphabet.
At the right of the screen was an alphabet flag box listing all of these letters. Initially all
solution. We then conducted an additional pilot exercise with student participants, and used the same criterion to
settle on the final selection of 14 maps.
4Another possible scheme for giving incentives would be a piece-rate scheme, in the spirit of e.g. Lazear
and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). Such a scheme would reward participants proportionally to
the distance saved by producing a shorter route. In early pilots we experimented with such a scheme; however,
because there are many “good” routes with similar distances, this produces very flat incentives.
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of these letters were grey; a letter changed colour to orange when the participant visited the
corresponding checkpoint.
Figure 2.1: Interacting with the decision screen
(a) At the start of a period (b) Drawing a route (c) After all journeys completed
To continue a journey, the participant then clicked on another orange triangle to visit another
checkpoint. As each checkpoint was visited, the clicked triangle turned grey, the line indicating
the path of the journey was extended, and the corresponding letter turned orange.5 At the left of
the screen, a box displayed, for each journey, the number of checkpoints visited on that journey
and the corresponding distance traveled. Distances were computed as the straight-line distance
between successive checkpoints. Figure 2.1(b) shows what the decision screen looked like in
the middle of the process of inputting a route.
The participant could visit at most five locations on a single journey. The participant could
end a journey at any time by clicking on the home icon. Once the participant had visited five
checkpoints on the current journey, a reminder message appeared at the bottom of the screen,
and the decision screen would only accept a click on the home icon as the next location to visit,
and complete the journey. Figure 2.1(c) shows a typical decision screen after the completion of
all three journeys.
After completing all three journeys in a round, participants saw a score card screen as shown
in Figure 2.2. This screen provided two score cards. At the left was the score card for the route
the participant selected for the current instance of the TDP. This listed, for each journey, the
number of locations visited on that journey, and the distance traveled on the journey.
We rounded the distance for each journey to the nearest integer, and computed the total
distance for the route as the sum of these three rounded distances. The decision screen did not
enforce that the participant provide a feasible route visiting all 13 locations. The score card
reported the number of locations not included in the route, if any, and the total penalty distance
of 100 units per omitted location. The total score was computed as the sum of the distances
traveled on the three journeys, plus any penalty distance for omitted locations.
At the right of the screen was a score card labeled Other’s Score Card for Round j (for CT
and NT) or Optimal Score Card for Round j (for NN). This score card had the same structure
5We frame this task as being as if the participant is making the journey from checkpoint to checkpoint. There-
fore there was no mechanism to undo a checkpoint visit once the triangle was clicked. We designed all maps so
that checkpoints were sufficiently far apart that accidental clicks on an unintended triangle should not occur.
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Figure 2.2: The score card as shown at the end of a round in Block One. The left card details the
route selected by the participant. The right card varies by treatment. In this example, the right
card is blank, because information on the performance of the other participant was revealed
only at the end of the block.
as the participant’s score card, except all entries contained question marks. Details of this score
card would be revealed after all seven rounds of the block were completed.
Figure 2.3: Summary screen at the end of Block One. The round selected for payment is high-
lighted in orange. The earnings calculation for the Block is summarised at the bot-
tom.
After all seven rounds in the block were completed, one of the rounds was chosen at random
to be the round which would be revealed in detail (and determine earnings in CT) for the Block.
This was done by placing seven ping-pong balls, numbered one through seven, in an opaque
bag; the experimenter asked a participant to reach into the bag and pull out one of the balls. The
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number on the selected ball determined the round which was displayed (paid).
After the round to be displayed (paid) was drawn, the participant saw a summary table as in
Figure 2.3. This table listed, for each round, the participant’s score, and the score of the other
participant with whom they were matched (or the optimal score in NN). The round selected for
payment was highlighted with an orange background.
Figure 2.4: The score card as shown at the end of Block One, including the details of the route
selected by the other participant.
The block concluded with a screen re-visiting the score cards for the round selected for
payment, as in Figure 2.4. This recapped the same information on the participant’s route in the
given round as they saw it at the end of that round, and adds the details for the other participant’s
(or the optimal) route as well.
2.4 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 6. The average performance of participants in the TDP will not vary by treatment.
Because the task of finding the shortest route in a TDP is NP-hard, we argue that the task
in our experiment is complex. Based on previous results, we expect that the incentive scheme
should not affect the level of performance.
Hypothesis 7. The variance in participants’ performance will be lower in the CT treatment.
Although levels of performance may not vary, financial incentives have been argued to re-
duce variability in performance. Therefore, performance should be less variable when incen-
tives contingent on performance are used.
Hypothesis 8. Response times in CT will be longer.
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When payment is contingent on the performance outcome, participants are given financial
incentives to apply cognitive reasoning processes to the task, rather than relying on instinctive
responses or perceptual impressions. Therefore, the use of contingent incentives should result
in longer response times.
Hypothesis 9. Looking across instances of the TDP, participants will not differ systematically in
the lengths of the routes they choose and performance within participants will not be positively
correlated across rounds.
The TDP instances participants face have 13 locations. Studies on the related TSP with
similar problem sizes generally find that within-participant correlation of relative performance
across instances is small. This implies that performance within participants will not be posi-
tively correlated across rounds and that good performance on one instance of the TDP will not
imply good performance on subsequent instances of the TDP.
2.5 Results
The experiments were conducted at the Laboratory for Economic and Decision Research (LEDR)
at the University of East Anglia. All interaction was mediated via computer, with a program
written using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 192 participants took part in the experi-
ment; 66 participants in Treatment CT, 60 participants in Treatment NT and 66 participants in
Treatment NN.
The average earnings per participant for the experiment was £15. We measure the quality of
the routes chosen by the score obtained by each participant in each round. The optimal score in
each round is different. To enable comparison in performance across rounds and across partici-
pants, we translate the scores into winning percentages. Let i = 1, . . . , 192 index participants,
and T : {1, . . . , 192} → {1, 2, 3} be the function mapping each participant into the treatment
they participated in. Let m = 1, . . . , 14 index the fourteen maps, in the order in which they
were presented to the participants. Let Sim be the score of participant i on map m, which is the
total distance travelled by participant i on their three journeys, plus any penalties for omitted
flags.
The winning percentage is computed as a round-robin comparison of each participant i’s
performance relative to the performance of others on the same map. The winning percentage of
participant i on map m, measured against all opponents, is given by
Wm(i) =
1
|{j 6= i}|
∑
j 6=i
[
1(Sim < Sjm) +
1
2
· 1(Sim = Sjm)
]
, (2.1)
where 1(b) is the indicator function equal to 1 when the Boolean condition b is true and 0
otherwise. The overall winning percentage of participant i across the experiment is W (i) =
1
14
∑14
m=1Wm(i).
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Result 6. The average performance of participants in the TDP as measured by winning per-
centages W (i) do not vary by treatment.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of participant winning percentages W (i) by treatment. Each dot rep-
resents one participant. The boxes indicate the lower quartile, median, and upper
quartile of the distributions for each treatment.
CT
NT
NN
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
0 .25 .50 .75 1
 Winning percentage W(i)
Support. Figure 2.5 plots the distribution of winning percentages W (i) by treatment. We use
the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test to compare the distributions. From the MWW test,
we obtain that the distribution of winning percentages in CT is not significantly different from
the distribution of winning percentages in NT (MWW p = 0.6514, r = .477). The distrisbution
of winning percentages in CT is not significantly different from the distribution of winning
percentages in NN (MWW p = 0.9166, r = .505). The distribution of winning percentages
in NT and NN are also not significantly different from one another (MWW p = 0.4879, r =
.536).
This result is consistent with the arguments presented by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and
Bonner et al. (2000) that problem solving tasks are generally not responsive to financial incen-
tives.
Result 7. The variance in participant’s performance, as measured by difference between par-
ticipant’s score and the optimal score, is not different across treatments.
Support. We define the excess distance Xim for participant i on map m as the difference be-
tween the optimal scoreOm on mapm and the participant’s actual score,Xim = Sim−Om. The
average excess distanceXi for participant i is thenXi = 114
∑14
m=1Xim. We plot the distribution
of Xi for each treatment in Figure 2.6. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the distribution
of Xi for each treatment.
Figure 2.6: Distribution of excess distanceXi by treatment. Each dot represents one participant.
The boxes indicate the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the distributions
for each treatment.
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Table 2.1: Excess distance by treatment.
Excess distance
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev.
CT 66 33.7 23.9
NT 60 29.6 17.3
NN 66 33.4 25.9
Overall 192 32.3 22.8
We observe from Figure 2.6 that, despite the absence of contingent incentives in two of
the three treatments, few participants choose routes which are exceptionally long consistently
across all maps. The standard deviation of excess distance across participants is smaller in
NT, but this is driven mainly by a few exceptional outliers in NN and CT. The quartiles of the
distributions are similar.
We use the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test to compare the distributions. We find
that the distribution of excess distance in NT is not significantly different from the distribu-
tion of excess distance in CT and NN (MWW p = 0.4147, r = .537). The distribution of
excess distance in CT and NN are also not significantly different from one another (MWW
p = 0.8909, r = .493).
Result 8. Response times are fastest overall in NT.
Table 2.2: Participant response times, in seconds, overall and for each journey.
Response Time
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Journey 1 192 27.6 9.3 12.9 74.2
Journey 2 192 14.0 5.3 6.1 36.7
Journey 3 192 8.1 3.47 3.1 24.9
Overall 192 49.8 15.2 22.1 113.3
Support. Participants faced a “soft” time limit of 180 seconds per map. There was no count-
down timer displayed on the screen. After 180 seconds elapsed, participants saw a message
which encouraged them to complete the route. Few participants took 180 or more seconds on
any map, and the average overall completion time was around 50 seconds. Figure 2.7 plots the
average response time by round. Even in the first round, average response times are less than 80
seconds. Response times decrease through Block One, and are generally stable through Block
Two.
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of average participant response times, in seconds.
Response times are reported for the overall route, representing the time elapsed from the display
of the map to the time where the participant completed the third journey. In addition, Table 2.2
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Figure 2.7: Average response time by treatment over time.
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breaks out the time spent on each of the three journeys. Completion time for the first journey is
the longest, which is to be expected as this includes the time participants would spend looking
at the map for the first time.
Table 2.3: Participant average response times over all maps, in seconds, by treatment
Response Time
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev.
CT 66 51.4 13.5
NT 60 46.5 15.6
NN 66 51.1 16.3
Overall 192 49.8 15.2
Table 2.3 summarises participant response times by treatment. Response times in NT are
lower than the other treatments (MWW, p = 0.0370, r = 0.594). Response times are not differ-
ent between CT and NN (MWW, p = 0.5113, r = 0.467). Lower response times when the task
is not rewarded by contingent incentives is plausible, as participants would not have financial
incentives to spend more time reflecting on the problem. However, the comparable response
times in CT and NN are surprising. A possible ex-post explanation for this result is that in NN,
participants find out the best possible score rather than the actual score of another participant.
Comparison against the optimal score may frame the task as one in which participants may be
motivated to do as well as possible, rather than simply doing enough to beat a competitor. Bon-
ner et al. (2000) suggest that having a clear performance benchmark is effective in encouraging
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performance because the benchmark becomes salient.
Result 9. Performance within participant is positively correlated across rounds. Participant
performance is more consistent than would be expected if all participants were identical.
Figure 2.8: Distribution of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for each pair of maps. Each
dot represents the correlation between participant performances in one pair of maps.
The boxes indicate the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the distributions
for each treatment.
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Support. Following e.g. MacGregor and Ormerod (1996) and Vickers et al. (2001), we take
each pair of maps m 6= n and calculate the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients ρmn of
the scores Sim and Sin across all participants i. There are 91 such pairwise combinations.
Figure 2.8 plots the distribution of these correlations, which range from 0.0796 to 0.4570 with
a median value of 0.2766. This distribution is similar to the one obtained by Chronicle et al.
(2008) (0.25 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.35), and provides evidence for a systematic difference in performance. In
Figure 2.9 we repeat the same calculation restricting the sample to each treatment in turn. The
median correlations are 0.2823 for CT, 0.2578 for NT and 0.3003 for NN, again placing each
treatment within a range comparable to Chronicle et al. (2008).
Figure 2.9: Distribution of participant Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient by treatment
across all 14 rounds. The boxes indicate the lower quartile, median, and upper
quartile of the distribution.
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Another way to measure the persistence of individual differences across maps is to use
the winning percentages W (i) as plotted in Figure 2.5. When the differences in performance
across participants are sustained over all maps, the standard deviation of the observed winning
percentages will be large. We take as a benchmark the case in which the ranking of participants
on a given map is random, assuming that each participant is equally likely to attain any rank,
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and the ranking of participants across any pair of maps is independent. We simulate 10000
draws of this benchmark and construct an empirical distribution of the standard deviation of
winning percentages, and use this to conduct hypothesis tests. For the whole sample of 192
participants, we observe a standard deviation of .1646. Looking at each treatment separately,
for CT, we observe a standard deviation of .1690; for NT, .1557; and for NN, .1700. All are
significant at p < .0001.6
2.6 Discussion
We investigate the role of individual skill in a real performance task and the responsiveness
of performance in the task to financial incentives. The task is complex, insofar as there is no
known algorithm that produces optimal solutions efficiently. Previous literature suggests that
performance on complex tasks is not very responsive to incentives. We confirm this in our data:
the central tendency and variability of performance is comparable with and without contingent
incentives.
Real performance tasks potentially sacrifice some experimental control insofar as individual
skill or other characteristics may influence performance on the task in ways the experimenter
cannot easily observe. Previous studies on the related Traveling Salesman Problem produced
a range of results on the relevance of individual characteristics to performance, from almost
no effect to a substantial effect. Our results fall in the middle; we do find that the ranking
of a participant’s performance on one instance is moderately predictive of the ranking of their
performance on another instance.
Combinatorial optimisation problems like the TSP and TDP have some characteristics which
are useful for the methodology of experimental economics. Many of these problems are mo-
tivated by real-world examples and are easy to explain to participants.7 They also come with
computational complexity results which give a formal characterisation of the difficulty of the
problem. Because they are optimisation problems, they are well-defined, with an objective func-
tion that can be used to evaluate performance in absolute and/or relative terms, as desired, and
therefore can be used to give well-defined incentives. In Chapter One, the TDP was embedded
in an experiment which studied the role of leadership; combinatorial optimisation problems can
stand in as an experimental task whenever an individual or group is imagined to face a complex
decision environment in which the exploration and identification of potentially “good” solutions
is important in understanding the decision-making process fully.
6In fact, these are significant at much lower levels as well. For example, for the whole sample of 192 par-
ticipants, significance at p = .001 would correspond to a standard deviation of about .090. For a sample of 66
participants, significance at p = .001 would correspond to a standard deviation of about .098. In our simulations
we never observed a sample in which the simulated standard deviations approached our observed levels.
7We presented a version of this work at a conference with participants who do not work in experimental eco-
nomics. An attendee approached us after our talk to say that our paper was the first time they understood what the
experimental task was that participants were asked to do, and why. Likewise, we encountered a participant who
had been in one of the session, who remarked the task was unusually “fun” compared to other experiments.
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2.A Experimental Instructions
2.A.1 Introduction
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment.
This is an experiment of decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make appro-
priate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your earnings
for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need any assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, e.t.c., you will be asked to leave and you
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Today’s session consists of two blocks. Your earnings in each block depend only on the
decisions made in that block.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions
as they are read aloud.
2.A.2 Block 1
CT
In Block 1, you will be matched randomly and anonymously with one other participant in
today’s session. You will not know the identity of the participant with whom you are matched,
nor will that participant know your identity, either during or after the session.
Your earnings for Block 1 will be determined by your choices and the choices made by the
other participant with whom you are matched.
In Block 1, there will be seven (7) decision rounds. In each round you will propose a route
which visits checkpoints laid out on a map. Each checkpoint is associated with a letter of the
alphabet. We will now show you what your screen will look like during a decision round.
NT
In Block 1, you will be matched randomly and anonymously with one other participant in
today’s session. You will not know the identity of the participant with whom you are matched,
nor will that participant know your identity, either during or after the session.
In Block 1, there will be seven (7) decision rounds. In each round you will propose a route
which visits checkpoints laid out on a map. Each checkpoint is associated with a letter of the
alphabet. We will now show you what your screen will look like during a decision round.
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NN
In Block 1, there will be seven (7) decision rounds. In each round you will propose a route
which visits checkpoints laid out on a map. Each checkpoint is associated with a letter of the
alphabet. We will now show you what your screen will look like during a decision round.
2.A.3 The Decision Screen
Figure 2.10: Example of the Decision Screen
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2.A.4 Alphabet Flags
In each round there will be 13 checkpoints for you to visit. When you visit a checkpoint, you
will automatically collect a flag with that checkpoint’s letter.
The box of ’Alphabet Flags’ at the right of the screen keeps track of the lettered flags you
have collected so far. When you collect a flag, the corresponding letter box will change from
grey to orange.
Figure 2.11: Box of Alphabet Flags
2.A.5 The Map
The checkpoints in each round are laid out on a map like the one below, which will be shown in
the middle of your screen. In each round, all participants will see the same map.
The map is 100 units top to bottom and 100 units left to right. In the centre of the map is
your home base, indicated by the picture of a house. On the map are the 13 checkpoints, each
indicated by a triangle. Each checkpoint has a corresponding alphabet flag.
Figure 2.12: Example of a Map
2.A.6 Choosing Your Route
You can make three journeys to collect flags. You begin each journey at your home base. From
there, you can visit a checkpoint by clicking on the corresponding triangle. When you visit a
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checkpoint, you will automatically collect a flag with that checkpoint’s letter. That checkpoint’s
triangle will change colour from orange to grey, and in the Alphabet Flags box the checkpoint’s
letter will change colour from grey to orange.
You can visit checkpoints in any order while on a journey. However, you can carry no
more than five flags at a time. Once you have visited five checkpoints and therefore collected
five flags, you must complete the journey by returning to your home base. You may choose to
complete a journey at anytime, even if you have not yet collected five flags. But, remember that
you have only three journeys in which to visit the 13 checkpoints and collect the corresponding
13 flags.
As you make your journeys, the computer will draw the route you have taken. Your route
will be represented by straight lines between checkpoints. Checkpoints which you have already
visited will be shown as grey triangles; the checkpoints you have yet to visit will be shown as
orange triangles.
Once you collect a flag from a checkpoint you cannot return it. So plan ahead for your
journey before setting out.
Figure 2.13: Routes are represented as straight lines between checkpoints
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2.A.7 Your Score
Your score for a round is given by the total straight-line distance you travel along the routes you
choose for your three journeys. Lower scores are better; therefore in choosing your journeys
your aim is to minimise the total distance travelled.
In the event you do not collect all of the flags on your three journeys, an additional penalty
distance of 100 will be added to your score for each flag you did not collect. Because the grid is
100 units high and 100 units wide, you can always get a lower score by visiting all checkpoints
rather than missing some out.
CT and NT
You will complete seven rounds, with a new map in each round. At the end of each round, you
will see a Score Card showing a detailed breakdown of how your score was determined for that
round. You will also see a Score Card for the person with whom you are match in Block 1.
Their score card will contain question marks, as you will only find out their score for that round
at the end of the block. The next screen shows a sample Score Card.
NN
You will complete seven rounds, with a new round in each round. At the end of each round, you
will see a score card showing a detailed breakdown of how your score was determined for that
round. You will also see a score card for the optimal score of that round. The Optimal Score
is the one which has the lowest possible score. The score card will contain question marks, as
you will only find out the optimal score for that round at the end of the block. The next screen
shows a sample Score Card.
86
2.A.8 Score Card
Figure 2.14: Example of a Score Card for CT and NT
Figure 2.15: Example of a Score Card for NN
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2.A.9 Summary Screen
CT
At the end of Block 1, one of the seven rounds in the block will be selected at random. Each
round has an equal chance of being select. In each pair the participant who had the lower score
in the selected round will earn £10, and the participants who had the higher score in the selected
round will earn £5. In the event both participants in a pair have the exact same score (i.e., a tie),
both participants will earn £7.50. Because you will not know in advance which round will be
selected, you should complete each round as if it will be the one chosen to determine payment
for the block.
After the round for payment is determined for Block 1, you will see a summary like the
one below. This table will show your score and the score of the other person with whom you
are matched for each of the seven rounds. The round which is selected for payment will be
highlighted.
NT
At the end of Block 1, one of the seven rounds in the block will be selected at random. The
details of this round will be displayed such that you will be shown the breakdown of your own
score and the breakdown of the score of the other participant with whom you are matched for
Block 1. The participant with the lower score wins the round. In the event that both participants
have the exact same score, the round is a tie.
After the round to be displayed in detail is determined for Block 1, you will see a summary
like the one below. This table will show your score and the score of the other participant with
whom you are match for each of the seven rounds. The round to be displayed in detail will be
highlighted.
NN
At the end of Block 1, one of the seven rounds in the block will be selected at random. The
details of this round will be displayed such that you will be shown the breakdown of your own
score and the breakdown of the Optimal Score for Block 1.
After the round to be displayed in detail is determined for Block 1, you will see a summary
like the one below. This table will show your score and the Optimal Score for each of the seven
rounds. The round to be displayed in detail will be highlighted. You will earn a fixed amount
of £7.50
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Figure 2.16: Summary Screen for CT and NT
Figure 2.17: Summary Screen for NN
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2.A.10 Block 2
As you were told earlier, today’s session consists of two blocks. Your earnings in each block
depend only on the decisions made in that block. You have just completed Block 1. We will
now begin Block 2. We will describe the block in more detail. Please follow along with these
instructions as they are read aloud.
CT
Block 2 has exactly the same structure as Block 1. You will see a new series of seven maps,
100 units wide by 100 units high, with a home base in the middle and 13 checkpoints. The
seven maps you see in Block 2 will be different than those in Block 1. Your objective again is to
collect all alphabet flags from the 13 checkpoints. You have three journeys to collect the flags,
and on each journey you can collect at most five flags.
The only difference is that in Block 2 you will be matched randomly and anonymously with
a different participant, who is not the participant you were matched with in Block 1. You will
not know the identity of the participant with whom you are matched, nor will that participant
know your identity, either during or after the experiment. Your earnings for this part of the
experiment will be determined by your choices and the choices made by the other participant
with whom you are matched.
NT
Block 2 has exactly the same structure as Block 1. You will see a new series of seven maps,
100 units wide by 100 units high, with a home base in the middle and 13 checkpoints. The
seven maps you see in Block 2 will be different than those in Block 1. Your objective again is to
collect all alphabet flags from the 13 checkpoints. You have three journeys to collect the flags,
and on each journey you can collect at most five flags.
The only difference is that in Block 2 you will be matched randomly and anonymously with
a different participant, who is not the participant you were matched with in Block 1. You will
not know the identity of the participant with whom you are matched, nor will that participant
know your identity, either during or after the experiment.
NN
Block 2 has exactly the same structure as Block 1. You will see a new series of seven maps,
100 units wide by 100 units high, with a home base in the middle and 13 checkpoints. The
seven maps you see in Block 2 will be different than those in Block 1. Your objective again is to
collect all alphabet flags from the 13 checkpoints. You have three journeys to collect the flags,
and on each journey you can collect at most five flags.
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2.A.11 Your Earnings
CT
At the end of the block, one of the seven rounds will be selected at random. Each round has
an equal chance of being selected. In each pair, the participant who had the lower score in the
selected round will earn £10 and the participant who had the higher score will earn £5. In the
event both participants in a pair have the exact same score (i.e., a tie), both participants will
earn £7.50. Because you will not know in advance which round will be selected, you should
complete each round as if it will be the one chosen to determine payment for the experiment.
Your total earnings for the experiment, then, will be your earnings form the randomly-selected
round in Block 1 plus your earnings from the randomly selected round in Block 2.
NT
At the end of the block, one of the seven rounds will be selected at random. The details of this
round will be displayed such that you will be shown the breakdown of your own score and the
breakdown of the score of the other participant with whom you are matched for Block 2. The
participant with the lower score wins the round. In the event that both participants have the
exact same score, the round is a tie.
Both you and the participant with whom you are matched in Block 2 will earn a fixed amount
of £7.50 in Block 2. Your total earnings for the experiment will be your £7.50 earnings from
Block 1 plus your £7.50 earnings from Block 2.
NN
At the end of the block, one of the seven rounds will be selected at random. The details of this
round will be displayed such that you will be shown the breakdown of your own score and the
breakdown of the score of the Optimal Score for Block 2.
You will earn a fixed amount of £7.50 in Block 2. Your total earnings for the experiment
will be your £7.50 earnings from Block 1 plus your £7.50 earnings from Block 2.
Chapter 3
Football and Domestic Abuse in England
and Wales
In this chapter, we study empirically the effects of domestic and international football tour-
naments on domestic abuse in England and Wales and how these effects vary with people’s
expectations of the football match outcomes. Previous studies on domestic abuse and foot-
ball in England and Wales have focused primarily on international tournaments and have
not taken into account the effects of expected match outcomes. This is surprising given the
visibility of the English Premier League (EPL). We find in our analysis, that the existence
of an EPL fixture is associated with a 1% percent increase in domestic violence while the
existence of a FIFA World Cup fixture is associated with a 3% increase in domestic vio-
lence in England and Wales. Our results, also suggest that expected match outcomes have
strong effects on domestic violence in England and Wales.
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3.1 Introduction
The treatment of sports within the field of economics can be split broadly into two broad areas.
The first area which is known as Economics of sports deals with topics such as competitive
balance, labour market regulations and policies (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Kahn, 2000; Szymanski,
2003, 2009). The second area which is known as Economics through sports studies the ways in
which sports affects activities outside the sports field such as subjective well-being (Kavetsos
and Szymanski, 2010; Pawlowski et al., 2014; Dolan et al., 2019), labour market behaviour
(Doerrenberg and Siegloch, 2014), general sports participation (Dawson, 2019; Kokolakakis
et al., 2019), stock market fluctuations (Edmans et al., 2007), and university enrolment (Weimar
and Schauberger, 2018).
For example, Dolan et al. (2019) find that hosting the 2012 Olympics game had a positive
effect on the life satisfaction of Londoners particularly around the opening and closing cere-
monies. Pawlowski et al. (2014) using panel data from 33 countries over 3 years (2006 -2009)
in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) find that hosting of sporting events have
positive effects on subjective well-being (SWB) of citizens. Doerrenberg and Siegloch (2014)
find that international tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA European Cup
had a positive effect on the motivation to search for jobs by unemployed citizens in Germany.
Unfortunately, the wider effects of sports can also be negative. Edmans et al. (2007) using
a longitudinal panel of 18 countries over 31 years find that negative sports outcome leads to
negative fluctuations in stock returns. In North America, Kalist and Lee (2016) find that Na-
tional Football League (NFL) games days are associated with higher crime rates in host cities.
In a similar vein, Williams et al. (2013) find positive associations between game days when
traditional rivals (Celtic and Rangers) play one another and domestic abuse rates in Scotland.
In this study, we are specifically interested in the links between football tournaments and do-
mestic abuse in England and Wales. At an anecdotical level, whenever there is an upcoming
football tournament such as the FIFA World Cup, it is heralded by articles and materials in the
general media warning about the links between the sporting event and domestic abuse. There
have been studies which have investigated the nature of the relationship between major foot-
ball tournaments (the FIFA World Cup) and domestic abuse in England (Brimicombe and Cafe,
2012; Kirby et al., 2014; PSCD, 2006; Sivarajasingam et al., 2005).
Drawing on the strand of literature which argues that domestic (club-level) football tour-
naments affect trends in domestic abuse through loss aversion (Card and Dahl, 2011; Dickson
et al., 2016), we aim to study the effects of domestic tournaments such as the English Premier
League (EPL) on domestic abuse in England and Wales. In addition we aim to study the com-
bined effects of international tournaments (FIFA World Cup and UEFA European Cup) and
domestic (club-level) tournaments (EPL) on domestic abuse in England and Wales. We argue
that a combined model, provides a more complete picture of the effects of football on domestic
abuse. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to combine international and domes-
tic tournaments in the analysis of the relationship between football and domestic abuse as well
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as the first study to investigate the effects of club-level (EPL) tournaments (broken by home and
away fixtures) on domestic abuse in England and Wales.
In our analysis of the club-level tournaments, we introduce variables which capture pre-
game expectations of match outcomes. We find that the EPL is associated with a 1% increase
in domestic abuse for parts of England & Wales excluding London, while the FIFA World Cup
is associated with about 3% increase in domestic abuse across all regions. We find evidence
in support of the hypothesis that match outcome and pre-game match expectations matter for
domestic abuse.
As an extension, we investigate the relations between football (domestic and international)
tournaments on a different crime measure known as Public Order Offence. In this extension,
we draw on literature with finds that college football games (in North America) are associated
with higher levels of (other) crimes like assaults, vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct, and
arrests for alcohol-related offences. We find evidence that levels of public order offence are also
affected by football tournaments in England and Wales.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Domestic Tournaments and Domestic Abuse
Two studies which are most related to ours are: Card and Dahl (2011) which study the corre-
lations between daily counts of domestic abuse and matches of the National Football League
(NFL) in North America and Dickson et al. (2016) which studies the correlations between do-
mestic abuse in Glasgow and the matches of the Scottish Premier League (SPL).
Card and Dahl (2011) studied the relationship between trends in family violence and games
of National Football League(NFL) They hypothesised that the risk of domestic abuse (violence)
can be affected by a gain-loss utility around rationally expected match outcomes, such that
emotional cues associated with wins and losses by professional football teams could act as vis-
ceral factors which affect fluctuations in the rate of reported family violence.1 They conducted
their analysis using police reports on family violence for Sundays during the professional foot-
ball season obtained from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Their data
spanned the years 1995 to 2006 for over 750 city and county police agencies. They matched
their data on family violence with NFL team records for six NFL teams (Carolina Panthers, De-
troit Lions, New England Patriots, Denver Broncos, Kansas City Chiefs and Tennessee Titans).2
Data on expected match outcomes was constructed from the pre-game point spread betting data
of the Las Vagas Bookmakers. They defined upset-losses as team losses when teams are ex-
1The variable of interest in their study is the rate of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) committed by men against
women. They do however use the term family violence when referring to IPV.
2Only the first three teams (Carolina Panthers, Detroit Lions, and New England Patriots) had data for all 12
years, the remaining three teams (Denver Broncos, Kansas City Chiefs and Tennessee Titans) have data in later
years.
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pected to win and upset-wins as team wins when teams are expected to lose the match. They
found that upset-losses led to 10% increase in family violence and upset-wins had no signifi-
cant effect on levels of reported family violence.3 In addition, they found that for salient games,
the effects of upset-losses were larger than 10%. For example, in games which involved tra-
ditional rivals, upset-losses led to 20% increase in family violence. Similarly, they found that
when teams were still in play-off contention, upset-losses led to a 13% increase in family vi-
olence and they found that, in frustrating games, upset-losses led to a 15% increase in family
violence. Comparing the effects of half-time and full-time results, they found evidence which
suggests that the gain-loss utility is updated at the end of the match as half-time results had
no significant effect on the rates of family violence. They interpreted their results as evidence
for loss-aversion, a phenomenon in which agents’ sensitivities to losses are much higher than
sensitivities to gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman et al., 1991).
Dickson et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between domestic abuse in Glasgow and
games of the Scottish Premier League (SPL). Similar to Card and Dahl (2011), they hypothe-
sised that reference-dependent preferences or gain-loss utilities might be relevant in the effects
of SPL games on domestic abuse. They conducted their analysis using data on domestic abuse
obtained from the Strathclyde Police and historical data on football matches, outcomes and pre-
match betting odds for games of the SPL. Their data included daily count of reported domestic
abuse incidents in and around Glasgow for the period spanning 1st January 2003 to 5th October
2011, disaggregated by each of the 30 Glasgow subdivisions. During the sample period, 18
teams participated in the SPL. The two most dominant teams in the sample period were tra-
ditional rivals, Celtics and Rangers.4 Constructing pre-games expectations from the pre-game
betting odds, they found that only matches which involved traditional rivals Celtics and Rangers
- commonly referred to as Old Firm matches - led to an increase in domestic abuse regardless
of outcome. They remarked that because matches between Celtics and Rangers were expected
to be close there was no scope for upset-losses or upset-wins between these two teams. Only
in important matches - defined as the last 10 matches of the season (24% of all matches in the
sample) or the last 5 matches of the season (8% of all matches in the sample ) - did they find
evidence for reference-dependence in the relationship between domestic abuse and games of
the SPL.
These two studies are situated within a body of literature which argues that the disap-
pointment of sports fans which result from unexpected sports outcomes leads to an increase
in recorded violent behaviour. For example, Rees and Schnepel (2009) find that on game days
in North American college football, the host community (the home team community) records
a sharp increase in assaults, vandalism and arrests for disorderly conduct. They note that the
increase in crimes is higher when the home team has suffered an unexpected loss (upset loss).
Priks (2010) finds that in Swedish football, fans exhibit higher levels of unruly behaviour i.e.
3Interestingly, they also find marginally significant increase in violence following an upset win against a rival.
4A point which is buttressed by the fact that either Celtics or Rangers had won the league in all the years in
sample as well as in the betting odds.
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throwing projectiles into the playing field, when supported teams perform worse relative to fan
expectations. Munyo and Rossi (2013) also find that in Uruguay, crimes such as robberies and
theft increase after fans experience frustration. They defined frustration as resulting from dis-
appointing sports outcome relative to fans’ expectations. These studies argue that in relation to
the outcome of sports competition, observed patterns in reported or recorded violent behaviour
exhibits what is known to psychologists as Disappointment Aversion (Gul et al., 1991) and to
economists as Loss Aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
Loss aversion was first proposed in Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect theory of decisions
under risky choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and risk-less choice (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1991). Prospect theory was proposed as a better model for explaining individual choice
relative to Expected Utility theory.
Expected Utility theory holds that all choices or prospects are evaluated on the final state
of their outcomes such that a certain choice should be made or accepted if the added utility of
making the choice exceeded the utility from not making the choice. Expected Utility theory also
assumes that the utility of wealth has an (everywhere) concave function. Using empirical evi-
dence, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that observed behaviour on risky choices
violate the predictions of Expected Utility in systematic ways such as the certainty effect which
violates the axiom of substitution, the reflection effect and the isolation effect. Certainty effect
refers to the idea that certain outcome given more weight relative to probable outcomes. Re-
flection effect refers to the idea that under risky choice, risk aversion in the positive domain is
associated with risk seeking in the negative domain. This effect violates the assumption that the
utility of wealth is everywhere concave because it implies that the utility function is concave in
the position domain but convex in the negative domain. The isolation effect refers to the idea
that shared features between choices are disregarded so that choices are only considered on their
distinguishing features.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that the real carriers of value are not the final states
of wealth but the changes in wealth relative to a neutral reference point such that choices or
prospects are evaluated as gains and losses from a given reference point like the current state
of wealth. They argued that because the value -utility- function is concave in the positive do-
main (above the reference point) and convex in the negative domain (below the reference point),
losses loom larger than gains. This implies that agents are more sensitive to losses than gains
of the same magnitude hence, agents are averse to losses. In Tversky and Kahneman (1991),
they argue that loss aversion can be used to explain other behaviour such as the endowment
effect where the loss of utility associated with giving up a good is greater than the utility gain
associated with receiving it (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990, 1991); the status quo bias in
which loss aversion induces a bias that favours the retention of the current status (Knetsch and
Sinden, 1984; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Knetsch et al., 1989) coined by (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988); and descrepancies between the willingness to pay (WTP) and the will-
ingness to accept (WTA) (Cummings, 1986; Heberlein and Bishop, 1986; Loewenstein, 1988;
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Kahneman et al., 1990).
The reference point around which agents evaluate gains or losses could be the current state
of wealth, a status quo, an endowment or a rational expectation (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006).
There is a body of literature which provides evidence for loss aversion and reference-dependent
preferences both in the experimental literature and in the empirical literature. Kőszegi and Ra-
bin (2006) find evidence for reference dependence in the labour supply behaviour of New York
cab drivers where drivers based their labour decisions on expectations about their earnings.
Genesove and Mayer (2001) found evidence for loss aversion in the real estate market of down-
town Boston where condomininum owners set higher asking prices, attain higher selling prices
and exhibit lower sale hazard subject to nominal losses. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) explained
the equity premium puzzle - the empirical phenomenon where stocks perform better than bonds
- using loss aversion. Closely following Card and Dahl (2011) and Dickson et al. (2016), we
hypothesize that the relationship between major football tournaments and trends in reported do-
mestic abuse in the United Kingdom exhibits reference dependence such that wins and losses
of supported football teams are evaluated based on pre-game (pre-match) expectations.
3.2.2 International Tournaments and Domestic Abuse in England and
Wales
There have been previous studies on the links between domestic abuse and football in England
and Wales (Brimicombe and Cafe, 2012; Kirby et al., 2014; PSCD, 2006; Sivarajasingam et al.,
2005). These studies have, however, only focused on the FIFA World Cup (international tour-
nament) and have used data on domestic abuse which span only the length of a month (June).
Based on a report by Sivarajasingam et al. (2005) which demonstrated the existence of
a link between major sporting events and trends in violent crime. The British Home Office
conducted an analysis which demonstrated that the 2006 FIFA World Cup was associated with
an increase in incidents of reported domestic abuse (PSCD, 2006). Their analysis involved
two domestic abuse Enforcement Campaigns (DVEC): the first, which ran from 3rd February
to 31st March 2006 had 46 participating Basic Command Units (BCUs) and the second, which
ran from 9th June to 9th July 2006 had 52 participating BCUs. The time period for the second
DVEC was selected specifically to capture the effects of the 2006 FIFA World Cup on trends
in domestic abuse. By comparing the levels of reported domestic abuse incidents on a FIFA
World Cup match day when England played5 and the match day of the FIFA World Cup final to
the average of all equivalent weekdays from the first DVEC, they found that England matches
of the FIFA World Cup tournament was associated with an increase in the number of domestic
abuse incidents (11%).
In response to PSCD (2006), Brimicombe and Cafe (2012) highlighted that the time of the
year in which the 2006 FIFA World Cup was held might have contributed to observed increase
5There were five England match days in the 2006 FIFA World Cup
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in reported domestic abuse. This is because warmer months are associated with higher levels
of reported domestic abuse. They also argued that the participating BCUs of the PSCD study
consisted mainly of urban regions and thus the findings of the study might be biased towards
urban regions. In addition, Brimicombe and Cafe were interested in the ways outcomes of
FIFA England matches might affect trends of reported domestic abuse. They hypothesised that
an England win would make fans happy and thus might lead to a decrease in domestic abuse
levels. Whilst an England loss would make the fans unhappy and thus lead to an increase in the
levels of domestic abuse.
Data for their analysis was obtained from Freedom of Information (FoI) requests6 made by
the BBC to each of the 52 police force areas in the United Kingdom (UK). Their data consisted
of of daily count of reported domestic violence for the month of June of 2005, 2006, 2009 and
2010.
With this they captured the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cup tournaments along with the pre-
ceding years of 2005 and 2009 which served as control periods. From comparing FIFA World
Cup England match days with equivalent non-match days, they found that England matches
which ended in a definite win or lose outcome led to significant increases in the rate of reported
domestic abuse. An England win led to a 27.7% increase whilst an England lose led to a 31.5%
increase in the rates of reported domestic abuse.
In a similar study, Kirby et al. (2014) investigated the links between the FIFA World Cup and
trends of reported domestic abuse in Lancashire. They obtained their data from the Lancashire
police force area. Their data consisted of monthly counts of reported domestic abuse for the
years 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 20107 as well as daily counts of reported domestic
abuse for the period spanning 1st of June to 1st of July for the FIFA World Cup years of 2002,
2006 and 2010. Using Poisson and Negative Binomial regression analyses, they found that the
risk of domestic abuse rose by 26% when the English national team won and 38% when the
English national team lost.
The Home Office defines domestic abuse as “Any incident of threatening behaviour, vio-
lence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are
or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”(ONS,
2018). According to the ONS (2018), domestic abuse affects approximately one third of the
population, with women being more affected than men. One in five women suffer interpersonal
violence, compared with one in ten men who suffer domestic abuse. The ONS (2018) estimates
that 6.1% of people aged 16 to 59 years had experienced some form of domestic abuse in the
last year. Women were two times more likely than men to be victims of domestic abuse (28.9%
women and 13.2% men since the age of 16 and 7.9% women versus 4.2% men in the last year).
Younger women (20 -24 years old), women who are divorced and women with lower income
were more likely to be victims of domestic abuse. Domestic abuse is characterised by repeat
6A Freedom of Information request is a request made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which
provides public access to information held by public authorities (ICO, 2017).
7To account for a change in accounting practices, the data from 2001 was removed from their analysis.
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victimisation and is largely underreported (HMIC, 2014, 2015), according to the ONS (2018) of
those who experienced domestic abuse in the previous year, only 17.3% told the police. Some
of the reasons stated for not reporting to the police includes: “it was a private family matter and
not the business of the police”, “it was too trivial or not worth reporting”, or “victims didn’t
think the police could help”.
Domestic abuse imposes a cost to society beyond the physical and mental cost experienced
by victims of domestic abuse and their immediate social circles (Walby, 2004; Oliver et al.,
2019). Walby (2004) estimated the cost of domestic abuse to society at £23 billion per year
and Oliver et al. (2019) estimated the cost of domestic abuse to society at £66 billion per year.
These include the cost to the criminal justice system, health care, social services, housing, civil
legal services, and loss in economic output as a result of the incident.
Like PSCD (2006) and Dickson et al. (2016), we argue that from a resource perspective,
it is important to identify factors which might affect domestic abuse , so that police resources
can be allocated efficiently. It is important to note, however, that we are not suggesting that the
only engagement with domestic abuse is via sport but we do posit that sport, and football in
particular is an important trigger.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a model which describes the effect of the EPL game outcomes of re-
ported domestic abuse. The model presented here closely follows that of Card and Dahl (2011).
The major hypothesis is that EPL local-team wins and losses generate emotional cues which
reflect gains or losses around a rationally expected reference point. This model treats domes-
tic abuse (violence) as an unintended outcome of interactions in conflict-prone8 relationships
which could by family relationships or intimate partner relationships. Following the loss of
control model presented in Card and Dahl (2011), we assume that the perpetrator is more likely
to lose control after exposure to negative emotional shocks.9 Consider a household where each
period has some positive risk of heated altercations which could escalate to violence h ≥ 0.
We argue that this positive likelihood of violence h is affected by the emotional cues associated
with the outcome of a professional football game y and p, where y = 1 indicates a local-team
win, y = 0 indicates a local-team loss. We denote the probability the individual assigns to a
local-team victory with p ∈ [0, 1]. From this we obtain:
h = h0 − µ(y − p) (3.1)
8We feel it important to highlight that we do not hold the position that the outcome of professional sports will
create the risk of violence where it does not already exist.
9In their study, Card and Dahl (2011) assume that men are the primary perpetrators. Although our data suggests
that women are more affected than men (ONS, 2018), we choose to stay agnostic to the gender of the perpetrators
as the abuse could also (less likely) be female (HMIC, 2015).
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where µ is the gain-loss utility associated with the game outcome. Like Card and Dahl (2011),
we assume that that µ is piecewise linear such that:
µ(y − p) = α(y − p), y − p < 0 (3.2)
µ(y − p) = β(y − p), y − p > 0 (3.3)
Loss aversion implies that the marginal effects of a loss is weighted higher than the marginal
effects of a win. Thus for positive constants α and β, α > β. These assumptions lead to four
extremal outcomes, in the case that the outcome of the game is a loss i.e. y = 0, we obtain:
hL(p) = h0 − α(0− 1) = h0 + α (3.4)
hL(p) = h0 − α(0− 0) = h0 (3.5)
Similarly, in the case that the outcome of the game is a win i.e. y = 1, we obtain:
hW (p) = h0 − β(1− 1) = h0 (3.6)
hW (p) = h0 − β(1− 0) = h0 − β (3.7)
Figure 3.1: Risk of Violence Following a Loss or Win (Card and Dahl, 2011)
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Given that h is linear in p Figure 3.1 is a plot of the risk of violence following a win or a
loss based on the above equations. As we can see Figure 3.1, the risk of violence following
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a loss out-weighs the risk of violence following a win. In the worst case, the risk of violence
following a win is h0, whilst the risk of violence following a loss is h0 + α.
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3.4 Data and Methodology
In this section we present our general econometric model and details on the data used in this
study.
3.4.1 Data
Domestic Abuse
We obtained our data on daily count of reported domestic abuse for the period 1st January 2014
to 31st July 2016 from Freedom of Information requests made to police forces in the United
Kingdom (UK).
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests are made under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) which gives members of the public the right to access recorded information held by
public sector organisations (ICO, 2017). We obtained positive responses from 28 police force
areas. Data for London is disaggregated by borough so in the empirical analysis we consider
these results separately from the other regions of England and Wales. Throughout this chap-
ter, we use England & Wales and County interchangeably when referring to the Police Force
Area which excludes London. We use London or London Boroughs to refer to data obtained for
London. In Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, we present the summary statistics of domestic abuse in Eng-
land & Wales and London Boroughs respectively. From Table 3.1 we can see that Manchester,
Thames Valley, West Midlands and West Yorkshire record higher levels of domestic abuse; this
might be due to the size of the counties. On the other hand, we can see that Table 3.2 among the
London boroughs, Heathrow Airport has the lowest recorded amount of domestic abuse; this is
probably because Heathrow Airport is not primarily residential.
In Figure 3.2, we present the plot of the sum of domestic abuse across all the police force
areas (or boroughs) in our sample. Figure 3.2 Panel (a) displays incidents of domestic abuse
across England and Wales (excluding London) and Panel (b) reports aggregate results for Lon-
don. We can see that data on daily count of domestic abuse appears to be volatile, with longer
spikes around the new year and around the middle of the year (around June). The spikes around
the new year are more pronounced for England & Wales than for London. In London the spikes
around the new year appear to be only slightly higher than the spikes around June. These and
other trends are explored further in the results section.
102 CHAPTER 3. FOOTBALL AND DOMESTIC ABUSE
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Reported Incidents of Domestic Abuse by Police Force Area
for England and Wales
Police Force Area Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Avon and Somerset 63.73 12.88 30 123
Bedfordshire 29.57 8.92 7 81
Cambrigdeshire 13.97 6.70 2 52
Cheshire 15.16 6.45 1 52
Croydon 21.73 5.27 9 41
Cumbria 19.25 5.63 5 55
Derbyshire 49.22 10.19 24 108
Devon and Cornwall 77.32 16.18 30 152
Essex 81.89 14.71 25 146
Gloucestershire 27.71 6.39 10 65
Hertfordshire 25.74 6.29 11 48
Kent 40.82 12.05 15 93
Lancashire 70.85 16.30 33 142
Lincolnshire 26.29 7.13 8 62
Manchester 178.95 31.25 124 417
Norfolk 30.20 16.37 0 98
Northamptonshire 16.38 5.99 1 39
Northumbria 81.79 16.93 41 221
North Wales 28.93 7.98 10 73
North Yorkshire 12.17 4.54 1 32
South Wales 73.39 17.61 22 177
South Yorkshire 67.09 16.50 35 266
Staffordshire 63.04 12.35 29 147
Suffolk 25.40 6.39 9 57
Surrey 18.29 5.46 5 43
Thames Valley 122.66 17.61 76 209
West Mercia 52.45 12.27 25 110
West Midlands 128.33 20.56 80 225
West Yorkshire 122.38 26.53 58 268
Wiltshire 53.07 15.66 19 172
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Reported Incidents of Domestic Abuse by Boroughs in London
Police Force Area Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Barking and Dagenham 14.73 4.12 4 29
Barnet 13.21 3.86 3 28
Brent 9.64 3.38 1 24
Bexley 14.51 4.17 3 31
Bromley 12.76 3.88 4 27
Camden 8.76 3.08 1 22
Ealing 15.65 4.50 5 33
Enfield 15.72 4.31 3 34
Greenwich 15.25 4.51 5 33
Hackney 14.80 4.02 5 30
Hammersmith and Fulham 8.69 3.18 0 23
Haringey 15.14 4.07 3 33
Harrow 8.22 2.99 0 20
Havering 11.76 3.73 1 30
Heathrow Airport .13 .37 0 2
Hillingdon 13.77 4.18 3 29
Hounslow 14.19 4.12 3 30
Islington 11.88 3.71 4 28
Kensington and Chelsea 5.48 2.43 0 14
Kingston upon Thames 5.77 2.56 0 15
Lambeth 16.10 4.34 6 30
Lewisham 16.79 4.54 3 33
Merton 7.32 2.89 1 19
Newham 17.64 4.71 6 34
Redbridge 11.78 3.60 2 27
Richmond Upon Thames 5.18 2.38 0 13
South Wark 16.09 4.30 4 34
Sutton 8.02 3.05 0 23
Tower Hamlets 17.06 4.44 4 37
Waltham Forest 14.12 4.07 4 31
Wandsworth 11.50 3.81 2 24
Westminister 8.21 3.03 1 20
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Figure 3.2: Trends in Reported Domestic Abuse from 1st January 2014 - 31st July 2016
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Football
In our sample, we capture three EPL seasons in some part - the second half of the 2013/2014
season, the whole 2014/2015 season and whole 2015/2016 season; the 2014 FIFA World Cup
and the 2016 UEFA European Championship.
The EPL is the richest league in the world generating revenue in excess of £5 billion in
the 2017/18 season (Deloitte, 2019). According to a report by EY (2019), 43 million people
watched the EPL on the TV in the UK and in the 2016 - 2017 season, the EPL achieved a 97%
stadium utilisation rate. The EPL currently, and since the late 1990s, has consisted of 20 clubs.
Whilst a separate organisation to the Football League, there is promotion to and relegation from
the EPL each season with the three highest ranked teams (the third team is determined via a
series of play-offs) in the Championship - the tier immediately below the Premier League -
replacing the three lowest ranked teams in the EPL (EPL, 2018).
Given the EPL’s historical links to football hooliganism (Taylor, 1982; Dunning, 1994; Guil-
ianotti, 1994; Spaaij, 2014), we think it would be appropriate to study the links between the EPL
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and domestic abuse in England and Wales.
We obtained data on EPL fixtures from www.football-data.co.uk. During the period, 26
football teams were active in at least one of the seasons. These include: Arsenal, Aston Villa,
Bournemouth, Burnley, Cardiff, Chelsea, Crystal Palace, Everton, Fulham, Hull, Leicester, Liv-
erpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Newcastle, Norwich, QPR, Southampton, Stoke,
Sunderland, Swansea, Tottenham, Watford, West brom, and West Ham. In Table 3.3, we present
our pairing of EPL teams and their home counties (or borough) along with whether or not the
data is available in our sample.
In addition, we obtained data on the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 UEFA European
Championship. We provide detailed discussions of these in later sections.
Table 3.3: Pairing EPL Teams to Home Counties (or Boroughs)
EPL Team Home County Data in Sample
1 Arsenal Islington Yes
2 Aston Villa West Midlands Yes
3 Bournemouth Dorset No
4 Burnley Lancashire Yes
5 Cardiff South Wales Yes
6 Chelsea Kensington and Chelsea Yes
7 Crystal Palace Croydon Yes
8 Everton Merseyside No
9 Fulham Hammersmith and Fulham Yes
10 Hull East Yorkshire No
11 Leicester Leicester No
12 Liverpool Merseyside No
13 Manchester City Manchester Yes
14 Manchester United Manchester Yes
15 Newcastle Northumbria Yes
16 Norwich Norfolk Yes
17 QPR Hammersmith and Fulham Yes
18 Southampton Hampshire No
19 Stoke Staffordshire Yes
20 Sunderland Northumbria Yes
21 Swansea South Wales Yes
22 Tottenham Haringey Yes
23 Watford Hertfordshire Yes
24 West Brom West Midlands Yes
25 West Ham Newham Yes
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3.4.2 Econometric Model
As noted above, our dataset is a panel comprising the number of incidents of domestic abuse
recorded each day for 28 Police Forces in England and Wales. In the case of London, this
information is further disaggregated by borough.
The daily count of reported domestic abuse (DA) is the dependent variable on which we
conduct our analyses. This data is classed as count data because it has positive discrete values.
This violates the normal distribution assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation
methods, thus we use an estimation method more suited to count data analysis, Poisson Regres-
sion Method (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).
In equation 3.8 we present our general model specification. This specification closely fol-
lows that of Card and Dahl (2011).
log(Γjt) = φj +Xtω + f(pjt, yjt, σ) + ξjt (3.8)
where Γ is the expected number of domestic abuse incidents recorded by police force area
j on day t, φj represents a fixed effect estimator which captures unobserved heterogeneity for
the police force area such as size and characteristic of the local population. Xjt represents time
related variables such as day of the week, holidays, month of the year, and year. f(pjt, yjt, σ)
is a function of the pregame predicted probability of a home win pjt, the actual outcome of
the game yjt and the parameter estimates σ. Each of these factors are discussed in more detail
below.
3.4.3 Test for Over-dispersion
Prior to reporting our results, we conducted a test for over-dispersion to determine the appropri-
ateness of the Poisson regression method for our analysis. A simple test of for over-dispersion is
to compare the mean of the distribution with the variance of the distribution. If the mean is the
mean is greater than the variance, then the distribution is said to under-dispersed. If the mean
is less than the variance then the distribution is said to be over-dispersed. Table 3.4, presents a
summary statistics of daily counts of domestic abuse for London and for England & Wales.
Table 3.4: Mean and Variance of Domestic Abuse by Region
Region Mean Variance
England and Wales 55.73 1832.66
London 12.17 34.20
We see from Table 3.4 that the variance of domestic abuse is much larger than the mean for
both regions. This suggest that our sample is over-dispersed. As a more formal test, we conduct
a post-estimation test on the poisson estimation of Model 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). We
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compare the hypotheses:
H0 : V [γjt|xjt] = E[γjt|xjt] (3.9)
H1 : V [γjt|xjt] = E[γjt|xjt] + α(E[γjt|xjt])2 (3.10)
This hypothesis can be reduced to H0 : α = 0 against H0 : α > 0. We implement the
following auxiliary regression:
((γjt − ξ̂jt)2 − γjt)/ξ̂jt = αξ̂jt + error (3.11)
and text the hypothesis of ξ̂jt is zero.
Table 3.5: Test of Over-dispersion
(1) (2)
England & Wales London
ξ̂jt 267469.3∗∗∗ 13906.1∗∗∗
(98815.7) (655.8)
Observations 27231 30987
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
From Table 3.5, we fail to accept the null hypothesis and find that there is over-dispersion
in our data. Thus Negative Binomial methods will be better suited to our study. The analysis
in the rest of this chapter will be conducted using Negative Binomial methods with bootstrap
standard errors.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Domestic Tournament: English Premier League
Model 1. Time Effects Only.
log(Γjt) = φj + ω1DOWt + ω2MOYt + ω3Holidayt + ω4Y eart + ξjt (3.12)
In Equation 3.12, we expand only the time components of Equation 3.8. We expand Xtω
into day of the week, month of the year, holiday and year fixed effects. The variable DOW
groups the data by the day of the week. The first day in our sample is Sunday, thus Sunday
serves as the base day in our regression analysis. The variable MOY groups the data by the
month of the year, starting with January. The variable Holiday is binary variable defined as:
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Holiday =
1 if the day is an official bank holiday,0 Otherwise (3.13)
In England and Wales, there are typically eight bank holidays in a year - New Year’s day,
Good Friday, Easter Monday, Early May Bank Holiday, Spring Bank Holiday, Summer Bank
Holiday, Christmas Day and Boxing Day. Details of which specific dates are associated with the
holidays for each year are presented in Appendix 3.A.1 Table 3.41. The variable Year groups
the observation based on what year it occurred: 2014, 2015 or 2016.
Table 3.6: Trend in Reported Incidents of Domestic Abuse by Day of Week
Day of Week Mean SD Max
England and Wales Sunday 65.44 50.27 280
Monday 55.64 41.54 244
Tuesday 51.86 38.64 212
Wednesday 51.91 39.11 417
Thursday 51.00 38.35 377
Friday 53.27 40.55 415
Saturday 60.92 47.52 269
London Sunday 13.97 6.43 41
Monday 12.04 5.73 36
Tuesday 11.49 5.56 34
Wednesday 11.34 5.56 39
Thursday 11.47 5.53 38
Friday 11.67 5.49 35
Saturday 13.22 6.03 37
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 display descriptive statistics of domestic abuse for London and for
England & Wales by day of the week and month of the year respectively. From Table 3.6, we
see that the general trend for both regional groupings is that mean levels of domestic abuse
are lowest around the middle of the week on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. Levels of
domestic abuse appear to start rising on Fridays through to Saturdays and start to decline on
Mondays. Similarly from Table 3.7, the pattern appears to be that levels of domestic abuse start
to rise around May and peaks by June before subsequently starting to decline in August. In
addition, another spike in the levels of domestic abuse appears around December. This spike in
December, however, appears to be muted in the case of London. The higher levels of domestic
abuse around July might be due to the higher temperatures associated with that time of the year
(Anderson, 2001).
Our regression results for Model 1 are presented in Table 3.8 for England & Wales and
London Boroughs. For both regions, we see that all days of the week are associated with lower
levels of domestic abuse relative to Sundays, the base day of our model. Tuesdays, Wednesdays,
Thursdays and Fridays are associated with lower levels of domestic abuse compared to the days
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Table 3.7: Trend in Reported Incidents of Domestic Abuse by Month of Year
Month of Year Mean S.D. Max
England and Wales January 53.32 42.96 417
February 53.45 40.91 255
March 53.12 41.19 228
April 54.31 41.31 249
May 56.29 43.29 267
June 58.86 44.86 280
July 60.85 45.52 271
August 57.40 43.14 231
September 55.02 41.84 238
October 53.71 41.07 242
November 54.78 42.19 267
December 57.21 43.64 269
London January 11.58 5.77 39
February 11.64 5.52 35
March 11.72 5.55 37
April 11.77 5.76 41
May 12.44 5.96 39
June 12.78 6.00 33
July 13.22 6.22 40
August 12.51 6.01 36
September 12.02 5.65 33
October 11.99 5.81 34
November 12.09 5.72 33
December 12.25 5.86 38
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Saturday and Monday. The loweest level of domestic abuse occurs on a Thursday for England
& Wales and occurs on a Wednesday for London Boroughs. In England & Wales, Thursdays
are associated with a reduction of 23% in domestic abuse with p < 0.01 compared to Sundays.
In London, Wednesdays are associated with a reduction of 20% in domestic abuse with p <
0.01 compared to Sundays. This result appears to be robust across the other specifications in
Table 3.8.
Similarly for both regions, England & Wales and London, we see that the base month, Jan-
uary, is associated with the lowest levels of domestic abuse. In both regions, levels of domestic
abuse appear to rise around the months of May and June, peaks in July and begin to decline
again around August with an additional spike around December.
Regarding year effects, we find that compared to 2014 (the base year), 2015 and 2016 are
associated with higher levels of domestic abuse for both regions. For England & Wales, 2015
is associated with a 4% increase in domestic abuse and 2016 is associated with a 9% increase
in domestic abuse relative to levels of domestic abuse in 2014. For London, 2015 is associated
with a 1% increase in domestic abuse and 2016 is associated with a 4% increase in domestic
abuse relative to levels in 2014. These results are robust across the specifications in Table 3.8.
Whilst the result might suggest that levels of domestic abuse have increased over the period in
our sample, the rise may be due to the fact that there is an increase in the rates of reporting
domestic abuse as opposed to a rise in the occurrence of the incidents (HMIC, 2014, 2015)
as well as a changes to the definition of domestic abuse to include coercive and controlling
behaviour in 2015 (HO, 2015).
As presented in columns 1b and 2b of Table 3.8, the variable Holiday is associated with a
22% increase in domestic abuse for England & Wales and a 12% increase in domestic abuse
for London with p < 0.01. In Columns 1c and 1b, we split Holiday into Bh-Oth and Bh-Chris.
Bh-Oth accounts for Non-Christmas and New Year bank holidays i.e. all bank holidays except
Christmas day and New Year day. Bh-Chris accounts for only Christmas and New Year bank
holidays. We find that for both regions, the holiday effect is driven primarily by the Christmas
and New Year bank holidays (Bh-Chris). In England & Wales Bh-Oth is associated with a 10%
increase in levels of domestic abuse whilst Bh-Chris is associated with a 45% increase in levels
of domestic abuse. In London a similar pattern holds. Bh-Oth is associated with a 2% increase
in domestic abuse whilst Bh-Chris is associated with a 27% increase in domestic abuse.10
10Table of results for the sample as a whole is included in Table 3.45 Appendix 3.A.2.
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Table 3.8: Regression Showing Time variables for England & Wales and London
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
dv
Monday -0.152∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0346) (0.0324) (0.00684) (0.00793) (0.00926)
Tuesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0303) (0.0295) (0.00700) (0.00804) (0.00931)
Wednesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0279) (0.00632) (0.00862) (0.00874)
Thursday -0.239∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.00727) (0.00933) (0.00933)
Friday -0.199∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0279) (0.0260) (0.00735) (0.00809) (0.00895)
Saturday -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗
(0.00795) (0.00754) (0.00930) (0.00503) (0.00599) (0.00654)
February 0.0129∗ 0.0169∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.00560 0.00925 0.0146
(0.00754) (0.00851) (0.00878) (0.0103) (0.00916) (0.0113)
March 0.00114 -0.000394 0.00917 0.0118 0.0128∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00702) (0.00949) (0.00819) (0.00951) (0.00628) (0.00772)
April 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0180∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.00980) (0.00891) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.00829) (0.00894)
May 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0689∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0129) (0.00822) (0.00756) (0.00759)
June 0.108∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0136) (0.00739) (0.00741) (0.00780)
July 0.146∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0146) (0.00850) (0.00891) (0.00766)
August 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0129) (0.00889) (0.0104) (0.00856)
September 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0163) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0108)
October 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0122) (0.0135) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0117)
November 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0140)
December 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0996∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0129) (0.0152) (0.00940) (0.00784) (0.0107)
2015 0.0433∗∗ 0.0427∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0154∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0153∗
(0.0192) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.00791) (0.00783) (0.00824)
2016 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0361) (0.0310) (0.0349) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0103)
holiday 0.222∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0106)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0271∗
(0.0282) (0.0140)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0195)
Constant 3.669∗∗∗ 3.725∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.278∗∗∗ 5.341∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.327) (0.310) (0.137) (0.138) (0.144)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Model 2. Time Effects and Match Day Variables.
log(Γjt) = φj +Xtω + σ1MatchDayjt + ξjt (3.14)
In Model 2, we begin unpacking the football related function f(pjt, yjt, σ) by adding a new
variable Matchday to Model 1. Matchday is defined as:
Matchday =
1 if EPL match takes place on that day,0 Otherwise (3.15)
In Table 3.42 of Appendix 3.A.1 we present a full list of all EPL match-days. In this model,
we test the hypothesis presented in PSCD (2006), that the mere existence of an EPL match or
fixture has an effect on the number of incidents of domestic abuse.
Our results are presented in Table 3.10.11 From Column 1a, we can see that Matchday is
associated with a 0.9% increase in domestic abuse for England & Wales with p < 0.01. From
Column 2a, we see that Matchday is associated with a 0.3% decrease in levels of domestic abuse
for London. The decrease associated with Matchday in London is not statistically significant.
It is possible that levels of domestic abuse in a given county or borough is only affected by
whether or not a local team from the county/borough is involved in a match. To test for this
possibility, we introduce a new variable Matchpa, which stands for Match by police authority.
Matchpa is a binary variable which is defined as:
Matchpa =
1 if EPL match involves a team from a relevant county/borough,0 Otherwise (3.16)
From Column 1b and 2b of Table 3.10, we see that for England & Wales, Matchpa is as-
sociated with a 1% increase in domestic abuse. This result is not statistically significant. In
London, Matchpa is associated with 2% decrease in domestic abuse. Like Matchday in Column
2a, the sign associated with this variable is negative, where we expect a positive sign, and is
not statistically significant. These results suggest that EPL matches have no effect on levels of
domestic violence in London even when the match involves a local team.
Before we settle on this conclusion, we break Matchpa into another variable named Match-
count. Since some counties/boroughs may have more than one local team involved in an EPL
fixture on a given match day, Matchcount accounts for the number of relevant games associated
11The complete table of full results can be found in Table 3.46 Appendix 3.A.2
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with a given county/borough on a match day. Matchcount is defined as:
Matchcount =

2 if there are up to two relevant EPL fixtures for a county/borough,
1 if there is one EPL fixture associated with a county/borough,
0 Otherwise
(3.17)
In our sample, the maximum number of EPL fixtures associated with a given county/borough
is two. From Column 1c, we see that for England & Wales, having up to two relevant matches
on a given day is associated with a 7% increase in levels of domestic abuse with p < 0.05 and
having only one relevant match is associated with a 0.5% decrease in levels of domestic abuse
but this is not statistically significant. From Column 2c, we see that for London, the number of
relevant matches has no statistically significant effect on level of domestic abuse.
As a further step, we break Matchcount into whether or not the EPL fixtures are home
fixtures or away fixtures. We replace Matchcount with two new variables named Hometeam
and Awayteam. These variables are binary variables defined as:
Hometeam =
1 if the EPL fixture associated with a county/borough is a home fixture,0 Otherwise
(3.18)
Awayteam =
1 if the EPL fixture associated with a county/borough is an away fixture,0 Otherwise
(3.19)
From Column 1d, we see that in England & Wales Hometeam is associated with about 2%
increase in domestic abuse and Awayteam is associated with about 3% increase in domestic
abuse. These results are, however, not statistically significant. From Column 2d, we see that
in London Hometeam is associated with a 2% decrease in domestic abuse and Awayteam is
associated with about 2% decrease in domestic abuse. These variables are not statistically
significant. Based on the results in Table 3.10, we find that in England & Wales the existence
of an EPL fixture is associated with an upward trend in domestic abuse. In London, we find
that trends in domestic abuse are unaffected by the existence of an EPL match. Our results for
England and Wales are consistent with the hypothesis of PSCD (2006), that the existence of
an (EPL) fixture appears to affect the levels of reported domestic abuse. Table 3.9 displays a
summary statistic of the time and match day variables by region.
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics of Time and Match Day Variables
Region Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
holiday 27,347 .0223 .1476 0 1
Bh-Oth 27,347 .0148 .1209 0 1
Bh-Chris 27,347 .0074 .0858 0 1
2014 27,347 .3871 .4871 0 1
2015 27,347 .3871 .4871 0 1
2016 27,347 .2259 .4182 0 1
matchday 27,347 .2587 .4379 0 1
matchpa 27,347 .0270 .1621 0 1
matchcount 27,347 .0333 .2119 0 2
hometeam 27,347 .0167 .1281 0 1
awayteam 27,347 .0177 .1318 0 1
London
holiday 31,119 .0223 .1476 0 1
Bh-Oth 31,119 .0148 .1209 0 1
Bh-Chris 31,119 .0074 .0858 0 1
2014 31,119 .3871 .4871 0 1
2015 31,119 .3871 .4871 0 1
2016 31,119 .2259 .4182 0 1
matchday 31,119 .2587 .4379543 0 1
matchpa 31,119 .0171 .12963 0 1
matchcount 31,119 .0171 .12963 0 1
hometeam 31,119 .0085 .09206 0 1
awayteam 31,119 .0085 .09206 0 1
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Table 3.10: Regression with Match Day Variables for Both Regions
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
Domestic Abuse
Bh-Oth 0.0996∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0271) (0.0262) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0115)
Bh-Chris 0.448∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0340) (0.0347) (0.0422) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0194)
matchday 0.00931∗∗∗ -0.00309
(0.00357) (0.00363)
matchpa 0.0141 -0.0209
(0.0319) (0.0240)
matchcount=1 -0.00507 -0.0209
(0.0375) (0.0294)
matchcount=2 0.0712∗∗
(0.0306)
hometeam 0.0161 -0.0221
(0.0522) (0.0180)
awayteam 0.0255 -0.0197
(0.0340) (0.0282)
Constant 3.753∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.405) (0.316) (0.434) (0.146) (0.142) (0.124) (0.118)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Model 3. Time Effects, Match Day and Match Result Variables.
log(Γjt) = φj +Xtω + σ1MatchOutcomejt + ξjt (3.20)
In Model 3, we introduce variables which capture the full time match outcome of each match
for EPL teams and their relevant county/borough. The football outcome variables are defined
separately for when the local team plays a home fixture and when the local teams plays an away
fixture. When the local team plays a home fixture, the football outcome variables are defined as
follows:
HW =
1 if the local team wins the home fixture,0 Otherwise (3.21)
HD =
1 if the local team draws in the fixture home fixture,0 Otherwise (3.22)
HL =
1 if the local team loses the home fixture,0 Otherwise (3.23)
When the local team plays an away fixture the football outcome variables are defined as
follows:
AW =
1 if the local team wins the away fixture,0 Otherwise (3.24)
AD =
1 if the local team draws the fixture away fixture,0 Otherwise (3.25)
AL =
1 if the local team loses the away fixture,0 Otherwise (3.26)
With this model, we test the hypothesis put forward by Brimicombe and Cafe (2012) that
a local team win will result in a reduction in levels of domestic abuse, while a local team lose
will result in an increase in levels of domestic abuse. From Column 1a of Table 3.12 we see that
for England and Wales, match outcomes are not associated with statistically significant changes
in domestic abuse, except when the local team wins an away fixture (AW). A win in an away
fixture (AW) is associated with a 4% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.05. From Column
2a we see that match outcomes are not associated with changes in trends of domestic abuse
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in London.12 These results stand in contrast to the hypothesis presented in Brimicombe and
Cafe (2012). We find that the outcome of an EPL match has no effect on domestic abuse in the
best case and that, in the worst case, a win is associated with an increase and not a decrease in
domestic abuse.
Table 3.11 displays a summary statistic of the match outcome variables by region.13
Table 3.11: Summary Statistics of Match Outcome Variables
Region Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
HW 27,347 .0066 .0811 0 1
HD 27,347 .0041 .0636 0 1
HL 27,347 .0055 .0743 0 1
AW 27,347 .0040 .0633 0 1
AD 27,347 .0039 .0630 0 1
AL 27,347 .0082 .0903 0 1
London
HW 31,119 .0043 .0652 0 1
HD 31,119 .0019 .0445 0 1
HL 31,119 .0023 .0477 0 1
AW 31,119 .0032 .0565 0 1
AD 31,119 .0022 .0470 0 1
AL 31,119 .0031 .0557 0 1
12The complete table of full results can be found in Table 3.47 Appendix 3.A.2
13Table of results for the sample as a whole is included in Table 3.49 Appendix 3.A.2.
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Table 3.12: Regression with Match Outcome and Reference Dependent Variables for Both Re-
gions
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
70% 50% 70% 50%
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0271∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0269) (0.0290) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0104)
Bh-Chris 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0315) (0.0319) (0.0209) (0.0201) (0.0205)
HW 0.0231 -0.0210
(0.0178) (0.0285)
HD 0.0252 -0.0229
(0.0222) (0.0358)
HL 0.00788 -0.0234
(0.0183) (0.0295)
AW 0.0432∗∗ -0.00810
(0.0188) (0.0283)
AD 0.0233 0.00817
(0.0203) (0.0269)
AL 0.0155 -0.0534
(0.0229) (0.0520)
H-Expected 0.0266∗∗ 0.0197 -0.0211 -0.0180
(0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0138) (0.0201)
H- UW 0.00133 0.00474 -0.0206 -0.0367
(0.0131) (0.0187) (0.0330) (0.0514)
H-UL 0.0418∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ -0.122 -0.0191
(0.0252) (0.0195) (0.127) (0.0581)
A-Expected 0.0184 0.0207∗ -0.0256 -0.0248
(0.0201) (0.0125) (0.0414) (0.0309)
A-UW 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗ -0.00920 0.00803
(0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0230) (0.0359)
A-UL 0.0754∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0631)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.348) (0.306) (0.154) (0.166) (0.146)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Model 4. EPL Related Trends in Domestic Abuse: Reference Dependent Match Outcome (RDMO).
log(Γjt) = φj +Xtω + σ1RDMOjt + ξjt (3.27)
In this model, we introduce reference-dependent match outcome variables. The reference
dependent variables are defined separately for home fixtures and away fixtures. When the local
team plays a home fixture, the reference dependent variables are defined as:
H − Expected =
1 if the local team’s outcome is as expected,0 Otherwise (3.28)
H − UW =
1 if the local team’s win is unexpected,0 Otherwise (3.29)
H − UL =
1 if the local team’s lose is unexpected,0 Otherwise (3.30)
When the local team plays an away fixture, the reference dependent variables are defined
as:
A− Expected =
1 if the local team’s outcome is as expected,0 Otherwise (3.31)
A− UW =
1 if the local team’s win is unexpected,0 Otherwise (3.32)
A− UL =
1 if the local team’s lose is unexpected,0 Otherwise (3.33)
The reference dependent variables were constructed by comparing the pre-game expected
match outcome with the actual match outcome of the EPL fixture.
We constructed the pre-game expected match outcomes by using betting odds obtained from
a football bookmaker. We chose the Ladbrokes bookmaker prices for our study. Pre-games bet-
ting odds are known to be efficient predictors of match outcomes ((Angelini and De Angelis,
2019; Elaad et al., 2019)). Data on betting odds were obtained from www.football-data.co.uk.
From the betting odds, we constructed the probability of match outcomes and corrected for the
overround by normalising the outcome probabilities i.e. we divided the each outcome probabil-
ity by the sum of the all outcome probabilities.
Following Dickson et al. (2016), in the first instance, we define expectedness of a match out-
come by a 70% threshold. However, as shown in Table 3.13, a 70% threshold is quite high for
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our sample. In addition, from the sample of probabilities in the blog posts at http://blogs.reading.ac.uk/econscorecast/
constructed by Reade et al. (2019) a 70% threshold is also considered to be high.
Table 3.13: Summary statistics of Probability of Home Wins and Away Wins across all five
EPL seasons
Variables Mean Standard Dev. Min Max
P(Home Win) 0.45 0.18 0.08 0.87
P(Away Win) 0.30 0.16 0.03 0.77
Thus, along with the 70% threshold, we also present results obtained from a 50% threshold
of expectedness. Table 3.14 presents an illustration of how pre-game expectations are mapped
unto actual performance and Table 3.16 presents an example of how variables are coded based
on EPL fixtures of 8th August 2015 and 15th May 2016.
Table 3.14: Mapping of Home-team pregame expected performance on Actual performance
Home Team Full Time Result
Expected Probabilty of Winning Loss Draw Win
≥ x Unexpected Unexpected Expected
< x Expected Expected Unexpected
Where x is the threshold of unexpectedness.
Columns 1b and 2b of Table 3.12 display the results the reference dependence variables
using the 70% threshold of expectedness whilst Columns 1c and 2c present the results using the
50% threshold of expectedness.14
For England and Wales, we see that for home fixtures at the 70% threshold of expected-
ness (Col. 1b), H-Expected is associated with a 3% increase in domestic abuse and H-UL is
associated with a 4% increase in domestic abuse. These results suggest that the reference de-
pendence of football match outcomes affects trends in domestic abuse such that compared to
an expected home outcome (H-Expected) and unexpected home lose (H-UL) leads to almost
two times higher increase in domestic abuse.15 This effect is stronger when we use the 50%
threshold in Column 1c. When we use the 50% threshold of expectedness, H-expected loses
it’s statistical significance and H-UL becomes associated with a 6% increase in domestic abuse
with p < 0.01. For away fixtures, we see in Col. 1b that an unexpected away win (A-UW) is as-
sociated with a 4% increase in domestic abuse at the 70% threshold of expectedness. However
at the 50% threshold of expectedness (Col. 1c), we see that overall away fixtures are associated
with an increase in domestic abuse but an unexpected away lose (A-UL) is associated with a
14In addition to the 70% and 50% threshold, we present results based on a 60% threshold of expectedness. These
results can be found in Table 3.48 Appendix 3.A.2
15These result are further confirmed by our analysis using a 60% threshold of expectedness. The effects sizes
from the 60% threshold are much larger than even those obtained from the 50% threshold of expectedness. These
results can be found in Table 3.48 Appendix 3.A.2
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much larger increase in domestic abuse. A-Expected is a associated with a 2% increase domes-
tic abuse with p < 0.1, A-UW is associated with a 3% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.05
and A-UL is associated with a 7% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.01.
For London, on the other hand, we see that trends in domestic abuse are not affected by
the reference dependence of football outcome. All the reference dependence variables are not
statistically significant expect A-UL in Col. 2c which is negatively signed. This suggests that
in London an unexpected loss in an away fixture is associated with a 27% decrease in domes-
tic abuse. Table 3.15 displays a summary statistic of the reference dependent match outcome
variables by region.
Table 3.15: Summary Statistics of Reference Dependence Match Outcome Variables
Region Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
70 Threshold
H-Expected 27,347 .0107 .1030 0 1
H-UW 27,347 .0054 .0731 0 1
H-UL 27,347 .000146 .0121 0 1
A-Expected 27,347 .0122 .1098 0 1
A-UW 27,347 .00402 .0633 0 1
50 Threshold
H-Expected 27,347 .0117 .1075 0 1
H-UW 27,347 .003803 .0615 0 1
H-UL 27,347 .000731 .02703 0 1
A-Expected 27,347 .0128 .1125 0 1
A-UW 27,347 .003108 .0556 0 1
A-UL 27,347 .0002925 .0171 0 1
London
70 Threshold
H-Expected 31,119 .00530 .0726 0 1
H-UW 31,119 .00308 .0554 0 1
H-UL 31,119 .000161 .01267 0 1
A-Expected 31,119 .00537 .0730 0 1
A-UW 31,119 .003187 .0563 0 1
50 Threshold
H-Expected 31,119 .00643 .0799115 0 1
H-UW 31,119 .00164 .0404504 0 1
H-UL 31,119 .000482 .02195 0 1
A-Expected 31,119 .00627 .0789126 0 1
A-UW 31,119 .00206 .0453 0 1
A-UL 31,119 .000225 .0150 0 1
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Table 3.16: Construction of the Reference Dependence Variable
Labroke Bookmarker Points Probabilities
Date Hometeam Awayteam Full Time Result Home Draw Away Home Draw Away Expectation
08/08/2015 Bournemouth Aston Villa A 2.05 3.30 4.00 0.47 0.29 0.24 Expected
08/08/2015 Chelsea Swansea D 1.40 4.50 10.00 0.69 0.21 0.10 Expecteda
08/08/2015 Everton Watford D 1.75 3.80 5.00 0.55 0.25 0.19 Expected
08/08/2015 Leicester Sunderland H 2.00 3.40 4.20 0.48 0.28 0.23 Unexpected Win
08/08/2015 Man United Tottenham H 1.67 4.00 5.50 0.58 0.24 0.18 Unexpected Win
08/08/2015 Norwich Crystal Palace A 2.62 3.20 2.90 0.37 0.30 0.33 Expected
15/05/2016 Arsenal Aston Villa H 1.15 9.00 19.00 0.84 0.11 0.05 Expected
15/05/2016 Chelsea Leicester D 2.30 3.75 3.00 0.42 0.26 0.32 Expected
15/05/2016 Everton Norwich H 1.80 4.20 4.20 0.54 0.23 0.23 Unexpected Win
15/05/2016 Newcastle Tottenham H 4.33 4.00 1.80 0.22 0.24 0.54 Unexpected Win
15/05/2016 Southampton Crystal Palace H 1.33 5.50 9.50 0.72 0.18 0.10 Expected
15/05/2016 Stoke West Ham H 3.40 3.75 2.10 0.28 0.26 0.46 Unexpected Win
15/05/2016 Swansea Man City D 6.50 4.33 1.53 0.15 0.22 0.63 Expected
15/05/2016 Watford Sunderland D 2.05 3.75 3.60 0.47 0.26 0.27 Expected
15/05/2016 West Brom Liverpool D 2.40 3.60 2.90 0.40 0.27 0.33 Expected
a Using the home-team winning probability threshold of 60% presented in in Table 3.48 of Appendix 3.A.2, this would be classed as an unexpected outcome.
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3.5.2 International Tournaments
In this section, we investigate the effects of two international tournaments: the FIFA World Cup
and the UEFA European Championship on domestic abuse in England and Wales.
Figure 3.3: Count of Reported Domestic Abuse Incidents for the month of June (2014 - 2016)
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(b) England & Wales
FIFA World Cup
Here, we investigate the effects of the 2014 FIFA World Cup on domestic abuse in England
and Wales. We obtained match data for the 2014 FIFA World Cup which took place in Brazil
between 12th June 2014 - 13th July 2014. We introduce FIFA related variables defined as:
FIFA−matchday =
1 if there is any FIFA fixture on a given day,0 Otherwise (3.34)
FIFA− England =
1 if there is any FIFA fixture which involves England,0 Otherwise (3.35)
EnglandDraw =
1 if the England FIFA fixture ends in a draw,0 Otherwise (3.36)
EnglandLose =
1 if the England FIFA fixture ends in a lose for England,0 Otherwise (3.37)
We obtained our data from www.fifa.com, Table 3.17 presents details about the FIFA 2014
fixture which involved England and the respective match outcomes.
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Table 3.17: 2014 FIFA World Cup: England Fixtures
Match Day Saturday, 14th June Thursday, 19th June Tuesday, 24th June
Fixture England vs Italy Uruguay vs England Costa Rica vs England
Result Lose (1-2) Lose (2-1) Draw (0-0)
From Table 3.19, we see that for England & Wales, the existence of a FIFA fixture is associ-
ated with a 3% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.01. However when we run the regression
for only FIFA matches which involve England (FIFA-England), we find, in Column 1b, that
the associated increase in domestic abuse is higher at 4% with p < 0.05 than FIFA-matchday.
When we take account of the FIFA match outcome of England games in Column 1c, we find that
games where England draws are associated with 6% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.01.
We also find that FIFA games where England loses have no statistically significant effect on
domestic abuse in England & Wales.
In the case of London (Col. 2a - 2c), we find that domestic abuse is only affected by
whether or not there is a FIFA fixture (FIFA-matchday). Whether or not the fixture involves
England (FIFA-England) and the outcome of the England FIFA match (England draw or lose)
has no statistically significant effect in domestic abuse in London. These results support the
hypothesis put forward in PSCD (2006) that the existence of a FIFA fixture affects domestic
abuse. The hypothesis put forward by Brimicombe and Cafe (2012) and Kirby et al. (2014) that
FIFA World Cup match outcomes matter for domestic abuse is not supported in our analysis.16
One methodological difference between our study and the other studies (Brimicombe and
Cafe, 2012; Kirby et al., 2014) is that whilst we used data over the course of a full calendar
year, they used data for only a month around the World Cup. As an extension, we restricted
our sample to a small window around the FIFA World Cup 1st June - 31st of July. We find from
Table 3.20 that FIFA match days become associated with a decrease in domestic abuse. This
decrease in domestic abuse is statistically significant for counties of England & Wales but not
statistically significant for London boroughs. Table 3.18 displays a summary statistic of the
FIFA World Cup variables by region.17
16The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.51 Appendix 3.B
17The results for all regions combined can be found in Table 3.52 Appendix 3.B
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Table 3.18: Summary Statistics of FIFA World Cup Match Variables
Region Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
FIFA Matchday 27,347 .0329 .1783 0 1
FIFA England 27,347 .00318 .0563 0 1
England Draw 27,347 .00106 .0325 0 1
England Lose 27,347 .00212 .0460 0 1
London
FIFA Matchday 31,119 .0329 .1783 0 1
FIFA England 31,119 .0031 .0563 0 1
England Draw 31,119 .0011 .0325 0 1
England Lose 31,119 .0021 .0460 0 1
Table 3.19: Regressions result with FIFA 2014 variables for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0271∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0311) (0.0277) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0129)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0368) (0.0342) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0189)
fifa-matchday 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0123)
fifa-england 0.0428∗∗ 0.0111
(0.0201) (0.0270)
England Draw 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0679
(0.0224) (0.0482)
England Lose 0.0351 -0.0163
(0.0296) (0.0392)
Constant 3.757∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.390) (0.316) (0.148) (0.146) (0.136)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.20: Regression Result with FIFA 2014 variables for both regions restricted to June and
July
England & Wales London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Abuse
Monday -0.167∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0363) (0.0322) (0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0115)
Tuesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.0235) (0.0328) (0.0316) (0.0129) (0.0160) (0.0154)
Wednesday -0.235∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0351) (0.0303) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0152)
Thursday -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0296) (0.0269) (0.0150) (0.0174) (0.0162)
Friday -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0150) (0.0122) (0.0138)
Saturday -0.104∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0698∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0138)
July 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗
(0.00575) (0.00705) (0.00572) (0.00788) (0.00969) (0.00819)
2015 0.000515 0.0104 0.0104 -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0315) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0112)
2016 0.0234 0.0333 0.0333 -0.00344 0.00194 0.00190
(0.0302) (0.0352) (0.0426) (0.0140) (0.0129) (0.0104)
fifa-matchday -0.0179∗ -0.0121
(0.00978) (0.0132)
fifa-england 0.0161 -0.0165
(0.0186) (0.0349)
England Draw 0.0204 0.0205
(0.0270) (0.0531)
England Lose 0.0141 -0.0347
(0.0236) (0.0389)
Constant 3.954∗∗∗ 3.943∗∗∗ 3.943∗∗∗ 5.459∗∗∗ 5.449∗∗∗ 5.452∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.382) (0.329) (0.243) (0.287) (0.406)
Observations 5307 5307 5307 6039 6039 6039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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UEFA European Championship
We investigate the effects of the 2016 UEFA European Championship on domestic abuse in
England and Wales. We obtained data for the 2016 UEFA European Championship which took
place in France from 10th June to 10th July 2016. We introduce UEFA European Championship
related variables defined as:
EURO −matchday =
1 if there is any UEFA fixture on a given day,0 Otherwise (3.38)
EURO − England =
1 if there is any UEFA fixture which involves England,0 Otherwise (3.39)
EnglandWin =
1 if the England UEFA fixture ends in a win for England,0 Otherwise (3.40)
EnglandDraw =
1 if the England UEFA fixture ends in a draw,0 Otherwise (3.41)
EnglandLose =
1 if the England UEFA fixture ends in a lose for England,0 Otherwise (3.42)
Data on the 2016 UEFA European Championship was obtained from www.uefa.com, Ta-
ble 3.21 displays details of the 2016 UEFA fixtures and outcomes for England.
Table 3.21: 2016 UEFA European Championship: England Fixtures
Match Day Saturday Thursday Monday Monday
11th June 16th June 20th June 27th June
Fixture England England Slovakia England
vs vs vs vs
Russia Wales England Iceland
Result Draw (1-1) Win (2-1) Draw (0-0) Lose (1-2)
From the various specifications in Table 3.24, we find that the mere existence of a UEFA
European Championship fixture (EURO-matchday) is associated with a statistically significant
decrease of 4% in levels of domestic abuse for England & Wales (Col. 1a) and has no effect on
domestic abuse in London (Col. 2a).
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UEFA European Championship fixtures which involve England (EURO-England) have no
statistically significant effect in both regions as can be seen in Col. 1b and Col. 2b.
UEFA match outcomes for England matches are largely not statistically significant. The
only statistically significant UEFA outcome variable is England Lose which is associated with
a 0.6% decrease in domestic abuse for England & Wales.18
As we did in the previous section with the FIFA World Cup, we restricted the sample to a
smaller window around the UEFA tournament (1st June - 31st July). We find from estimations
in Table 3.25 that the UEFA European Championship has no effect on domestic abuse in the
counties of England & Wales as well as the boroughs of London. With the exception of an
England win in Col. 1c which is associated with a 7% increase in domestic abuse for England
% Wales.19
Table 3.22: 2016 UEFA European Championship: Wales Fixtures
Match Day Saturday Thursday Monday Monday Friday Wednesday
11th June 16th June 20th June 25th June 1st July 6th July
Fixture Wales England Russia Wales Wales Portugal
vs vs vs vs vs vs
Slovakia Wales Wales Northern Ireland Belgium Wales
Result Win (2-1) Lose (2-1) Win (0-3) Win (1-0) Win (3-1) Lose (2-0)
In the 2016 UEFA European Championship, Wales also qualified and had a much more
successful tournament compared to England. To exploit this, in Table 3.22 we provide details
regarding the UEFA fixtures involving Wales. In Table 3.26, we restrict our regressions to
North and South Wales police force areas.20 We find from Col. 1a that a UEFA European
Championship fixture is associated with a 5% decrease in domestic abuse in Wales. However,
when restricted to matches involving Wales (Col. 1b), we find that the variables EURO-Wales
is associated with a 5% increase in domestic abuse. From Col. 1c, we find that a lose for
Wales (Wales Lose) is associated with about 2% increase in domestic abuse while, on the other
hand, a win for Wales (Wales Win) is associated with a 0.9% increase in domestic abuse. When
restricted to the months of June and July, we find that a lose for Wales is associated with a 20%
increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.1. Overall, the 2016 UEFA fixtures involving Wales and
the outcome of such fixtures have a strong effect on domestic abuse in North and South Wales.
Table 3.23 displays a summary statistic of the UEFA European Championship match variables
by region.
18The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.53 Appendix 3.B
19In Appendix 3.B Table 3.54, we present a table of results for all counties combined.
20The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.26 Appendix 3.B
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Table 3.23: Summary Statistics of UEFA European Championship Match Variables
Region Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
Euro Matchday 27,347 .0244 .1543 0 1
Euro England 27,347 .00424 .0649 0 1
England Lose 27,347 .00106 .0325 0 1
England Draw 27,347 .00212 .0460 0 1
London
Euro Matchday 31,119 .02439 .1542 0 1
Euro England 31,119 .00424 .0649 0 1
England Lose 31,119 .00106 .0325 0 1
England Draw 31,119 .00212 .0460 0 1
Wales
Euro Matchday 1,886 .0243 .1542 0 1
Euro Wales 1,886 .0042 .0650 0 1
Wales Lose 1,886 .00106 .0325 0 1
Wales Win 1,886 .00318 .0563 0 1
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Table 3.24: Regression Result with UEFA variables for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0274) (0.0209) (0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0393) (0.0336) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0215)
euro-matchday -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0153
(0.0119) (0.0136)
euro-england -0.00701 -0.00172
(0.0213) (0.0212)
England Lose -0.0636∗∗ -0.0229
(0.0300) (0.0434)
England Draw -0.00642 0.00961
(0.0215) (0.0277)
England Win 0.0509 -0.00496
(0.0361) (0.0397)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.356) (0.312) (0.152) (0.163) (0.153)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.25: Regression Results with UEFA variables for both regions restricted to June and July
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.167∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0305) (0.0266) (0.0141) (0.0135) (0.0112)
Tuesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0291) (0.0250) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0132)
Wednesday -0.235∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0270) (0.0243) (0.0186) (0.0139) (0.0174)
Thursday -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0229) (0.0217) (0.0156) (0.0140) (0.0174)
Friday -0.217∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0261) (0.0253) (0.0139) (0.0122) (0.0130)
Saturday -0.105∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0713∗∗∗ -0.0720∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0121)
July 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.00667) (0.00522) (0.00542) (0.00866) (0.00933) (0.00961)
2015 0.00963 0.00962 0.00959 -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0237) (0.0247) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0113)
2016 0.0357 0.0307 0.0307 -0.000264 0.00131 0.00133
(0.0447) (0.0305) (0.0369) (0.0164) (0.0141) (0.0136)
euro-matchday -0.00839 0.00785
(0.0101) (0.0176)
euro-england 0.0279 0.0216
(0.0221) (0.0206)
England Lose -0.0379 -0.00710
(0.0332) (0.0494)
England Draw 0.0354 0.0374
(0.0234) (0.0320)
England Win 0.0782∗∗ 0.0161
(0.0335) (0.0437)
Constant 3.945∗∗∗ 3.944∗∗∗ 3.946∗∗∗ 5.448∗∗∗ 5.450∗∗∗ 5.451∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.327) (0.287) (0.252) (0.247) (0.265)
Observations 5307 5307 5307 6039 6039 6039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.26: Regression result with UEFA variables for Wales
Restricted to June and July
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0458) (0.0491) (0.0402) (.) (.) (.)
Bh-Chris 0.547∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0354) (0.0384) (0.0311) (.) (.) (.)
euro-matchday -0.0505∗ -0.0268
(0.0291) (0.0331)
euro-wales 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.0953
(0.0117) (0.0622)
Wales Lose 0.190∗∗∗ 0.205∗
(0.0564) (0.118)
Wales Win 0.00909∗ 0.0601
(0.00494) (0.0714)
Constant 3.966∗∗∗ 3.966∗∗∗ 3.968∗∗∗ 4.623∗∗∗ 4.632∗∗∗ 4.643∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.299) (0.275) (0.191) (0.193) (0.194)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Observations 1886 1886 1886 366 366 366
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.3 Combined Effects of Domestic and International Tournaments
In this section, we estimate a combined specification which contains variables of the domestic
tournament (English Premier League) and the international tournaments (FIFA World Cup and
UEFA European Championship). To the best of our knowledge no study on domestic abuse
in England and Wales has presented a combined estimation of domestic tournament (English
Premier League) and international tournaments (FIFA World Cup and UEFA European Champi-
onship). We argue that a combined estimation provides a more complete view of the correlations
between major football tournaments and domestic abuse.
In Table 3.27, we present regressions which include Match day and Match outcome variables
for EPL, FIFA and UEFA European Championship.21 From Col. 1a, we see that compared to
an EPL match day and a UEFA match day, a FIFA match day is associated with a higher effect
on domestic abuse in England & Wales at a 2% increase with p < 0.10. Similarly for London,
compared to an EPL match day and a UEFA match day, a FIFA match day is a associated with
a higher and statistically significant effect on domestic abuse at a 3% increase with p < 0.01.
When restricted to only England matches for the international tournaments and relevant
counties for the EPL matches, we find that a FIFA match involving England is associated with a
4% increase on domestic abuse in England & Wales with p < 0.10. The other variables in Col.
1b and Col. 2b are not statistically significant.
When we consider the match outcome variables for FIFA, UEFA European Championship
and for EPL fixtures, we find that for England & Wales (Col. 1c) most outcome variables are not
statistically significant except England Draw (FIFA) and England Lose (EURO). An England
draw in a FIFA fixture is associated with about 6% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.1
and an England lose in a UEFA European Championship is associated with a 6% decrease in
domestic abuse with p < 0.05. For London (Col. 2c), none of the match outcome variables
have statistical effects on the levels of domestic abuse.
These results conform to those obtained in PSCD (2006). Similar to PSCD (2006) we find
that the mere existence of a fixture has an effect on domestic abuse.22
21The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.55 Appendix 3.B
22In Appendix 3.B Table 3.56, we present a table of results for all counties combined.
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Table 3.27: Regression results with domestic and international tournaments for both regions
England & Wales London
1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.0998∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0216) (0.0278) (0.0137) (0.0118) (0.0125)
Bh-Chris 0.448∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0261) (0.0377) (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0193)
fifa-matchday 0.0238∗ 0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0108)
euro-matchday -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0104
(0.0124) (0.0162)
matchday 0.00892∗∗∗ -0.00307
(0.00338) (0.00391)
fifa-england 0.0432∗ 0.0108
(0.0229) (0.0280)
euro-england -0.00550 -0.00144
(0.0180) (0.0248)
hometeam 0.0161 -0.0221
(0.0331) (0.0211)
awayteam 0.0255 -0.0197
(0.0244) (0.0388)
England Draw FIFA 0.0584∗ 0.0680
(0.0309) (0.0530)
England Lose FIFA 0.0363 -0.0169
(0.0347) (0.0339)
England Lose EURO -0.0631∗∗ -0.0223
(0.0322) (0.0488)
England Draw EURO -0.00399 0.00944
(0.0204) (0.0277)
England Win EURO 0.0513 -0.00434
(0.0334) (0.0386)
HW 0.0232 -0.0210
(0.0292) (0.0274)
HD 0.0252 -0.0230
(0.0227) (0.0472)
HL 0.00791 -0.0234
(0.0332) (0.0292)
AW 0.0432 -0.00814
(0.0298) (0.0256)
AD 0.0234 0.00812
(0.0349) (0.0551)
AL 0.0155 -0.0534
(0.0433) (0.0489)
Constant 3.752∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.379) (0.386) (0.149) (0.148) (0.119)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.4 Extension and Robustness Analysis
In this section, we present some extensions and robustness analysis. Following Card and Dahl
(2011) and Dickson et al. (2016), we introduce some concepts of salience. We consider three
concepts. First, we consider when a local-team plays against a traditional rival. Then we con-
sider matches towards the end of the season and finally we consider matches which are expected
to be close. Although our construction of the second is fairly crude (see Equation 3.44 for de-
tails), it allows us capture the potential impact of matches that might be important for deter-
mining the overall winner of the title, qualification for European club competitions and matches
which matter with regards to relegation from the EPL.
Traditional Rivals
Table 3.28: Football Teams and Traditional Rivals
Manchester United Manchester City
Manchester United Liverpool
Newcastle Sunderland
Aston Villa West Brom
Any London Derby
We pair teams with their traditional local rivals as in Table 3.28 and define a new variable,
called Derby, as:
Derby =
1 if rival teams play one another,0 Otherwise (3.43)
From Columns 1b and 2b of Table 3.29, we see that matches between rival teams have no
statistically significant effect of levels of domestic abuse in both regions.23 In Table 3.30, we
present the results of regressions in which we restrict the sample to the relevant county of the
respective rivalries. For example, we restricted the Manchester rivalry (Manchester United ver-
sus Manchester City) to Greater Manchester. We see from the regression results that only the
Northumbria rivalry affects domestic abuse in Northumbria. The Northumbria rivalry (New-
castle versus Sunderland) in Col. 2b is associated with a 17% increase in domestic abuse with
p < 0.01 whereas a match day where a Northumbria team plays any team is associated with a
2% increase in domestic abuse with p < 0.1. We would like to add the caveat that since our
study focuses on traditional rivalries when they occur in the EPL and not other divisions, our
analysis might be underestimating the effects of derbies on domestic abuse.
23The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.60 Appendix 3.D
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Table 3.29: Regression results with traditional rivals for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.164∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0330) (0.00827) (0.00766)
Tuesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0285) (0.00687) (0.00779)
Wednesday -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0282) (0.00827) (0.00821)
Thursday -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0240) (0.00837) (0.00991)
Friday -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0263) (0.00895) (0.00959)
Saturday -0.0745∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗
(0.00940) (0.0101) (0.00655) (0.00640)
February 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0145
(0.00863) (0.00834) (0.0100) (0.0101)
March 0.00911 0.00907 0.0202∗∗ 0.0204∗∗
(0.00902) (0.00689) (0.00833) (0.00871)
April 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00790) (0.00942) (0.00855)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.00966) (0.00800) (0.00892)
June 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.00835) (0.00720)
July 0.157∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0118) (0.00764) (0.00717)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0120) (0.00917) (0.00901)
September 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0101) (0.0114)
October 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0101) (0.0118)
November 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0115)
December 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0129) (0.00818) (0.00894)
2015 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0153∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0171) (0.00648) (0.00772)
2016 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0318) (0.00912) (0.0111)
Bh-oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0275∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0214) (0.0131) (0.0124)
Bh-Chris 0.449∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0356) (0.0173) (0.0155)
Matchpa 0.0141 -0.0209
(0.0697) (0.0275)
Derby 0.0733 -0.00645
(0.0633) (0.00674)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.349) (0.128) (0.145)
Observations 27347 27347 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.30: Regression results with traditional rivals restricted to relevant counties/boroughs
Manchester Northumbria West-Midlands Liverpool - Manchester
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Domestics abuse
Bh-Oth 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0320) (0.0333) (0.0394) (0.0240) (0.0203) (0.0331) (0.0272)
Bh-Chris 0.654∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.134) (0.169) (0.154) (0.106) (0.0999) (0.148) (0.123)
matchpa 0.00700 0.0278∗ -0.00844 0.00700
(0.0117) (0.0157) (0.0127) (0.0120)
Manchester Derby -0.000735
(0.0530)
Northumbria Derby 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0637)
West Midlands Derby -0.0638
(0.0649)
Liverpool- Manchester Derby 0.0297
(0.0199)
Constant 5.342∗∗∗ 5.345∗∗∗ 4.524∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.342∗∗∗ 5.344∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0136) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0173) (0.0147)
/
lnalpha -5.598∗∗∗ -5.597∗∗∗ -5.197∗∗∗ -5.217∗∗∗ -5.607∗∗∗ -5.610∗∗∗ -5.598∗∗∗ -5.598∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.213) (0.246) (0.299) (0.168) (0.164) (0.197) (0.212)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Matches Towards the End of the Season
For the second concept of salience, following Dickson et al. (2016), we included a binary vari-
able, Title, which is defined as follows:
Title =
1 for the last 5 matches of any team in the EPL season,0 Otherwise (3.44)
From Table 3.31, we see that the variable Title is associated with a decrease in domestic
abuse in both regions across various specifications.24 In England & Wales, the last five matches
of the season (Title) are associated with a decrease of about 4% in domestic abuse with p < 0.01.
In London, we find that the last five matches of the season (Title) are associated with about 6%
decrease in domestic abuse with p < 0.01, This result goes against our expectations as we
anticipated that the last five matches of the season would be associated with an increase in
domestic abuse.
24The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.61 Appendix 3.B
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Table 3.31: Regression results with the last five matches of the season for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Title -0.0368∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗ -0.0598∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0144) (0.0125) (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0217)
hometeam 0.0203 -0.0147
(0.0222) (0.0236)
awayteam 0.0296∗∗ -0.0106
(0.0141) (0.0362)
HW 0.0283 -0.0130
(0.0264) (0.0257)
HD 0.0293 -0.0156
(0.0237) (0.0452)
HL 0.0115 -0.0172
(0.0255) (0.0316)
AW 0.0478∗∗ -0.000445
(0.0229) (0.0326)
AD 0.0273 0.0171
(0.0272) (0.0605)
AL 0.0197 -0.0432
(0.0305) (0.0545)
H-expected 0.0237 -0.0107
(0.0179) (0.0273)
H-UW 0.00970 -0.0310
(0.0280) (0.0366)
H-UL 0.0658∗∗∗ -0.00827
(0.0205) (0.0500)
A-expected 0.0248 -0.0155
(0.0185) (0.0471)
A-UW 0.0398∗ 0.0149
(0.0205) (0.0299)
A-UL 0.0739∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0704)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.370) (0.350) (0.167) (0.154) (0.136)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Holiday Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Close Matches
In this section, we introduce another measure of salience. We define a new variable Close,
which is defined as the absolute difference between the probability of home wins and away
wins.
Close = |p(homewin)− p(awaywin)| (3.45)
We anticipate that for the variable Close matches with lower values will be associated with
higher levels of domestic abuse than matches with higher values. As such we expect the variable
to be negatively signed.
From Table 3.33, we see that the variable Close is associated with a decrease in domestic
abuse for both regions.25 For England & Wales the variable Close is only statistically significant
when we use reference dependent variables and is associated with a 5% decrease in domestic
abuse. For London, the variable Close is associated with about a 10% statistically significant
decrease in domestic abuse. Table 3.32 displays a summary statistic of salience variables by
region.
Table 3.32: Summary Statistics of Salience Variables
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
England & Wales
Title 27,347 .00483 .0693 0 1
Close 27,347 .007871 .0575 0 .7817
Derby 27,347 .0006216 .0249 0 1
London
Title 31,119 .002410 .04903 0 1
Close 31,119 .00546 .0494 0 .7906
Derby 31,119 .0615 .2402 0 1
Others
Manchester Derby 943 .00530 .0727 0 1
Northumbria Derby 943 .00530 .0727 0 1
West Midlands Derby 943 .00530 .0727 0 1
Liverpool Manchester Derby 943 .00530 .0727 0 1
25The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.62 Appendix 3.B
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Table 3.33: Regression results with the absolute difference in home win and away win proba-
bilities for both regions
England & Wales London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Close -0.0427 -0.0463 -0.0569∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.0939∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0375) (0.0270) (0.0459) (0.0516) (0.0421)
hometeam 0.0239 0.0109
(0.0202) (0.0235)
awayteam 0.0342∗∗∗ 0.0105
(0.0127) (0.0316)
HW 0.0325 0.0129
(0.0201) (0.0366)
HD 0.0312∗ 0.000663
(0.0186) (0.0334)
HL 0.0163 0.00267
(0.0208) (0.0288)
AW 0.0530∗∗ 0.0171
(0.0206) (0.0260)
AD 0.0325∗∗ 0.0281
(0.0153) (0.0243)
AL 0.0266 -0.0195
(0.0269) (0.0439)
H-expected 0.0308 0.0193
(0.0195) (0.0177)
H-UW 0.0102 -0.0166
(0.0327) (0.0396)
H-UL 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0361
(0.0282) (0.0585)
A-expected 0.0337∗∗ 0.00904
(0.0168) (0.0383)
A-UW 0.0457∗ 0.0327
(0.0236) (0.0282)
A-UL 0.0968∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0550)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.416∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.368) (0.376) (0.133) (0.140) (0.145)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Holiday Effects X X X X X X
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Public Order Offence
Following studies which find links between sporting tournaments and other crimes (Rees and
Schnepel, 2009), we investigate the link between football tournaments and a different crime
measure. For example, Rees and Schnepel (2009) find evidence that host communities register
sharp increases in assaults, vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct and arrests for alcohol-
related offences on games days especially when the game ends in an unexpected loss. We chose
a variable to capture disorderly conduct known as Public Order Offences.
According to CPS (2019), Public Order Offence as documented in Part 1 of the Public
Order Act 1986 includes offences such as riots, violent disorder, affray, threatening behaviour,
disorderly behaviour with intent and disorderly behaviour and racially or religiously aggravated
threatening behaviour, disorderly behaviour with intent and disorderly behaviour.
We obtained data on Public Order Offence in England from 26 police force areas. This set
of 26 police force areas is not the same as the set of police force areas used for our study on
domestic abuse. Table 3.34 presents summary statistics of the police force areas used in our
analysis. We did not receive data on Public Order Offence for London, so we conducted only
one set of analysis in this section. From Figure 3.4, we can see that public order offences have
been rising steadily since 2014. According to ONS (2019), a large part of the increase in public
order offence is likely due improvements, as incidents would have been recorded as anti-social
behaviour are now being recorded as public order offence and also due to genuine increases in
public order offences. Using public order offence as our dependent variable, we preform the
analysis for domestic tournament (EPL club-level) and international tournaments (FIFA World
Cup and UEFA Euro Cup). Table 3.35 presents the pairing of EPL teams with their respective
home counties and their availability in our data.
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Figure 3.4: Reported Public Order Offence for England & Wales from January 2014 - July 2016
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Table 3.34: Summary Statistics of Reported Incidents of Public Order Offence by Police Force
Area
County Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
British Transport Police 18.60 5.61 2 43
Cambridgeshire 5.30 2.82 0 17
Cheshire 10.26 6.42 1 55
Cleveland 4.83 2.49 1 19
Cumbria 4.35 2.36 1 15
Devon 12.49 4.28 2 30
Dorset 3.62 2.16 1 17
Durham 4.39 2.75 1 17
Dyfed 2.83 1.74 1 13
Essex 9.13 5.25 1 36
Humberside 7.09 3.40 1 25
Kent 8.48 3.77 1 28
Lancashire 7.03 3.28 1 23
Leicester 2.42 1.35 1 7
Lincolnshire 3.84 2.29 1 28
Manchester 31.60 11.06 8 71
Metropolitan Police Service 111.38 23.49 42 188
Northamptonshire 3.55 1.91 1 12
Northern Ireland 3.97 2.09 0 13
Northumbria 13.39 9.86 1 53
North Yorkshire 3.59 1.94 1 11
South Yorkshire 8.66 5.18 1 61
Staffordshire 5.68 3.61 1 18
West Midlands 11.18 4.13 1 25
West Yorkshire 23.14 11.91 4 69
Wiltshire 5.76 3.99 1 24
Overall 13.14 22.55 0 188
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Table 3.35: Pairing EPL Teams to Home Counties - Public Order Offence
EPL Team Home County Data in Sample
1 Arsenal Islington No
2 Aston Villa West Midlands Yes
3 Bournemouth Dorset Yes
4 Burnley Lancashire No
5 Cardiff South Wales No
6 Chelsea Kensington and Chelsea No
7 Crystal Palace Croydon No
8 Everton Merseyside No
9 Fulham Hammersmith and Fulham No
10 Hull East Yorkshire No
11 Leicester Leicester Yes
12 Liverpool Merseyside No
13 Manchester City Manchester Yes
14 Manchester United Manchester Yes
15 Newcastle Northumbria Yes
16 Norwich Norfolk No
17 QPR Hammersmith and Fulham No
18 Southampton Hampshire No
19 Stoke Staffordshire Yes
20 Sunderland Northumbria Yes
21 Swansea South Wales No
22 Tottenham Haringey No
23 Watford Hertfordshire No
24 West Brom West Midlands Yes
25 West Ham Newham No
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The model specifications and variables used in this section are the same as defined in Sec-
tion 3.5.1. Regression results with time variables (day of the week, month of the year, year and
holiday) are presented in Table 3.36. Across all three specifications in the table, we can see that
the day of the week variables are not statistically significant, except for Tuesday in Col. 1 which
has p < 0.1. The coefficients of the day of the week variables suggest that Tuesdays maybe
associated with the lowest levels of public order offence in a week while Fridays are associated
with the highest levels of public order offence.
Similar to the monthly trends in domestic abuse, we find that levels of public order offence
tend to rise towards and peak at July, then somewhat decline towards January. July is associated
with a 35% increase in public order offence with p < 0.01 across all specifications.
Compared to 2014 (the base year), 2015 and 2016 are associated with higher levels of public
order offence. 2015 is associated with a statistically significant 1% increase in public order
offence while 2016 is associated with a statistically significant 4% increase in public order
offence.
In contrast to the results obtained on domestic abuse, we find in Col. 2 that bank holidays
are associated with about 2% decrease in levels of public order offence. However, this seems
primarily driven by the non-christmas bank holidays (Bh-Oth). From Col. 3 we see that Bh-Oth
is associated with about 2% decrease in public order offence with p < 0.01 while the Christmas
and New year bank holidays (Bh-Chris) has no statistically significant effect on levels of public
order offence.
Regression results with EPL variables are presented in Table 3.37.26 We see from Col. 1 that
an EPL match day is associated with about 2% increase in public order offence with p < 0.01.
When we restrict the analysis to only counties whose local team have a match on a given day
(matchpa), the effect is not statistically significant. The same goes for the number of matches
associated with local teams of a relevant county (matchcount) and whether the matches are
home or away fixtures (hometeam & awayteam).
We find for Col. 5 that the match outcomes do not affect public order offence, except when
a local team draws in an away fixture. A local team draw in an away fixture is associated with
9% decrease in levels of public order offence with p < 0.05. From Col. 6, we find no evidence
for reference dependence in the association between EPL matches and trends in public order
offence. The reference dependent variables have no statistically significant effect on public
order offence except when a local team’s match outcome in an away match is as expected (A-
Expected). A-Expected is associated with about 7% decrease in levels of public order offence
with p < 0.05.
26The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.63 Appendix 3.E
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Table 3.36: Regression results with time variables
(1) (2) (3)
Public order offence
Monday -0.0336 -0.0190 -0.0181
(0.0218) (0.0358) (0.0342)
Tuesday -0.0347∗ -0.0346 -0.0345
(0.0206) (0.0305) (0.0278)
Wednesday 0.00127 0.00206 0.00199
(0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0294)
Thursday 0.00638 0.00853 0.00819
(0.0219) (0.0289) (0.0273)
Friday 0.0143 0.0215 0.0211
(0.0216) (0.0290) (0.0256)
Saturday 0.000137 0.000206 0.000210
(0.0158) (0.0171) (0.0158)
February 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.00938) (0.00872)
March 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0154) (0.0176)
April 0.171∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0265) (0.0288)
May 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0307) (0.0292)
June 0.305∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0262) (0.0272)
July 0.355∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0329) (0.0309)
August 0.236∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0321)
September 0.302∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0398) (0.0333)
October 0.284∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0470) (0.0398)
November 0.289∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0533) (0.0411)
December 0.225∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.0380) (0.0545) (0.0390)
2015 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0585) (0.0722) (0.0527)
2016 0.439∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.0821) (0.117) (0.0891)
holiday -0.165∗∗∗
(0.0610)
Bh-Oth -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0432)
Bh-Chris -0.130
(0.0916)
Constant 2.252∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.326) (0.281)
Observations 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.37: Regression results with EPL variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
matchday 0.0199∗∗∗
(0.00511)
matchpa -0.0495
(0.155)
matchcount=1 -0.0303
(0.0367)
matchcount=2 -0.0815
(0.0504)
hometeam -0.0130
(0.0552)
awayteam -0.0621
(0.110)
HW -0.0101
(0.0656)
HD -0.0325
(0.0617)
HL -0.00629
(0.0692)
AW -0.0507
(0.0687)
AD -0.0932∗∗
(0.0408)
AL -0.0481
(0.0538)
H-expected -0.0227
(0.0445)
H-UW 0.0211
(0.0529)
H-UL -0.0120
(0.308)
A-Expected -0.0661∗∗
(0.0330)
A-UW -0.0736
(0.0472)
A-UL 0.0475
(0.0915)
Constant 2.253∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.284) (0.314) (0.331) (0.300) (0.375)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Holiday Effects X X X X X X
Observations 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with variables of international tournaments (FIFA and UEFA European
Championship) are presented in Table 3.39.27 We find from Columns 1 - 3 that the FIFA world
cup has no statistically significant effect on levels of public order offence. Neither the FIFA
match day with any fixture, with fixtures involving England nor the outcome the England FIFA
matches have statistically significant effect on public order offence. From Column 4 - 6, we find
that only UEFA fixtures where England loses is associated with a statistically significant effect
on levels of public order offence. UEFA European Championship matches in which England
loses is associated with a 12% increase in the levels of public order offence with p < 0.05.
In Table 3.40 we present regression results in with variables of both domestic (EPL) and
international tournaments.28 We find in Col. 1 that only the EPL match day is associated with
a 2% increase in levels of public order offence with p < 0.01. From Col. 2 we find that only
EPL away fixtures are associated with a statistically significant 6% decrease in levels of public
order offence with p < 0.1 From Col. 3 we find that of all the match outcome variables, only
England loses in the UEFA European Championship associated with a statistically significant
about 13% increase in public order offence with p < 0.05.
Our result on trends in public order offence suggests that the existence of a domestic (club
level) fixture matters more compared to international tournaments while the outcome of inter-
national tournaments matter more compared to the outcome of domestic tournaments.
A step for future research could be to study the associations between major sporting events in
England & Wales and other types of crime. Table 3.38 displays a summary statistic of variables
used in the analysis of this section.
27The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.64 Appendix 3.E
28The complete table of results can be found in Table 3.65 Appendix 3.E
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Table 3.38: Summary Statistics of Public Order Offence variables
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Public order offence 22,935 13.1367 22.5517 0 188
matchpa 24,518 .0116 .1072 0 1
matchcount 24,518 .0294 .2040 0 2
hometeam 24,518 .01476 .1206 0 1
awayteam 24,518 .01464 .1201 0 1
HW 24,518 .00619 .0785 0 1
HD 24,518 .00347 .0588 0 1
HL 24,518 .00509 .0712 0 1
AW 24,518 .00387 .0621 0 1
AD 24,518 .00379 .0615 0 1
AL 24,518 .00697 .0832 0 1
50% Threshold
H-Expected 24,518 .0106 .1024 0 1
H-UW 24,518 .00343 .0584 0 1
H-UL 24,518 .000734 .0271 0 1
A-Expected 24,518 .01073 .1030 0 1
A-UW 24,518 .00310 .0556 0 1
A-UL 24,518 .000816 .0285 0 1
FIFA matchday 24,518 .0329 .1783 0 1
FIFA England 24,518 .00318 .0563 0 1
England Draw 24,518 .00106 .0325 0 1
England Lose 24,518 .00212 .0460 0 1
EURO Matchday 24,518 .0244 .1543 0 1
EURO England 24,518 .00424 .0650 0 1
England Lose 24,518 .00106 .0325 0 1
England Draw 24,518 .00212 .0460 0 1
England Win 24,518 .00106 .0325 0 1
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Table 3.39: Regression results with variables International Tournaments
FIFA UEFA European Championship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
fifa-matchday -0.00140
(0.0188)
fifa-england 0.0406
(0.0312)
England Draw (fifa) 0.0722
(0.0956)
England Lose (fifa) 0.0250
(0.0360)
euro-matchday 0.00525
(0.0288)
euro-england 0.0306
(0.0379)
England Lose (uefa) 0.125∗∗
(0.0577)
England Draw (uefa) -0.0101
(0.0509)
England Win (uefa) 0.0165
(0.0666)
Constant 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.313) (0.254) (0.273) (0.278) (0.309)
Day of the Week Effects X X X X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X X X X
Year Effects X X X X X X
Holiday Effects X X X X X X
Observations 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.40: Regression results with Domestic (EPL) and international tournaments variables
(1) (2) (3)
Public order offence
fifa-matchday -0.0000133
(0.0133)
euro-matchday 0.00665
(0.0277)
matchday 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.00659)
fifa-england 0.0412
(0.0449)
euro-england 0.0313
(0.0389)
hometeam -0.0130
(0.0317)
awayteam -0.0620∗
(0.0362)
England Draw (fifa) 0.0741
(0.0901)
England Lose (fifa) 0.0247
(0.0365)
England Lose (uefa) 0.126∗∗
(0.0592)
England Draw (uefa) -0.0108
(0.0544)
England Win (uefa) 0.0187
(0.0553)
HW -0.0103
(0.0555)
HD -0.0326
(0.148)
HL -0.00646
(0.0755)
AW -0.0508
(0.139)
AD -0.0933
(0.148)
AL -0.0482
(0.107)
Constant 2.253∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.296) (0.283)
Day of the Week Effects X X X
Month of the Year Effects X X X
Year Effects X X X
Holiday Effects X X X
Observations 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has contributed to the literature which focuses on the relationship between domes-
tic abuse and football. Our empirical evidence shows that for domestic (club-level) analysis
game days are associated with a 1% increase in number of domestic abuse incidents in England
& Wales but have no effects on levels of domestic abuse in London. When we restrict our anal-
ysis to only counties/boroughs with local teams playing EPL fixtures on a given day, we find no
effects on domestic abuse in England & Wales or in London.
We find evidence that pre-game expectation affect trends in domestic abuse more than the
win or lose outcomes of EPL fixtures. Match outcome only affect domestic abuse when a local
team wins in an away fixture in England & Wales. We do not find any statistically significant
effects of match outcome on domestic abuse in London. Pre-game expectations have a strong
and positive effect on trends of domestic abuse in England & Wales and a strong and negative
effect in trends of domestic abuse in London. In England & Wales, a local team’s unexpected
loss in an away fixture is associated with a 7.5% increase in domestic abuse. A local team’s
unexpected win in an away fixture is associated with a 3.5 increase in domestic abuse and a
local team’s expected outcome (win, loss or draw) is associated with a 2% increase in domestic
abuse. For home fixtures, only a local team’s unexpected loss is statistically significant at a 6%
increase in domestic abuse. For London, a local team’s lose in an away fixture is associated
with a 27% decrease in domestic abuse in London.
For the FIFA World Cup, we find that only the presence of (any) game appears to matter for
levels of domestic abuse in London with a magnitude of about 3%. Whilst for England & Wales,
FIFA World cup matches involving England and the outcomes of such matches also matter for
levels of domestic abuse. The magnitudes associated with match effects for FIFA World Cup
fixtures range between 2-6%.
For UEFA European Championship, we find that match effects are negative for levels of do-
mestic abuse England & Wales but not statistically significant for London. For UEFA European
Championship involving Wales, we find that the match outcome of such fixture are important,
leading to up to 19% increase in domestic abuse when Wales loses.
Overall our results are support by Card and Dahl (2011) who argue that reference depen-
dence play an important role in the trends of domestic abuse as they relate to football games.
One of the limitations of this study is that we restrict attention to one domestic league and
major football tournaments. Further work could consider other domestic leagues in England
(e.g. Championship) as well as other domestic club competitions (such as the FA and League
Cups) and European club competitions (UEFA Champions League and Europa League). Con-
sideration could also be given to other sporting tournaments, especially those that took place
in England and Wales during the sample period (such as the Rugby World Cup 2015). Future
work could look more closely at whether contests are televised live and what effects this might
have on trends in violent behaviour. Overall we believe our investigation opens up a number of
avenues for future work in what remains a relatively under-developed area.
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3.A Domestic Tournament: EPL
3.A.1 Construction of Variables
Table 3.41: Construction of the Holiday Variable
2014 2015 2016
Holiday 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1st Jan - 31st Jul
New Year’s Day 1st January 1st January 1st January
Good Friday 18th April 3rd April 25th March
Easter Monday 21st April 6th April 28th March
Early May Bank Holiday 5th May 4th May 2nd May
Spring Bank Holiday 26th May 25th May 30th May
Summer Bank Holiday 25th August 31st August 29th August
Christmas Day 25th December 25th December -
Boxing Day 26th December 28th December -
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Table 3.42: List of all EPL Match Days in Sample Period (Part One)
Year
Month 2014 2015 2016
January 01-Jan-14 01-Jan-15 02-Jan-16
11-Jan-14 10-Jan-15 03-Jan-16
12-Jan-14 11-Jan-15 12-Jan-16
13-Jan-14 17-Jan-15 13-Jan-16
18-Jan-14 18-Jan-15 16-Jan-16
19-Jan-14 19-Jan-15 17-Jan-16
20-Jan-14 31-Jan-15 18-Jan-16
28-Jan-14 23-Jan-16
29-Jan-14 24-Jan-16
February 01-Feb-14 01-Feb-15 02-Feb-16
02-Feb-14 07-Feb-15 03-Feb-16
03-Feb-14 08-Feb-15 06-Feb-16
08-Feb-14 10-Feb-15 07-Feb-16
09-Feb-14 11-Feb-15 13-Feb-16
11-Feb-14 21-Feb-15 14-Feb-16
12-Feb-14 22-Feb-15 27-Feb-16
22-Feb-14 28-Feb-15 28-Feb-16
23-Feb-14
March 01-Mar-14 01-Mar-15 01-Mar-16
02-Mar-14 03-Mar-15 02-Mar-16
08-Mar-14 04-Mar-15 05-Mar-16
15-Mar-14 07-Mar-15 06-Mar-16
16-Mar-14 14-Mar-15 12-Mar-16
22-Mar-14 15-Mar-15 13-Mar-16
23-Mar-14 16-Mar-15 14-Mar-16
25-Mar-14 21-Mar-15 19-Mar-16
26-Mar-14 22-Mar-15 20-Mar-16
29-Mar-14
30-Mar-14
31-Mar-14
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Table 3.43: List of all EPL Match Days in Sample Period (Part Two)
Year
Month 2014 2015 2016
April 05-Apr-14 04-Apr-15 02-Apr-16
06-Apr-14 05-Apr-15 03-Apr-16
07-Apr-14 06-Apr-15 09-Apr-16
12-Apr-14 07-Apr-15 10-Apr-16
13-Apr-14 11-Apr-15 13-Apr-16
15-Apr-14 12-Apr-15 16-Apr-16
16-Apr-14 13-Apr-15 17-Apr-16
19-Apr-14 18-Apr-15 18-Apr-16
20-Apr-14 19-Apr-15 19-Apr-16
21-Apr-14 25-Apr-15 20-Apr-16
26-Apr-14 26-Apr-15 21-Apr-16
27-Apr-14 28-Apr-15 23-Apr-16
28-Apr-14 29-Apr-15 24-Apr-16
25-Apr-16
30-Apr-16
May 03-May-14 02-May-15 01-May-16
04-May-14 03-May-15 02-May-16
05-May-14 04-May-15 07-May-16
06-May-14 09-May-15 08-May-16
07-May-14 10-May-15 10-May-16
11-May-14 11-May-15 11-May-16
16-May-15 15-May-16
17-May-15 17-May-16
18-May-15
20-May-15
24-May-15
August 16-Aug-14 08-Aug-15
17-Aug-14 09-Aug-15
18-Aug-14 10-Aug-15
23-Aug-14 14-Aug-15
24-Aug-14 15-Aug-15
25-Aug-14 16-Aug-15
30-Aug-14 17-Aug-15
31-Aug-14 22-Aug-15
23-Aug-15
24-Aug-15
29-Aug-15
30-Aug-15
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Table 3.44: List of all EPL Match Days in Sample Period (Part Three)
Year
Month 2014 2015 2016
September 13-Sep-14 12-Sep-15
14-Sep-14 13-Sep-15
15-Sep-14 14-Sep-15
20-Sep-14 19-Sep-15
21-Sep-14 20-Sep-15
27-Sep-14 26-Sep-15
28-Sep-14 27-Sep-15
29-Sep-14 28-Sep-15
October 04-Oct-14 03-Oct-15
05-Oct-14 04-Oct-15
18-Oct-14 17-Oct-15
19-Oct-14 18-Oct-15
20-Oct-14 19-Oct-15
25-Oct-14 24-Oct-15
26-Oct-14 25-Oct-15
27-Oct-14 31-Oct-15
November 01-Nov-14 01-Nov-15
02-Nov-14 02-Nov-15
03-Nov-14 07-Nov-15
08-Nov-14 08-Nov-15
09-Nov-14 21-Nov-15
22-Nov-14 22-Nov-15
23-Nov-14 23-Nov-15
24-Nov-14 28-Nov-15
29-Nov-14 29-Nov-15
30-Nov-14
December 02-Dec-14 05-Dec-15
03-Dec-14 06-Dec-15
06-Dec-14 07-Dec-15
07-Dec-14 12-Dec-15
08-Dec-14 13-Dec-15
13-Dec-14 14-Dec-15
14-Dec-14 19-Dec-15
15-Dec-14 20-Dec-15
20-Dec-14 21-Dec-15
21-Dec-14 26-Dec-15
22-Dec-14 28-Dec-15
26-Dec-14 29-Dec-15
28-Dec-14 30-Dec-15
29-Dec-14
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3.A.2 Regression Results
Table 3.45: Regression for Time and Match Day Variables (All regions combined)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.151∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0223) (0.0276) (0.0238) (0.0180) (0.0248) (0.0222)
Tuesday -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0186) (0.0238) (0.0221) (0.0172) (0.0217) (0.0207)
Wednesday -0.218∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0182) (0.0226) (0.0206) (0.0166) (0.0219) (0.0200)
Thursday -0.226∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0161) (0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0153) (0.0184) (0.0183)
Friday -0.193∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0166) (0.0215) (0.0202) (0.0155) (0.0211) (0.0185)
Saturday -0.0668∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗ -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.0683∗∗∗ -0.0685∗∗∗
(0.00662) (0.00661) (0.00659) (0.00689) (0.00640) (0.00623) (0.00601)
February 0.0108∗ 0.0149∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(0.00619) (0.00657) (0.00642) (0.00702) (0.00692) (0.00879) (0.00669)
March 0.00505 0.00452 0.0133∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0132∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00534) (0.00641) (0.00699) (0.00550) (0.00677) (0.00570) (0.00621)
April 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.00742) (0.00730) (0.00773) (0.00641) (0.00797) (0.00703) (0.00673)
May 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.0520∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗
(0.00806) (0.00827) (0.00841) (0.00664) (0.00884) (0.00812) (0.00818)
June 0.106∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.00790) (0.00810) (0.00767) (0.00785) (0.00944) (0.00895) (0.00910)
July 0.142∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.00795) (0.00844) (0.00864) (0.00826) (0.00826) (0.00889) (0.00979)
August 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00704) (0.00884) (0.00838) (0.00875) (0.00791) (0.00870) (0.00888)
September 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0108) (0.00951) (0.00963) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.00883)
October 0.0471∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.00960) (0.00936) (0.00988) (0.00873) (0.00934) (0.0102) (0.00974)
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Regression for Time and Match Day Variables (All regions combined) - Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Domestic Abuse
November 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00964) (0.0109) (0.00894) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0110)
December 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.00963) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.00989) (0.0119)
year=2015 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0324∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0325∗
(0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0171)
year=2016 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0235) (0.0207) (0.0280) (0.0210) (0.0286)
holiday 0.188∗∗∗
(0.0201)
Bh-Oth 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0201) (0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0169)
Bh-Chris 0.397∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0233) (0.0296) (0.0300)
matchday 0.00529∗
(0.00275)
matchpa 0.00799
(0.0227)
matchcount=1 -0.00818
(0.0151)
matchcount=2 0.0714∗∗
(0.0336)
hometeam 0.0124
(0.0210)
awayteam 0.0203
(0.0187)
Constant 3.843∗∗∗ 3.892∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.921∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.926∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.293) (0.321) (0.342) (0.232) (0.307) (0.316)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 58466 58466 58466 58466
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.46: Regression with Match Day Variables for Both Regions
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Domestic Abuse
Monday -0.162∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0380) (0.0342) (0.0408) (0.00746) (0.00907) (0.00803) (0.00826)
Tuesday -0.218∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0339) (0.0309) (0.0362) (0.00708) (0.00828) (0.00840) (0.00895)
Wednesday -0.220∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0323) (0.0296) (0.0358) (0.00876) (0.00998) (0.00949) (0.00953)
Thursday -0.241∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0279) (0.0262) (0.0296) (0.00886) (0.0104) (0.00928) (0.00837)
Friday -0.207∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0319) (0.0283) (0.0327) (0.00773) (0.0103) (0.00874) (0.00895)
Saturday -0.0733∗∗∗ -0.0745∗∗∗ -0.0756∗∗∗ -0.0760∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗
(0.00846) (0.00731) (0.00963) (0.00907) (0.00515) (0.00752) (0.00581) (0.00626)
February 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗ 0.0229∗∗ 0.0147 0.0147∗ 0.0147 0.0147
(0.00842) (0.00879) (0.00951) (0.00892) (0.00999) (0.00889) (0.0116) (0.00919)
March 0.00865 0.00911 0.00902 0.00905 0.0203∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00891) (0.00735) (0.00709) (0.00751) (0.00795) (0.00818) (0.00788) (0.00618)
April 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.00881) (0.00961) (0.00878) (0.0103) (0.00902) (0.00923) (0.00792) (0.00888)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0101) (0.00872) (0.00777) (0.00830)
June 0.121∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0131) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.00923) (0.00643) (0.00735) (0.00733)
July 0.159∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.00830) (0.00784) (0.00807) (0.00643)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗
(0.00998) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.00896) (0.00997) (0.00925) (0.00978)
September 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0122) (0.00844) (0.0110)
October 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.0125)
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Regression with Match Day Variables for Both Regions (continued)
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
November 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0104)
December 0.0833∗∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0145) (0.00812) (0.00967) (0.00909) (0.00987)
2015 0.0420∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0153∗ 0.0153∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0153∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0210) (0.0186) (0.0212) (0.00821) (0.00804) (0.00686) (0.00676)
2016 0.0925∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗
(0.0388) (0.0340) (0.0304) (0.0376) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.00800) (0.0109)
Bh-Oth 0.0996∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0271) (0.0262) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0115)
Bh-Chris 0.448∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0340) (0.0347) (0.0422) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0194)
matchday 0.00931∗∗∗ -0.00309
(0.00357) (0.00363)
matchpa 0.0141 -0.0209
(0.0319) (0.0240)
matchcount=1 -0.00507 -0.0209
(0.0375) (0.0294)
match count=2 0.0712∗∗
(0.0306)
hometeam 0.0161 -0.0221
(0.0522) (0.0180)
awayteam 0.0255 -0.0197
(0.0340) (0.0282)
Constant 3.753∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.405) (0.316) (0.434) (0.146) (0.142) (0.124) (0.118)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.47: Regression with Match Outcome and Reference Dependent Variables for Both Re-
gions
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
Domestic Abuse
Monday -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0304) (0.0370) (0.00723) (0.00733) (0.00782) (0.00774)
Tuesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0325) (0.0293) (0.0325) (0.00725) (0.00844) (0.00775) (0.00840)
Wednesday -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0307) (0.0275) (0.0318) (0.00855) (0.00756) (0.00768) (0.00882)
Thursday -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0265) (0.0240) (0.0281) (0.00921) (0.0100) (0.00847) (0.00974)
Friday -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0264) (0.0252) (0.0307) (0.00763) (0.00948) (0.00823) (0.00996)
Saturday -0.0758∗∗∗ -0.0759∗∗∗ -0.0760∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0527∗∗∗
(0.00827) (0.00780) (0.00865) (0.00756) (0.00551) (0.00599) (0.00641) (0.00655)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0271∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0269) (0.0290) (0.0259) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0104) (0.0113)
Bh-Chris 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0315) (0.0319) (0.0388) (0.0209) (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0207)
February 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147∗ 0.0147
(0.00797) (0.00869) (0.00868) (0.00753) (0.00927) (0.0112) (0.00791) (0.0101)
March 0.00906 0.00904 0.00906 0.00816 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗
(0.00693) (0.00915) (0.00862) (0.00714) (0.00737) (0.00796) (0.00659) (0.00814)
April 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗
(0.00939) (0.00886) (0.0112) (0.00949) (0.00850) (0.00911) (0.00845) (0.00822)
May 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0106) (0.00953) (0.00953) (0.00825) (0.00852)
June 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.00652) (0.00774) (0.00766) (0.00691)
July 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0120) (0.00787) (0.00866) (0.00751) (0.00792)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0135) (0.00997) (0.00842) (0.00930) (0.00982) (0.00908)
September 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.00935) (0.0105) (0.0101)
October 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.00987) (0.0105)
November 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0120)
December 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0154) (0.0124) (0.00931) (0.0102) (0.00764) (0.00984)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression with Match Outcome and Reference Dependent Variables for Both Regions (Con-
tinued)
England & Wales London Boroughs
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
Domestic Abuse
2015 0.0421∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0426∗∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0151∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.00645) (0.00653) (0.00709) (0.00617)
2016 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0348) (0.0369) (0.0310) (0.00980) (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.00860)
HW 0.0231 -0.0210
(0.0178) (0.0285)
HD 0.0252 -0.0229
(0.0222) (0.0358)
HL 0.00788 -0.0234
(0.0183) (0.0295)
AW 0.0432∗∗ -0.00810
(0.0188) (0.0283)
AD 0.0233 0.00817
(0.0203) (0.0269)
AL 0.0155 -0.0534
(0.0229) (0.0520)
H-Expected 0.0266∗∗ 0.0197 -0.0211 -0.0180
(0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0138) (0.0201)
H-UW 0.00133 0.00474 -0.0206 -0.0367
(0.0131) (0.0187) (0.0330) (0.0514)
H-UL 0.0418∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ -0.122 -0.0191
(0.0252) (0.0195) (0.127) (0.0581)
A-Expected 0.0184 0.0207∗ -0.0256 -0.0248
(0.0201) (0.0125) (0.0414) (0.0309)
A-UW 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗ -0.00920 0.00803
(0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0230) (0.0359)
A-UL 0.0754∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0631)
H-DUL 0.0158 -0.0327
(0.0618) (0.0429)
H-DUW 0.0323 -0.0375
(0.0627) (0.0577)
A-DUL 0.0279 -0.0918
(0.0894) (0.0944)
A-DUW 0.0464 -0.0141
(0.0378) (0.0472)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.751∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.348) (0.306) (0.383) (0.154) (0.166) (0.146) (0.144)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 27245 31119 31119 31119 31104
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.48: Regression with Match Outcome and 60% Reference Dependent Variables for both
Regions
(England & Wales) (London)
1a 1b 2a 2b
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0333) (0.00720) (0.00842)
Tuesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0285) (0.00841) (0.00808)
Wednesday -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0286) (0.00949) (0.00876)
Thursday -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0243) (0.00995) (0.00838)
Friday -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0272) (0.00975) (0.00804)
Saturday -0.0758∗∗∗ -0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0529∗∗∗
(0.00834) (0.00809) (0.00593) (0.00611)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0273∗
(0.0222) (0.0201) (0.0118) (0.0142)
Bh-Chris 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0355) (0.0208) (0.0230)
February 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0147∗
(0.00722) (0.00663) (0.0102) (0.00890)
March 0.00906 0.00903 0.0203∗∗ 0.0203∗∗
(0.00682) (0.00648) (0.00834) (0.00792)
April 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.00923) (0.00787) (0.0105) (0.00850)
May 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.00895) (0.00865) (0.00877)
June 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.00945) (0.00781) (0.00835)
July 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0103) (0.00843) (0.00619)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.00861) (0.0100) (0.00808)
September 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0128) (0.00960) (0.0109)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression with Match Outcome and 60% Reference Dependent Variables for both Re-
gions(Continued)
(England & Wales) (London)
1a 1b 2a 2b
Domestic abuse
October 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0117)
November 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0117) (0.00947) (0.0101)
December 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0128) (0.00856) (0.00748)
2015 0.0421∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0152∗
(0.0184) (0.0172) (0.00665) (0.00794)
2016 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0327) (0.0104) (0.0112)
HL 0.00788 -0.0234
(0.0393) (0.0320)
HD 0.0252 -0.0229
(0.0279) (0.0358)
HW 0.0231 -0.0210
(0.0363) (0.0276)
AW 0.0432 -0.00810
(0.0274) (0.0286)
AD 0.0233 0.00817
(0.0355) (0.0262)
AL 0.0155 -0.0534
(0.0446) (0.0552)
H-Expected 0.0270∗ -0.0211
(0.0161) (0.0163)
H-UW -0.00323 -0.0308
(0.0218) (0.0348)
H-UL 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0308
(0.0209) (0.0869)
A-Expected 0.0187 -0.0227
(0.0197) (0.0386)
A-UW 0.0401∗∗ -0.00629
(0.0198) (0.0343)
A-UL 0.129∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0312)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.365) (0.128) (0.155)
Observations 27347 27347 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.49: Regression with Match Outcome and Reference Dependent Variables for all regions
combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0275) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0170)
Tuesday -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0248) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0161)
Wednesday -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0239) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0153)
Thursday -0.231∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0217) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0141)
Friday -0.203∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0238) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0148)
Saturday -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0685∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0680∗∗∗
(0.00759) (0.00725) (0.00642) (0.00705) (0.00568)
Bh-Oth 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0159)
Bh-Chris 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0259) (0.0329) (0.0283) (0.0239)
February 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00805) (0.00662) (0.00667) (0.00626) (0.00636)
March 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0128∗∗
(0.00615) (0.00543) (0.00640) (0.00520) (0.00621)
April 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗
(0.00731) (0.00705) (0.00699) (0.00611) (0.00747)
May 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
(0.00857) (0.00856) (0.00814) (0.00817) (0.00865)
June 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.00924) (0.00951) (0.00840) (0.00984) (0.00837)
July 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.00849) (0.00971) (0.00838) (0.00941) (0.00840)
August 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00761) (0.00789) (0.00910) (0.00842) (0.00785)
September 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.00834) (0.0106) (0.00903) (0.0114) (0.00917)
October 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0566∗∗∗
(0.00895) (0.00931) (0.00903) (0.00945) (0.00849)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.50: Regression with Match Outcome and Reference Dependent Variables for all regions
combined (Combined)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic abuse
November 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.00896) (0.0106) (0.00991) (0.0102) (0.00874)
December 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.00994) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.00886)
2015 0.0325∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0124)
2016 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0212) (0.0228) (0.0249) (0.0190)
HL 0.00669
(0.0273)
HD 0.0193
(0.0234)
HW 0.0175
(0.0255)
AW 0.0329∗∗
(0.0166)
AD 0.0232
(0.0205)
AL 0.00957
(0.0357)
H-Expected 0.0219 0.0214 0.0159
(0.0238) (0.0247) (0.0150)
H-UW -0.0000137 -0.00519 0.000750
(0.0172) (0.0261) (0.0199)
H-UL 0.00789 0.0507 0.0507
(0.0859) (0.0632) (0.0350)
A-Expected 0.0145 0.0155 0.0164
(0.0286) (0.0266) (0.0200)
A-UW 0.0323∗∗ 0.0308∗ 0.0305∗
(0.0152) (0.0182) (0.0184)
A-UL 0.0403 0.0323
(0.226) (0.147)
H-DUL 0.0131
(0.0412)
H-DUW 0.0261
(0.0523)
A-DUL 0.0160
(0.0603)
A-DUW 0.0363
(0.0265)
Constant 3.924∗∗∗ 3.925∗∗∗ 3.925∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.919∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.376) (0.263) (0.264) (0.245)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 58466 58349
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.B International Tournaments
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Table 3.51: Regressions result with FIFA 2014 variables for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.165∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0377) (0.0363) (0.00835) (0.00589) (0.00676)
Tuesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0343) (0.0341) (0.00855) (0.00690) (0.00823)
Wednesday -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0323) (0.0321) (0.00918) (0.00779) (0.00721)
Thursday -0.246∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0288) (0.0282) (0.00852) (0.00740) (0.00704)
Friday -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0310) (0.0301) (0.00869) (0.00732) (0.00865)
Saturday -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0737∗∗∗ -0.0737∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0537∗∗∗
(0.00871) (0.0112) (0.00920) (0.00675) (0.00623) (0.00754)
February 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146
(0.00766) (0.00756) (0.00787) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0100)
March 0.00917 0.00917 0.00917 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00861) (0.00735) (0.00868) (0.00781) (0.00836) (0.00760)
April 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.00801) (0.00813) (0.0109) (0.00759) (0.0103) (0.00849)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗
(0.00884) (0.00998) (0.0125) (0.00850) (0.00883) (0.0104)
June 0.113∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.00975) (0.0102) (0.0136) (0.00861) (0.00884) (0.00908)
July 0.153∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0103) (0.0129) (0.00904) (0.00824) (0.00712)
August 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.00995) (0.0124) (0.00860) (0.00865) (0.00832)
September 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0157) (0.00951) (0.0113) (0.0113)
October 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0612∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0156) (0.0100) (0.0123) (0.0126)
November 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0172) (0.00980) (0.0116) (0.0107)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regressions result with FIFA 2014 variables for both regions (Continued)
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
December 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0165) (0.00933) (0.00828) (0.00918)
2015 0.0447∗∗ 0.0424∗∗ 0.0424∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0186) (0.0206) (0.00602) (0.00683) (0.00530)
2016 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0322) (0.0337) (0.00854) (0.0104) (0.0110)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0271∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0311) (0.0277) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0129)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0368) (0.0342) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0189)
fifa-matchday 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0123)
fifa-england 0.0428∗∗ 0.0111
(0.0201) (0.0270)
England Draw 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0679
(0.0224) (0.0482)
England Lose 0.0351 -0.0163
(0.0296) (0.0392)
Constant 3.757∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.390) (0.316) (0.148) (0.146) (0.136)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.52: Regression results with FIFA 2014 variables for all regions combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0173) (0.0216) (0.0246)
Tuesday -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0153) (0.0208) (0.0236)
Wednesday -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0170) (0.0214) (0.0224)
Thursday -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0161) (0.0176) (0.0206)
Friday -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0.0220)
Saturday -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0672∗∗∗ -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0931∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗ -0.0934∗∗∗
(0.00643) (0.00696) (0.00733) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.00872)
February 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗
(0.00592) (0.00671) (0.00699)
March 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00530) (0.00555) (0.00674)
April 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.00622) (0.00724) (0.00678)
May 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
(0.00732) (0.00931) (0.00783)
June 0.110∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.00813) (0.00963) (0.00875)
July 0.149∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗
(0.00962) (0.0107) (0.00873) (0.00436) (0.00440) (0.00488)
August 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00786) (0.00960) (0.00790)
September 0.0746∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.00905) (0.0115) (0.00964)
October 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.00966) (0.0113) (0.00935)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with FIFA 2014 variables for all regions combined (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
November 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.00890) (0.0121) (0.0107)
December 0.0794∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0121)
2015 0.0352∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ -0.0123 -0.00411 -0.00411
(0.0140) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0169) (0.0160) (0.0173)
2016 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0142 0.0224 0.0224
(0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0268) (0.0227) (0.0257) (0.0264)
Bh-Oth 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0159) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0) (0) (0)
Bh-Chris 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0268) (0) (0) (0)
fifa-matchday 0.0298∗∗∗ -0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00970) (0.00531)
fifa-england 0.0318∗ 0.00506
(0.0168) (0.0150)
England Draw 0.0612∗∗ 0.0198
(0.0270) (0.0257)
England Lose 0.0180 -0.00202
(0.0211) (0.0196)
Constant 3.923∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 4.108∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.278) (0.268) (0.231) (0.295) (0.289)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 11346 11346 11346
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.53: Regression Results with UEFA variables for both regions
(England & Wales) (London)
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.166∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0420) (0.0279) (0.00857) (0.00796) (0.00688)
Tuesday -0.223∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.0311) (0.0366) (0.0255) (0.00757) (0.00889) (0.00857)
Wednesday -0.225∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0354) (0.0245) (0.00995) (0.0103) (0.00901)
Thursday -0.247∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0313) (0.0216) (0.00954) (0.0105) (0.00796)
Friday -0.214∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0347) (0.0225) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00838)
Saturday -0.0737∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗
(0.00961) (0.00757) (0.00673) (0.00630) (0.00717) (0.00707)
February 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146∗
(0.00696) (0.00854) (0.00699) (0.0105) (0.00982) (0.00851)
March 0.00920 0.00917 0.00916 0.0202∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00811) (0.00728) (0.00814) (0.00813) (0.00870) (0.00675)
April 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.00748) (0.0104) (0.00747) (0.00883) (0.00914) (0.00834)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗
(0.00992) (0.0131) (0.00920) (0.00794) (0.00807) (0.00794)
June 0.127∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0131) (0.0102) (0.00853) (0.00705) (0.00857)
July 0.160∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.00803) (0.00839) (0.00780)
August 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.00921) (0.0102) (0.00894)
September 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0119) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0108)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression Results with UEFA variables for both regions(Continued)
(England & Wales) (London)
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
October 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0124) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.00854)
November 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0105)
December 0.0867∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0654∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.00856) (0.00919)
2015 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0153∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.00709) (0.00734) (0.00677)
2016 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0354) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0112)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0274) (0.0209) (0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0393) (0.0336) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0215)
euro-matchday -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0153
(0.0119) (0.0136)
euro-england -0.00701 -0.00172
(0.0213) (0.0212)
England Lose -0.0636∗∗ -0.0229
(0.0300) (0.0434)
England Draw -0.00642 0.00961
(0.0215) (0.0277)
England Win 0.0509 -0.00496
(0.0361) (0.0397)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.356) (0.312) (0.152) (0.163) (0.153)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.54: Regression results with UEFA variables for all regions combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.162∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0231) (0.0203) (0.0195) (0.0266) (0.0203)
Tuesday -0.215∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0176) (0.0203) (0.0260) (0.0209)
Wednesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0199) (0.0169) (0.0197) (0.0275) (0.0206)
Thursday -0.233∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0187) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0231) (0.0179)
Friday -0.205∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0242) (0.0183)
Saturday -0.0672∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0945∗∗∗ -0.0950∗∗∗
(0.00775) (0.00558) (0.00552) (0.00805) (0.00832) (0.00831)
February 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗
(0.00729) (0.00610) (0.00713)
March 0.0134∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00585) (0.00502) (0.00580)
April 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
(0.00620) (0.00697) (0.00643)
May 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
(0.00590) (0.00699) (0.00773)
June 0.123∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.00704) (0.00779) (0.00822)
July 0.155∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(0.00769) (0.00818) (0.00832) (0.00423) (0.00526) (0.00460)
August 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00717) (0.00740) (0.00894)
September 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗
(0.00904) (0.00987) (0.00958)
October 0.0586∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.00800) (0.00832) (0.00917)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with UEFA variables for all regions combined (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
November 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.00982) (0.00955) (0.00879)
December 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗
(0.00927) (0.0104) (0.0105)
2015 0.0324∗∗ 0.0325∗ 0.0325∗∗ -0.00434 -0.00435 -0.00436
(0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0142) (0.0196) (0.0170) (0.0145)
2016 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0234 0.0204 0.0205
(0.0252) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0260) (0.0222) (0.0239)
Bh-Oth 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0162) (0.0196) (0.0143) (0) (0) (0)
Bh-Chris 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0236) (0.0320) (0.0275) (0) (0) (0)
euro-matchday -0.0354∗∗∗ -0.00324
(0.00712) (0.00934)
euro-england -0.00519 0.0260∗
(0.0191) (0.0151)
England Lose -0.0512∗ -0.0288
(0.0273) (0.0285)
England Draw -0.00118 0.0361∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0156)
England Win 0.0337 0.0592∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0267)
Constant 3.924∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗ 4.101∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.279) (0.282) (0.252) (0.310) (0.267)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 11346 11346 11346
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.55: Regression results with domestic and international tournaments for both regions
England & Wales London
1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.163∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0317) (0.0387) (0.00805) (0.00663) (0.00901)
Tuesday -0.219∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0290) (0.0341) (0.00842) (0.00795) (0.00997)
Wednesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0284) (0.0328) (0.00910) (0.00741) (0.0103)
Thursday -0.242∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0248) (0.0276) (0.00948) (0.00909) (0.00992)
Friday -0.208∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0267) (0.0302) (0.00948) (0.00705) (0.00999)
Saturday -0.0736∗∗∗ -0.0763∗∗∗ -0.0760∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗ -0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0529∗∗∗
(0.00691) (0.00852) (0.00768) (0.00644) (0.00639) (0.00767)
February 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147
(0.00811) (0.00756) (0.00843) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.00930)
March 0.00870 0.00905 0.00906 0.0203∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0203∗∗
(0.00823) (0.00745) (0.00933) (0.00793) (0.00792) (0.00847)
April 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.00751) (0.0100) (0.00981) (0.00785) (0.00806)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.00906) (0.0110) (0.00924) (0.00663) (0.00874)
June 0.124∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.00959) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.00768) (0.00702)
July 0.159∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.00887) (0.00878) (0.00790)
August 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0102) (0.00896) (0.00912) (0.0102)
September 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0101) (0.00968) (0.0112)
October 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.00869) (0.00846) (0.0115)
November 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.00918) (0.0119) (0.0105)
December 0.0857∗∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0664∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0143) (0.00878) (0.00791) (0.00851)
2015 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0424∗ 0.0424∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗ 0.0153∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0234) (0.0184) (0.00593) (0.00600) (0.00679)
2016 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0402) (0.0341) (0.00739) (0.00867) (0.00983)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with domestic and international tournaments for both regions (Continued)
England & Wales London
1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c
Domestic abuse
Bh-Oth 0.0998∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0216) (0.0278) (0.0137) (0.0118) (0.0125)
Bh-Chris 0.448∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0261) (0.0377) (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0193)
fifa-matchday 0.0238∗ 0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0108)
euro-matchday -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0104
(0.0124) (0.0162)
matchday 0.00892∗∗∗ -0.00307
(0.00338) (0.00391)
fifa-england 0.0432∗ 0.0108
(0.0229) (0.0280)
euro-england -0.00550 -0.00144
(0.0180) (0.0248)
hometeam 0.0161 -0.0221
(0.0331) (0.0211)
awayteam 0.0255 -0.0197
(0.0244) (0.0388)
England Draw FIFA 0.0584∗ 0.0680
(0.0309) (0.0530)
England Lose FIFA 0.0363 -0.0169
(0.0347) (0.0339)
England Lose EURO -0.0631∗∗ -0.0223
(0.0322) (0.0488)
England Draw EURO -0.00399 0.00944
(0.0204) (0.0277)
England Win EURO 0.0513 -0.00434
(0.0334) (0.0386)
HW 0.0232 -0.0210
(0.0292) (0.0274)
HD 0.0252 -0.0230
(0.0227) (0.0472)
HL 0.00791 -0.0234
(0.0332) (0.0292)
AW 0.0432 -0.00814
(0.0298) (0.0256)
AD 0.0234 0.00812
(0.0349) (0.0551)
AL 0.0155 -0.0534
(0.0433) (0.0489)
Constant 3.752∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.379) (0.386) (0.149) (0.148) (0.119)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.56: Regression results with domestic and international tournaments for all regions com-
bined
(Full time period) (Restricted to June and July)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Abuse
Monday -0.160∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0206) (0.0241) (0.0263)
Tuesday -0.212∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0215) (0.0228) (0.0190) (0.0234) (0.0244)
Wednesday -0.218∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0207) (0.0223) (0.0188) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Thursday -0.230∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0161) (0.0213) (0.0236)
Friday -0.202∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0170) (0.0208) (0.0214)
Saturday -0.0671∗∗∗ -0.0687∗∗∗ -0.0685∗∗∗ -0.0933∗∗∗ -0.0948∗∗∗ -0.0950∗∗∗
(0.00592) (0.00571) (0.00614) (0.00932) (0.00852) (0.00948)
February 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(0.00621) (0.00659) (0.00720)
March 0.0131∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00753) (0.00530) (0.00666)
April 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.00743) (0.00706) (0.00750)
May 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗
(0.00821) (0.00849) (0.00921)
June 0.118∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.00935) (0.00846) (0.00936)
July 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗
(0.00901) (0.00934) (0.00853) (0.00437) (0.00500) (0.00478)
August 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00856) (0.00950) (0.00888)
September 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗
(0.00977) (0.0119) (0.0115)
October 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗
(0.00976) (0.0109) (0.00763)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with domestic and international tournaments for all regions combined (Con-
tinued)
(Full time period) (Restricted to June and July)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Abuse
November 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.00893) (0.0113) (0.0105)
December 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107)
2015 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ -0.0123 -0.00408 -0.00406
(0.0134) (0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0181)
2016 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0155 0.0207 0.0208
(0.0256) (0.0224) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0231) (0.0235)
Bh-Oth 0.0769∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0207) (0) (0) (0)
Bh-Chris 0.395∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0323) (0.0292) (0.0302) (0) (0) (0)
fifa-matchday 0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗
(0.00789) (0.00755)
euro-matchday -0.0307∗∗∗ -0.00372
(0.00955) (0.00736)
matchday 0.00504 0
(0.00325) (0)
fifa-england 0.0321 0.00583
(0.0206) (0.0150)
euro-england -0.00410 0.0261∗
(0.0147) (0.0157)
hometeam 0.0125 0
(0.0252) (0)
awayteam 0.0203 0
(0.0199) (0)
England Draw FIFA 0.0607∗∗ 0.0200
(0.0256) (0.0249)
England Lose FIFA 0.0187 -0.00000895
(0.0204) (0.0234)
England Lose EURO -0.0507∗ -0.0288
(0.0283) (0.0318)
England Draw EURO 0.000468 0.0361∗
(0.0227) (0.0215)
England Win EURO 0.0341 0.0592∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0288)
HL 0.00670
(0.0306)
HD 0.0194
(0.0292)
HW 0.0175
(0.0278)
AW 0.0329∗∗
(0.0148)
AD 0.0232
(0.0278)
AL 0.00958
(0.0381)
Constant 3.921∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.925∗∗∗ 4.109∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗ 4.101∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.288) (0.284) (0.313) (0.326) (0.335)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 11346 11346 11346
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.57: Regression results with both international tournaments combined for both regions
(England & Wales) (London)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.165∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0368) (0.0336) (0.00765) (0.00734) (0.00851)
Tuesday -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0336) (0.0310) (0.00821) (0.00899) (0.00903)
Wednesday -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0321) (0.0292) (0.00884) (0.00925) (0.00907)
Thursday -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0291) (0.0261) (0.00871) (0.00971) (0.0105)
Friday -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0307) (0.0287) (0.00912) (0.00978) (0.00888)
Saturday -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗
(0.00924) (0.00918) (0.00845) (0.00685) (0.00674) (0.00728)
February 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0146 0.0146∗ 0.0146
(0.00764) (0.00835) (0.00833) (0.00974) (0.00878) (0.0129)
March 0.00917 0.00917 0.00918 0.0201∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗
(0.00752) (0.00843) (0.00841) (0.00810) (0.00751) (0.00822)
April 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.00893) (0.00950) (0.0101) (0.00942) (0.00975) (0.00838)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0123) (0.00913) (0.00882) (0.00938)
June 0.120∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0114) (0.00952) (0.00834) (0.00866)
July 0.158∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0106) (0.00784) (0.00687) (0.00948)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.00844) (0.00915) (0.00793)
September 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0131) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0114)
October 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0101) (0.0131)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with both international tournaments combined for both regions(Continued)
(England & Wales) (London)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
November 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0107) (0.0125)
December 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0125) (0.00920) (0.0108) (0.00874)
year=2015 0.0416∗∗ 0.0420∗ 0.0422∗∗ 0.0164∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0154∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0236) (0.0203) (0.00838) (0.00716) (0.00751)
year=2016 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0418) (0.0315) (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0120)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0270∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0265) (0.0243) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Bh-Chris 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0352) (0.0291) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0168)
int-matchday -0.00504 0.0123
(0.00773) (0.00908)
int-england -0.000255 0.00486
(0.0163) (0.0189)
Eng Lose -0.000403 -0.0183
(0.0236) (0.0327)
Eng Draw 0.0578∗ 0.0679
(0.0304) (0.0663)
Eng Win -0.0127 0.00670
(0.0170) (0.0211)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.347) (0.380) (0.146) (0.165) (0.150)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.58: Regression results with both international tournaments combined for both regions
restricted to June and July
England & Wales (London)
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.168∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0293) (0.0324) (0.0133) (0.0165) (0.0121)
Tuesday -0.223∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0277) (0.0297) (0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0131)
Wednesday -0.236∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0265) (0.0293) (0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0111)
Thursday -0.249∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0245) (0.0251) (0.0161) (0.0174) (0.0157)
Friday -0.217∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0257) (0.0259) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0107)
Saturday -0.105∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.0705∗∗∗ -0.0719∗∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0111)
July 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗
(0.00598) (0.00547) (0.00461) (0.00806) (0.00918) (0.00975)
2015 0.00265 0.0104 0.00983 -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗ -0.0312∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0229) (0.0257) (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0139)
2016 0.0307 0.0319 0.0308 0.00236 0.00231 0.000277
(0.0393) (0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0115) (0.0139) (0.0114)
int-matchday -0.0137∗∗∗ -0.00270
(0.00490) (0.00926)
int-england 0.0168 0.0121
(0.0139) (0.0192)
Eng Lose -0.00280 -0.0235
(0.0218) (0.0338)
Eng Draw 0.0199 0.0210
(0.0255) (0.0519)
Eng Win 0.0305 0.0361∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0184)
Constant 3.954∗∗∗ 3.943∗∗∗ 3.944∗∗∗ 5.451∗∗∗ 5.450∗∗∗ 5.454∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.290) (0.331) (0.250) (0.286) (0.252)
Observations 5307 5307 5307 6039 6039 6039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.59: Regression results with both international tournaments combined for all regions
combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0247) (0.0238) (0.0191) (0.0219) (0.0255)
Tuesday -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0226) (0.0162) (0.0213) (0.0236)
Wednesday -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0159) (0.0224) (0.0240)
Thursday -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0209)
Friday -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0218)
Saturday -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0953∗∗∗ -0.0958∗∗∗
(0.00563) (0.00595) (0.00715) (0.00926) (0.00953) (0.00913)
February 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗
(0.00566) (0.00628) (0.00525)
March 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0134∗∗
(0.00539) (0.00589) (0.00569)
April 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
(0.00737) (0.00704) (0.00540)
May 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
(0.00868) (0.00812) (0.00607)
June 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.00944) (0.00812) (0.00641)
July 0.152∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗
(0.00922) (0.00824) (0.00758) (0.00392) (0.00513) (0.00515)
August 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00705) (0.00838) (0.00732)
September 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.00939) (0.00964) (0.00879)
October 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.00986) (0.00843)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with both international tournaments combined for all regions com-
bined(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
November 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.00956) (0.0104) (0.00912)
December 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗
(0.00903) (0.0119) (0.00855)
2015 0.0325∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0326∗∗ -0.00941 -0.00363 -0.00436
(0.0132) (0.0154) (0.0128) (0.0170) (0.0150) (0.0221)
2016 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0208 0.0216 0.0201
(0.0219) (0.0266) (0.0205) (0.0281) (0.0205) (0.0295)
Bh-Oth 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0192) (0.0174) (0.0193) (0) (0) (0)
Bh-Chris 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.0277) (0.0325) (0.0273) (0) (0) (0)
int-matchday 0.000853 -0.00995∗
(0.00651) (0.00590)
int-england 0.00135 0.0152
(0.0121) (0.0125)
Eng Lose -0.00646 -0.00980
(0.0172) (0.0188)
Eng Draw 0.0603∗∗ 0.0196
(0.0267) (0.0241)
Eng Win -0.00621 0.0325∗
(0.0153) (0.0175)
Constant 3.924∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 4.107∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.302) (0.304) (0.236) (0.291) (0.306)
Observations 58466 58466 58466 11346 11346 11346
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.60: Regression results with traditional rivals restricted to relevant counties/boroughs
Manchester Northumbria West-Midlands Liverpool - Manchester
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.209∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0110) (0.0114)
Tuesday -0.282∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.00907) (0.00930) (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0131) (0.0111) (0.0136) (0.00919)
Wednesday -0.285∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0179) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0113)
Thursday -0.310∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0187) (0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0116)
Friday -0.249∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0175) (0.0138) (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0150) (0.0118)
Saturday -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0452∗∗∗ -0.0517∗∗∗ -0.0390∗∗ -0.0390∗∗∗ -0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0445∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0108)
February 0.0425∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗ 0.0457∗∗ 0.00353 0.00156 0.0425∗∗ 0.0430∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0157) (0.0232) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0160) (0.0174) (0.0136)
March 0.0229 0.0228∗ 0.0320 0.0308 -0.0228 -0.0236 0.0229 0.0225
(0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0255) (0.0203) (0.0141) (0.0179) (0.0163) (0.0144)
April 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0475∗ 0.0476∗∗ 0.0158 0.0140 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0260) (0.0233) (0.0161) (0.0174) (0.0158) (0.0153)
May 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0842∗∗∗ 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗ 0.0358∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0140) (0.0229) (0.0184) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0159)
June 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0170) (0.0231) (0.0198) (0.0168) (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0145)
July 0.123∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0159) (0.0142)
August 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0271) (0.0222) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0171) (0.0155)
September 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0196 0.0191 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0244) (0.0205) (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0161)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Manchester Northumbria West-Midlands Liverpool - Manchester
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Domestic abuse
October 0.0249 0.0249 0.0536∗∗ 0.0505∗∗ 0.0227 0.0214 0.0249 0.0253
(0.0177) (0.0160) (0.0243) (0.0224) (0.0198) (0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0160)
November 0.0402∗∗ 0.0399∗∗ 0.0423 0.0430∗ 0.0157 0.0138 0.0402∗∗ 0.0403∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0267) (0.0244) (0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0201) (0.0177)
December 0.0495∗ 0.0498∗ 0.0771∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0199 0.0195 0.0495∗ 0.0496∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0348) (0.0274) (0.0255) (0.0191) (0.0262) (0.0251)
2015 -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0187∗ -0.0187∗ -0.000192 -0.000132 -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗
(0.00697) (0.00647) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.00782) (0.00840) (0.00818) (0.00808)
2016 -0.0621∗∗∗ -0.0621∗∗∗ 0.0192 0.0191∗ -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0621∗∗∗ -0.0621∗∗∗
(0.00894) (0.00747) (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.00805) (0.00890) (0.00938) (0.00868)
Bh-Oth 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0320) (0.0333) (0.0394) (0.0240) (0.0203) (0.0331) (0.0272)
Bh-Chris 0.654∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.134) (0.169) (0.154) (0.106) (0.0999) (0.148) (0.123)
matchpa 0.00700 0.0278∗ -0.00844 0.00700
(0.0117) (0.0157) (0.0127) (0.0120)
man-derby -0.000735
(0.0530)
nor-derby 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0637)
wmid-derby -0.0638
(0.0649)
liv-derby 0.0297
(0.0199)
Constant 5.342∗∗∗ 5.345∗∗∗ 4.524∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.342∗∗∗ 5.344∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0136) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0173) (0.0147)
/
lnalpha -5.598∗∗∗ -5.597∗∗∗ -5.197∗∗∗ -5.217∗∗∗ -5.607∗∗∗ -5.610∗∗∗ -5.598∗∗∗ -5.598∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.213) (0.246) (0.299) (0.168) (0.164) (0.197) (0.212)
Observations 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.61: Regression results with the last five matches of the season for both regions
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0366) (0.0311) (0.00672) (0.00712) (0.00816)
Tuesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0329) (0.0312) (0.00738) (0.00754) (0.00918)
Wednesday -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0317) (0.0288) (0.00771) (0.00775) (0.00899)
Thursday -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0280) (0.0269) (0.00840) (0.00883) (0.00998)
Friday -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0301) (0.0240) (0.00927) (0.00838) (0.00779)
Saturday -0.0763∗∗∗ -0.0760∗∗∗ -0.0762∗∗∗ -0.0534∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗
(0.00669) (0.00953) (0.00582) (0.00565) (0.00526) (0.00675)
February 0.0229∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0147∗ 0.0147 0.0147
(0.0102) (0.00811) (0.00753) (0.00771) (0.00927) (0.00991)
March 0.00904 0.00905 0.00905 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.00919) (0.00722) (0.00955) (0.00703) (0.00799) (0.00696)
April 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.00928) (0.00897) (0.0106) (0.00819) (0.00795)
May 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0116) (0.00842) (0.00876) (0.00811) (0.00777)
June 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0101) (0.00804) (0.00775) (0.00630)
July 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.00789) (0.00677) (0.00772)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.00939) (0.00874) (0.00883)
September 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0121) (0.00917) (0.00871)
October 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0102)
November 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0116)
December 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0103) (0.00842) (0.00946)
2015 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0152∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.00747) (0.00685) (0.00705)
2016 0.0925∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0323) (0.0351) (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0102)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with the last five matches of the season for both regions (Continued)
England & Wales London
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Bh-Oth 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0272∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0230) (0.0295) (0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0127)
Bh-Chris 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0326) (0.0307) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0175)
title -0.0368∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗ -0.0598∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0144) (0.0125) (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0217)
hometeam 0.0203 -0.0147
(0.0222) (0.0236)
awayteam 0.0296∗∗ -0.0106
(0.0141) (0.0362)
HW 0.0283 -0.0130
(0.0264) (0.0257)
HD 0.0293 -0.0156
(0.0237) (0.0452)
HL 0.0115 -0.0172
(0.0255) (0.0316)
AW 0.0478∗∗ -0.000445
(0.0229) (0.0326)
AD 0.0273 0.0171
(0.0272) (0.0605)
AL 0.0197 -0.0432
(0.0305) (0.0545)
H-expected 0.0237 -0.0107
(0.0179) (0.0273)
H-UW 0.00970 -0.0310
(0.0280) (0.0366)
H-UL 0.0658∗∗∗ -0.00827
(0.0205) (0.0500)
A-expected 0.0248 -0.0155
(0.0185) (0.0471)
A-UW 0.0398∗ 0.0149
(0.0205) (0.0299)
A-UL 0.0739∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0704)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.370) (0.350) (0.167) (0.154) (0.136)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.62: Regression results with the absolute difference in home win and away win proba-
bilities for both regions
England & Wales London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
Monday -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0328) (0.0340) (0.00690) (0.00841) (0.00778)
Tuesday -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0292) (0.0330) (0.00798) (0.00880) (0.00838)
Wednesday -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0286) (0.0301) (0.00750) (0.00900) (0.00941)
Thursday -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0247) (0.0274) (0.00793) (0.00925) (0.00988)
Friday -0.212∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0265) (0.0290) (0.00837) (0.00945) (0.00976)
Saturday -0.0759∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0758∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0532∗∗∗
(0.00891) (0.00825) (0.00981) (0.00460) (0.00659) (0.00638)
February 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147
(0.00773) (0.00861) (0.00820) (0.00957) (0.00929) (0.00900)
March 0.00905 0.00903 0.00905 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.00819) (0.00859) (0.00836) (0.00746) (0.00703) (0.00774)
April 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗
(0.00832) (0.00982) (0.00806) (0.0109) (0.00867) (0.00895)
May 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗
(0.00883) (0.00970) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.00894) (0.00886)
June 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.00925) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.00768) (0.00759) (0.00742)
July 0.158∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.00914) (0.0116) (0.0131) (0.00881) (0.00849) (0.00588)
August 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.00833) (0.00906) (0.0130) (0.00874) (0.00844) (0.00839)
September 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0113) (0.00902) (0.00967)
October 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.00880) (0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0117)
November 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.00932)
December 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0160) (0.00668) (0.00913) (0.00948)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with the absolute difference in home win and away win probabilities for both
regions (Continued)
England & Wales London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic abuse
2015 0.0421∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0420∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0152∗∗ 0.0152∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0224) (0.00741) (0.00644) (0.00747)
2016 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0345) (0.00968) (0.0105) (0.0113)
Bh-Oth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0272∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0240) (0.0270) (0.0115) (0.0128) (0.0130)
Bh-Chris 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0331) (0.0274) (0.0208) (0.0184) (0.0164)
Close -0.0427 -0.0463 -0.0569∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.0939∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0375) (0.0270) (0.0459) (0.0516) (0.0421)
hometeam 0.0239 0.0109
(0.0202) (0.0235)
awayteam 0.0342∗∗∗ 0.0105
(0.0127) (0.0316)
HW 0.0325 0.0129
(0.0201) (0.0366)
HD 0.0312∗ 0.000663
(0.0186) (0.0334)
HL 0.0163 0.00267
(0.0208) (0.0288)
AW 0.0530∗∗ 0.0171
(0.0206) (0.0260)
AD 0.0325∗∗ 0.0281
(0.0153) (0.0243)
AL 0.0266 -0.0195
(0.0269) (0.0439)
H-expected 0.0308 0.0193
(0.0195) (0.0177)
H-UW 0.0102 -0.0166
(0.0327) (0.0396)
H-UL 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0361
(0.0282) (0.0585)
A-expected 0.0337∗∗ 0.00904
(0.0168) (0.0383)
A-UW 0.0457∗ 0.0327
(0.0236) (0.0282)
A-UL 0.0968∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0550)
Constant 3.758∗∗∗ 3.758∗∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗ 5.416∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.368) (0.376) (0.133) (0.140) (0.145)
Observations 27347 27347 27347 31119 31119 31119
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.E Public Order Offence
200
Table 3.63: Regression results with EPL variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
Monday -0.0125 -0.0187 -0.0197 -0.0197 -0.0197 -0.0196
(0.0305) (0.0359) (0.0263) (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0311)
Tuesday -0.0254 -0.0353 -0.0360 -0.0361 -0.0361 -0.0359
(0.0251) (0.0314) (0.0233) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0301)
Wednesday 0.0111 0.00140 0.000561 0.000456 0.000396 0.000504
(0.0232) (0.0304) (0.0238) (0.0262) (0.0223) (0.0294)
Thursday 0.0195 0.00735 0.00624 0.00612 0.00611 0.00622
(0.0250) (0.0314) (0.0250) (0.0291) (0.0262) (0.0308)
Friday 0.0326 0.0203 0.0192 0.0190 0.0190 0.0191
(0.0217) (0.0242) (0.0250) (0.0265) (0.0237) (0.0274)
Saturday 0.000542 0.00159 0.00365 0.00361 0.00346 0.00372
(0.0185) (0.0144) (0.0178) (0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0175)
February 0.0769∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗∗
(0.00925) (0.0107) (0.00869) (0.0111) (0.00865) (0.00876)
March 0.138∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0154)
April 0.170∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0272) (0.0298) (0.0282) (0.0279)
May 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0333) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0266) (0.0268)
June 0.307∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0294) (0.0263) (0.0288) (0.0238) (0.0264)
July 0.357∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0333) (0.0346) (0.0292) (0.0276) (0.0296)
August 0.237∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0336) (0.0353) (0.0386) (0.0318) (0.0278)
September 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0370) (0.0329) (0.0397) (0.0301) (0.0270)
October 0.280∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0432) (0.0427) (0.0469) (0.0313) (0.0320)
November 0.285∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0477) (0.0484) (0.0485) (0.0390) (0.0351)
December 0.227∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0479) (0.0482) (0.0485) (0.0496) (0.0401) (0.0360)
2015 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0642) (0.0628) (0.0598) (0.0736) (0.0582) (0.0472)
2016 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.0974) (0.102) (0.102) (0.112) (0.0847) (0.0855)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with EPL variables (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
Bh-Oth -0.183∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0445) (0.0475) (0.0490) (0.0397) (0.0482)
Bh-Chris -0.136 -0.127 -0.123 -0.123 -0.124 -0.123
(0.0949) (0.100) (0.0963) (0.111) (0.0869) (0.112)
matchday 0.0199∗∗∗
(0.00511)
matchpa -0.0495
(0.155)
matchcount=1 -0.0303
(0.0367)
matchcount=2 -0.0815
(0.0504)
hometeam -0.0130
(0.0552)
awayteam -0.0621
(0.110)
HW -0.0101
(0.0656)
HD -0.0325
(0.0617)
HL -0.00629
(0.0692)
AW -0.0507
(0.0687)
AD -0.0932∗∗
(0.0408)
AL -0.0481
(0.0538)
H-expected -0.0227
(0.0445)
H-UW 0.0211
(0.0529)
H-UL -0.0120
(0.308)
A-Expected -0.0661∗∗
(0.0330)
A-UW -0.0736
(0.0472)
A-UL 0.0475
(0.0915)
Constant 2.253∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.284) (0.314) (0.331) (0.300) (0.375)
Observations 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.64: Regression results with variables International Tournaments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
Monday -0.0181 -0.0180 -0.0180 -0.0180 -0.0188 -0.0194
(0.0272) (0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0316) (0.0314) (0.0291)
Tuesday -0.0346 -0.0348 -0.0351 -0.0344 -0.0345 -0.0345
(0.0265) (0.0250) (0.0238) (0.0256) (0.0276) (0.0274)
Wednesday 0.00198 0.00200 0.00200 0.00211 0.00199 0.00200
(0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0247)
Thursday 0.00817 0.00793 0.00803 0.00830 0.00785 0.00801
(0.0285) (0.0242) (0.0218) (0.0263) (0.0279) (0.0267)
Friday 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211 0.0213 0.0211 0.0211
(0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0228) (0.0250) (0.0272) (0.0241)
Saturday 0.000211 -0.0000879 0.0000273 0.000267 -0.000131 0.000311
(0.0175) (0.0151) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0146) (0.0162)
February 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.00983) (0.00679)
March 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0208) (0.0153) (0.0153)
April 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0278) (0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0283)
May 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0282) (0.0268) (0.0329) (0.0313) (0.0296)
June 0.302∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0270) (0.0243) (0.0338) (0.0267) (0.0280)
July 0.352∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0304) (0.0285) (0.0353) (0.0285) (0.0322)
August 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0425) (0.0375) (0.0350)
September 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0393) (0.0371) (0.0340)
October 0.281∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.0413) (0.0384) (0.0343) (0.0426) (0.0415) (0.0407)
November 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0455) (0.0397) (0.0440) (0.0448) (0.0481)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with variables International Tournaments (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public order offence
December 0.230∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0477) (0.0371) (0.0474) (0.0429) (0.0470)
2015 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.0632) (0.0582) (0.0563) (0.0692) (0.0639) (0.0678)
2016 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.107) (0.0851) (0.0977) (0.0917) (0.0979)
Bh-Oth -0.181∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0353) (0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0481) (0.0362)
Bh-Chris -0.130∗ -0.130 -0.130 -0.130 -0.130∗ -0.130
(0.0770) (0.0943) (0.104) (0.0851) (0.0762) (0.102)
fifa-matchday -0.00140
(0.0188)
fifa-england 0.0406
(0.0312)
England Draw (fifa) 0.0722
(0.0956)
England Lose (fifa) 0.0250
(0.0360)
euro-matchday 0.00525
(0.0288)
euro-england 0.0306
(0.0379)
England Lose (uefa) 0.125∗∗
(0.0577)
England Draw (uefa) -0.0101
(0.0509)
England Win (uefa) 0.0165
(0.0666)
Constant 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.313) (0.254) (0.273) (0.278) (0.309)
Observations 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.65: Regression results with Domestic (EPL) and international tournaments variables
(1) (2) (3)
Public order offence
Monday -0.0123 -0.0203 -0.0211
(0.0258) (0.0277) (0.0293)
Tuesday -0.0252 -0.0364 -0.0366
(0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0257)
Wednesday 0.0113 0.000471 0.000403
(0.0245) (0.0213) (0.0244)
Thursday 0.0197 0.00552 0.00575
(0.0248) (0.0237) (0.0267)
Friday 0.0328 0.0190 0.0190
(0.0237) (0.0185) (0.0224)
Saturday 0.000616 0.00295 0.00340
(0.0175) (0.0133) (0.0167)
February 0.0769∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗
(0.00927) (0.00918) (0.0119)
March 0.138∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0210) (0.0186)
April 0.170∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0337) (0.0273)
May 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0366) (0.0283)
June 0.305∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0355) (0.0273)
July 0.356∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0348) (0.0307)
August 0.237∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0419) (0.0327)
September 0.298∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0395) (0.0311)
October 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0438) (0.0406)
November 0.285∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0480) (0.0480)
December 0.227∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0529) (0.0453)
2015 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0666) (0.0592)
2016 0.439∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.115) (0.102)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression results with Domestic (EPL) and international tournaments variables (Continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Public order offence
Bh-Oth -0.183∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0388) (0.0392) (0.0434)
Bh-Chris -0.136∗ -0.124 -0.124
(0.0731) (0.0805) (0.0933)
fifa-matchday -0.0000133
(0.0133)
euro-matchday 0.00665
(0.0277)
matchday 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.00659)
fifa-england 0.0412
(0.0449)
euro-england 0.0313
(0.0389)
hometeam -0.0130
(0.0317)
awayteam -0.0620∗
(0.0362)
England Draw (fifa) 0.0741
(0.0901)
England Lose (fifa) 0.0247
(0.0365)
England Lose (uefa) 0.126∗∗
(0.0592)
England Draw (uefa) -0.0108
(0.0544)
England Win (uefa) 0.0187
(0.0553)
HW -0.0103
(0.0555)
HD -0.0326
(0.148)
HL -0.00646
(0.0755)
AW -0.0508
(0.139)
AD -0.0933
(0.148)
AL -0.0482
(0.107)
Constant 2.253∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗ 2.268∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.296) (0.283)
Observations 22935 22935 22935
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In this thesis we approached competition from two broad perspectives. First, we considered
competition as a motivator of performance as in chapter one and chapter two of this thesis.
Then, we considered competition as a source of emotional stimulus as in chapter three.
In chapter one, we studied the role of leadership in teams facing a game with a complex
strategy space. Teams of three members faced an instance of a team dispatching problem, in
which the members jointly devised then separately implemented a plan to visit a set of locations
on a map. Some teams had one member designated as a “leader”, although this role did not
confer any distinct responsibility or capability in the game. We compared the performance of
teams with elected leaders, appointed leaders, and no leaders. We found that teams with leaders
performed better than those without, while teams with elected leaders and teams with appointed
leaders performed similarly. Our results indicate that electing a leader serves as a device to
coordinate team activity, and is valuable primarily when a team needs to be able to deliver well
immediately.
In chapter two, we studied experimentally the effects of individual skill in a real-performance
task and the responsiveness of individual skill to various incentive schemes. Participants faced
instances of the Truck Dispatch Problem, in which they devised three journeys which visit a set
of locations on a map. Some participants were remunerated under a rank order tournament in-
centive scheme, some participants were informed of their performance ranking and were given
a fixed rate whilst some participants were remunerated under a fixed rate incentive scheme.
We found evidence for individual skill differences in the task, but that the distribution of these
differences does not depend on the incentive treatment
In chapter three, we studied empirically the effects of domestic and international football
tournaments on domestic abuse in England and Wales and how these effects vary with people’s
expectations of the football match outcomes. We found in our analysis, that the existence of an
EPL fixture is associated with a 1% percent increase in domestic abuse while the existence of a
FIFA World Cup fixture is associated with a 3% increase in domestic violence in England and
Wales. Our results, also suggest that expected match outcomes have strong effects on domestic
abuse in England and Wales.
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